

The transcendental method is the inquiry not into objects but into the nature of their objectivity (i.e. their Being) and hence into the subjectivity of Reason, for which it is objectivity and in which it is rooted.



- J.L. Mehta
(in Heidegger and the Metaphysical Tradition)

The religious mind has no belief, no dogma; it moves from fact to fact. Therefore the religious mind is a scientific mind but the scientific mind is not the religious mind.



- Prof. P. Krishna
(in Religious and Scientific Quest)

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Chief Editor
Rama Pandey



Editor
Archana Tiwari
Rajesh Kumar Chaurasia



DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
Vasanta College for Women
Rajghat, Varanasi-221001



विज्ञानात्तारम् अरे! केन विज्ञानीयात्

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(A Peer Reviewed Journal)

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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
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Department of Philosophy, Vasanta College for Woment, Rajghat Varanasi.

Contact

Office: 0542-2441187, Rama Pandey : +91-9919209159, Archana Tiwari : +91-
9918700677, Rajesh Kumar Chaurasia : +91-9450341080

Email: journalofdarshan@gmail.com, Website: www.vasantakfi.com

Editorial

The *Journal of Darśana*, first published in 2015, has a great objective. The objective is to promote philosophy as critical awareness. Today we are living in the era of science and technology which is making our life easier and pleasurable day by day. But at the same time science is an enquiry of external world. It has nothing to do with the inner life of human beings which expresses a true sense of our values and relationships. Philosophy is not limited in any specific subject matter of human life. It is a pure Darśana, a pure awareness which tries to see and examine the human reality as whole. Human knowledge and wisdom starts with awareness. Since philosophy is a pure critical awareness so it has been reflected in every aspect of life. But today time has changed and many branches of knowledge studying human life have emerged up. Therefore the question is ‘what is the specialty of philosophy?’ Do we need philosophy in contemporary times or not? Many so-called thinkers think that there is no need of philosophy. It is an old subject which is out of date. Neither it has any contribution to human knowledge nor does it have any role in achieving a good livelihood. No doubt science is doing a very good job in order to understand and transform our external world. But at the same time science has nothing to do with self-knowledge. So I believe that today philosophy should concentrate itself to the area of self-knowledge which is untouched by science. As Science transforms our external life, philosophy should transform our inner life.

Two quests are fundamental to understand human life: the one is scientific quest and the other is religious quest. We are publishing **A Dialogue** with Prof. P. Krishna on **Scientific and Religious Quest** in this volume of JOD which deals with the above raised question. The true philosophy is not the no man’s land between science and religion but it is a critical awareness of our life, of our being. And in this way in India true religious quest and a true philosophical quest are one. Both quests are aiming the question of being, the question of self-knowledge. Since today best minds of humanity involve in scientific quest, it is really important

to know that 'what is true science' and 'what is true philosophy' and the most important question is 'what is the relationship between the two quests.' The Dialogue is tried to discuss these questions.

We are publishing **Bhāvanākṛm III (Text)** an important Bhuddhist text of Kamalśīla, Romanized Text by Giuseppe Tucci and its English translation by Robert F. Olson and Masao Ichisima. It is an important Bhuddhist text which deals with the question of levels in *Samādhi*.

We are also publishing a **Triologue between Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Nāgārjuna** by Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Since it is an imaginative meeting of these three philosophers therefore it is a fiction but it deals with some important aspects of philosophy. We welcome it in JOD.

The *Journal of Darśana* is a bi-lingual (Hindi and English) and bi-annual Journal. We will publish every year one volume in English and one volume in Hindi. We are starting a new journal in the area of philosophical research with great objectives. We are feeling a responsibility that will require much hard work, clear vision about journal and of course active co-operation from the philosophical community of our country. We will take a wider aspect of philosophy in our journal. We invite the research papers from philosophical community, the papers with innovative ideas and new interpretations of texts which will help us to understand modern complexes of time. Time is good teacher therefore we believe that we will not stop learning and what time will teach we will listen to it and we will try to give a significant place to this journal in the world of philosophical thinking.

Dr. Rama Pandey
Dr. Archana Tiwari
Dr. Rajesh Kumar Chaurasia

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Triologue between Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Nāgārjuna

Daniel Fidel Ferrer

Author: Daniel Fidel Ferrer studied philosophy at Western Michigan University, and he did graduate work in philosophy at Duquesne University, and Banaras Hindu University (1977-1978, and 2014). He visited Banaras Hindu University Philosophy department during his honors studied abroad in fall of 1973. Spent the summer with the Tibetans in Dharamshala (1978) and published a small translation of Bhāvaviveka.

Martin Heidegger was a steadfast and deep thinker. His collected writings exceed 100 volumes. Heidegger advised Dr. J.L. Mehta (1912-1988) while he was in Germany to study the Greek language. Heidegger has profoundly changed the study of Greek philosophy; and most of his lectures to students at Freiburg University (*im Breisgau*) were on Greek philosophers, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, and the poet Hölderlin. The list of thinker that have been influence by Nietzsche would fill up pages, including Jean-Paul Sartre, Carl Jung and Freud. Nietzsche philosophy is ninety percentages critical and he is excellent counter-punch to all ideas (his own included). He wrote music, played piano, poetry, wrote a novel (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*) and was against all forms of Christianity. Nietzsche like Heidegger learned much from the study of Greek philosophy and culture. Nāgārjuna was born a Hindu; however he became a Buddhist and his writings and worldview are non-essentialist, anti-metaphysical, anti-soul, and the de-construction of all philosophical systems this point of view sees the world in terms of fixed substances and

essences – indeed, this fits right in with Nietzsche and the great philosophical issues and debates at the end of the 20th century. Nāgārjuna is also against the logical concept of “proof”.

INTRODUCTION:

Not too far from here the famous physicist Albert Einstein (1879-1955) conducted thought experiments which undeniably lead to his theory of relativity. Example of this theory was that time was no longer absolute or uniform. The following philosophical dialogue between three philosophers is a thought experiment like Einstein's. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is the most written about 20th century philosopher. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is a critical thinker of the highest order who proclaimed the death of God and is considered the last western metaphysician. He found Platonism everywhere. The Acharya Nāgārjuna (2-3d century AD) is perhaps the greatest single Indian philosopher; he is considered the greatest Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself. Nāgārjuna although less famous than the other two philosopher, his audacious and unique eastern way of thinking may provide some fundamental solutions to Heidegger's and Nietzsche's stickler dilemmas; and their morass and entanglement in their western philosophical predicaments and knots. Should we say, Nāgārjuna will act as cutting the Gordian Knot? Philosophical conundrums and quandaries are based on the wrong assumptions and presuppositions. Heidegger in the 1925 lectures intricate and stimulate analysis of different types of ambiguity. Many of these philosophical dilemmas live in the in-between of the labyrinth of ambiguity. Perhaps the three thinkers can overcome a little of their singularity and speak to thinking; and hence lead the fly out of Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) bottle. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) said that all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare. We will see if these three men can come to a meeting

of the minds here on a cold day in southern Germany. They are nearby the village of Todtnauberg which is deep in the Homey Black Forest (German: *Schwarzwald*).

Nietzsche is well known to Heidegger. Heidegger complained to his friends that Nietzsche kaput him, he actually said, “*Er hat mich kaputt gemacht!*” in English, “Nietzsche kaput me!” (broke me)”. In his letter to Medard Boss dated August 16, 1960, Heidegger says “I am still stuck in the “abyss” of Nietzsche.” He must have been working on his two volume set on Nietzsche which was finally published in 1961; at this point I hesitate to call them books. These two volumes are the re-writing by Heidegger of his lectures on Nietzsche dating from the 1930s at the University of Freiberg. Accord to his friend and student Hans-Georg Gadamer; Elfrida Heidegger was very concerned about Martin having another mental break-down; so she asked Otto Pöggeler who was helping Heidegger editing the volumes, to stop working on his two-volume study of Nietzsche. These autobiographical statements by Heidegger show his ongoing engagement (*Auseinandersetzung*) and struggle and fight with Nietzsche’s critical stance. Heidegger in 1937 said, “to dare to come to grips with *Nietzsche* as the one who is nearest but to recognize that he is farthest removed from the question of Being.” So, except for the ontological themes Nietzsche is indeed close to Heidegger. Both are strongly anti-system thinkers – with Nietzsche taking the lead with a swarm of ideas and aphorisms; whereas Heidegger is just trying to open up the question of Being. Looking for the voice (*Stimme des Seins*) of Being and the shepherd of Being (*Hirt des Seins*) -- perhaps in all the wrong places. Is it just so, Socrates? This question and its question mark are often used by Plato in his dialogues to place the final question mark of thinking. This is the question mark which we would now call the reality check or the gut check. In a course

(1934-35) on the great Hölderlin (1770-1843), Martin said, “Wer vieles beginnt, kommt oft nie zum Anfang” (Whoever often starts never gets to the beginning). This is a hard choice to make at the beginning.

Dramatis personas: Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). **Elfride** (*Née Petri*) **Heidegger**’ wife. **Friedrich Nietzsche** (1844-1900). **Archaya Nāgārjuna** (2-3th century AD), The **Buddha** (563-483 BC). **Socrates**(469 BC to 399 BC). **Plato** (424BC - 348 BC). **Narrator**, author himself.

I

In 1922, Martin Heidegger's wife Elfride Heidegger (*née Petri*) gave Martin Heidegger a present of a small cottage overlooking the minor mountain village of Todtnauberg in the Black Forrest (Schwarzwald). This is 16 miles from Freiburg, where Heidegger was living and teaching. Elfride used an advance of her father’s inheritance money to buy a plot of land and paid a local carpenter to build the cottage. Because the depression money was rapidly becoming worthless and she thought it wiser to invest her share in real-estate. The land is small it is only 2-3 acres and for the farmer it was 'wet' and 'rocky', thus the farmer was interested in selling it. Win and win situation. Elfride designed the cottage herself. In August 1922 the family moved in the cottage. They had rented their own small apartment in Freiburg to Americans for the summer break. Heidegger worked on most of his writings at this mountain cottage. A large part of his most famous work, *Being and Time* (1927), was finished at a nearby farm house owned by Johann Brender where Martin had rented a room in a part of Todtnauberg called the Rütte. The two children, his sons were too noisy. By some calculations he spent about 10 years out of 50+ years at his cottage working on his philosophical writings. The German word "Hütte" means "hut", but in the

general context I think it makes sense to call a "cottage" or a "cabin" in the woods. On the uphill side are the trees and woods, and then on the other downside you can see the distance valleys and ski slopes. It is a nice lovely place for a little philosophical reflection and thinking. There is a very small creek that runs alongside the cottage and the water continuously runs into a hollowed out log that is used as a cooler for food. There is no running water inside. There are three small rooms inside. Supposedly, much of the actual building was done by Pius Schweizer. Two portraits hang on the walls the famous Alemannic poet Johann Peter Hebel (1760-1826) and great philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854). Karl Jasper (1883-1969) had given Martin a copy of Schelling book on freedom that he took to hut. Heidegger said about the following about Schelling, that he was the "truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy". G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) remarked about this work, "Schelling had made known a single treatise on Freedom. It is of a deep speculative nature, but it stands alone. In philosophy a single piece cannot be developed". Heidegger was awarded the Johann Peter Hebel prize May 10, 1960 in Baden-Württemberg. Martin was often alone in the cottage for his thinking and writing.

Elfride did some skiing in the area during the winter of 1914 when she was a young student at Kiel. She stayed at a similar cottage skiing with her student friends. After her marriage in 1917 to Martin Heidegger she decided to have the cottage built as a place where her husband could work in all quietness and find his own way and path. Heidegger's own motto to his collected writings: "*Wege – nicht Werke*" or in English: "Pathways – not Works". Martin added this motto shortly before his death in 1976.

There is no driveway to die Hütte. Heidegger would often walk all the way there or sometime taking a bicycle, there was also a train up to the nearby village of Todtnauberg. When Heidegger rejected his appointment to the University of Berlin for the second time in 1933, the University of Freiburg offered to pay for putting in electricity to the cottage, which was buried in the ground and came up from below. But there are no outside lights, no electric poles, or telephone lines, no cell phones, no smart phones, and no computers. Most likely, in fact, no typewriters, they were not used by Martin Heidegger.

There are few modern conveniences, there is no refrigerator instead a very small cold creek that runs next to the Hütte and is used to cool milk, butter, and cheese. Nevertheless, great philosophers, thinkers, scientists, and poets like Edmund Husserl, Hans-Georg Gadamer, René Char, Jean Beaufret, Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Herbert Marcuse, Karl Löwith, Gerhard Ritter, Heinrich Petzet, Rudolf Bultmann, Werner Heisenberg, Rudolph Augstein, and Paul Celan; have joined Heidegger at this remote and secluded location to engage in moments of reflections. See for example, the most famous poem by Paul Celan (Jewish poet from the Bukowina, survivor of a Nazi work camp) with the simple title of Todtnauberg, which he wrote after his visit to the Hütte and Heidegger in July 25, 1966. Many of Heidegger's writing can be called in German: *Hüttenbüchlein* after they were written at the Hütte (the Hut).

Nietzsche arrives. The first snow fall had happen last night and the winter sun was shining when a figure appears at the door – Nietzsche arrives with his thick glasses and bushy mustache, and knocks on the doors and asks if Professor Heidegger is at home in a very formal manner. He says the old philologist is here.

Nietzsche strides into view as he enters the Hütte. Heidegger offers Nietzsche some hot chocolate free of oil.

Nāgārjuna approaches. In the distance a Buddhist monk wrapped in a monk's yellow/red robe (colors see: *Śāriputrapariṣchā*) appears in the snow walking slowly and obviously cold and forlorn. Nāgārjuna looks right and left appears to be wandering through the little woods leading up to the Hütte. Nāgārjuna walks up to the door and knocks, asking for Herr Heidegger in broken German.

Inside the Hütte, wooden fire in the stove provides some heat, warmth, and nourishing hot drinks in winter. There is a front room by the door, the Vorraum – where the boots and heavy winter coats are removed.

Nāgārjuna, the south Indian pulls off his warm fur Tibetan hat (a *Xamo Gyaise*) and his completely shaven head appears and looks out of place on this cold winter day in southern Germany as he lays down his alms bowl (*pātra*). He has come thousands of miles to engage in a dialogue with these two philosophers over nature of their thinking and especially their own impenetrable enigmas. Later he would give a seminar at the University of Freiburg on the nature of the Buddhist's nothingness or voidingness (*Śūnyatā*); but in the meantime, he came across a great distance to help these humans in need of relief from their suffering. Suffering is the basic stance, position, and fundamental factual condition of all humans for Buddhist. Heidegger is in his proverbial *Heimat*, his home against the homeless (*Heimatlosigkeit*) nature of modern life. Nietzsche is still a wander and meandering in his life, but he is looking for a home; whereas, Nāgārjuna is a Buddhist monk, who by definition, is a homeless monk. He knows that no home is either needed or possible for us humans. Nāgārjuna comes from a long ways from *Nalanda* in

northern India but this is neither his home nor his homeland. Nāgārjuna had taught at the Buddhist University the ancient and famous Nalanda University in Bihar, India; when he taught there centuries ago there were some 10,000 students and 2,000 monks at the height of Buddhism in India. The background of 1000s of years of traditions and competing schools with different philosophical thoughts is part of the process. In Jainism the word and meaning of Anekāntavāda or multiplicity of viewpoints anekānta ("manifoldness") and vāda ("school of thought") dates back before even the Buddha.

Martin bends his head and says "*parnam - namaskar*" to the great teacher, the Archaya Nāgārjuna Indian Buddhist monk. You are welcome here. I met once with a Thai monk Bikkhu Maha Mani and we had a wonderfully conversation about nothingness. That dialogue was in German, I understand you only speak English, Hindi, Sanskrit, and Telugu. I think English is the closest to German on that list. Heidegger turns to Nietzsche and says what about we carrying on our dialogue in English is that ok with you the old philologist?

Nāgārjuna bows his head deeply and says "*pranām - namaskār*" to you all.

Nietzsche turns and states briefly, I have not spent one good hour speaking German or with Germans, for myself I would have preferred French, but *sauve qui peut*(every man for himself). As for Germans, Herr Goethe is the last German that I have any respect for and he died a long time ago. I wished I had written more in French.

Nietzsche remembers a poem he wrote in 1884, his poeticized homelessness in one draft calls the title of the poem of 'Homesickness'; and the ending words are:

Woe to the one who had no home! (*Weh dem, der keine Heimat hat!*). What we have here is godlessness, wordlessness, and homelessness.

In another note, I said: We homeless ones from the beginning – we have no choice, we have to be conquerors and discoverers: so that we perhaps may bequeath to our descendants what we ourselves lack – that we *bequeath a home* to them. (1885-1886).

Martin says that I welcome you here graciously in my warm home in the protection against the cold and snow.

Heidegger reminds us that the first western Sanskrit grammar was done by the German missionary Heinrich Roth, a native of Augsburg, who died in India in the city of Agra in 1668. Sanskrit is close to Greek and that makes an ideal language for philosophy, but I wish I knew more about Sanskrit and I hope to find out about the ontological difference in Sanskrit from Nāgārjuna. It is too bad we cannot speak in the classical Sanskrit of Pāṇini – it may help get to the ground and origins (*Ursprung*) of real onto-theo-logical thinking pre-metaphysics and pre-Christian – like the ancient Greeks before Socrates and Plato. I would like to return to the first thinking before all the assumptions have crept into our mind, which we call today the ‘common sense’ disease of metaphysical thinking or in most popular cases now it is just called “philosophy”. We have to move back before the common sense and abstract thinking of today to a time when thinking was “raw”.

Nāgārjuna said it is lucky that in conversations with the Japanese, about nature of language, they did not include the learning to play the *shakuhachi* or the Zen flute in it. They believe that it would have taken you years to begin to play at all. But this may have led to a great awareness for you: the first step in Zen is

that there is no Zen – the world is a Zenless place. To speak in sports metaphors think of a mindful aikido throw and *ukemi*. I too have spent time with the Japanese Buddhist. Nāgārjuna stands up and put out one hand: listen and you will hear that one hand clapping loudly – if you are ready. I wanted Aishwarya Rai to come and model for us as a one hand clapper; but apparently she is not coming. Martin you had away with women once upon time – no?

Nietzsche likes the mood of music. You know I played and wrote music for piano; but not for the Zen flute – I was certainly not ready at that time. The young Russian Ms. Lou von Salomé enjoyed my music too. Perhaps I have come a little further or at least a little closer. Like you were fond of talking about your great work *Being and Time* (1927) – which you have not gotten any further, something we might call empty progress. Oswald Spengler talks of Germany being a frontier against "Asia." Martin, do not you want to find out more about the Eastern philosophical world? Some illustrations of your western tradition connection and philosophers with Eastern thinking: Christian Wolff, for example: in 1721 Wolff delivered in Latin the '*oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica*' at the University of Halle; Leibniz, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and of course I have praised Buddhism above Christianity since Buddhism is beyond our simple Christian concepts of good and evil.

The old philologist looks around for his hot chocolate and says that because of our faith in the Indo-European languages grammar we still have this dreaded theology in our blood. Nietzsche turns to Heidegger and asks him, Martin where did you end up with this last God or last gods business after the 1930s? Nietzsche, his eyes gaze upwards and starts looking up at the portrait of Schelling hanging on the wall.

II

Heidegger: I will keep my silence on that question that is why I never wanted those thoughts published during my life time. When I said, “Only a God can save us,” I knew that there would be a lot of room for misunderstanding. Perhaps I was not a philosopher when I said those remarks. Although in 1964, I wrote, “One should avoid the impression that dogmatic theses are being stated in terms of a Heideggerian philosophy, when there is no such thing.” There is no soul in *Being and Time* and yet, I am still a religious person and I used an expression from Schelling, “the last God” to open a space that would allow for a dialogue about God [in his mind: How can I tell them how mixed I was throughout my life about religion? I wanted to be more than a philosopher doing western philosophy].

Narrator: Schelling wrote the remarkable words, “*das Werden eines umgekehrten Gottes*”. In English perhaps the sense of the words would be: become the reversible or inverted God. What *aporia* or perplexity from our great Schelling? Schelling’s genius was greater than his ability to actually write. He was always re-thinking everything.

Martin says, when I was working on Schelling, I once wrote, “God lets the oppositional will of the ground operate in order in which love might unify and subordinate itself to, for the glorification of the absolute. The will of love is about the will of the ground and this predominance, this eternal decidedness; therefore, the love for itself as the essence of ‘Being’ (*Wesen des Seyns*).” In general; this decidedness is the innermost core of absolute freedom.

Nietzsche gasps and mutters, just what I thought that the shadow of God is still playing on Plato’s cave no matter what has actually

been said. You thought that I (Nietzsche) am stuck with Plato. Here you are with the metaphysical realm or the super sensuous world of Plato's returning again. I found this theological instinct everywhere – no wonder I find it here again in Germany. German philosophy is corrupted by metaphysical theology but it is still lives in the soul of this one here, in Heidegger. Southern German's the *Swabians* and their innocent lying and need I mention the historical school, the *Tübinger Stift* and their insidious theology everywhere, plus the whole ponderousness of the German scholar on Greek Gods.

Nietzsche: "In relation to Plato, I am a thorough skeptic, and am never in the condition to add my voice to the chorus of praise, which is common among the learned people, for the *artist* Plato ... Plato throws ... all forms of style together, he is thus a *first* decadent of style ... Plato is boring ... my refreshment, my preference, my cure from all Platonism was always *Thucydides*." (*Twilight of the Idols, or, How to philosophize with a Hammer Götzen-Dämmerung, oder, Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt* written in 1880.) 'What I Owe to the Ancients'. Thucydides (460 BC – 395 BC): Athenian general and historian, author of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*. In other words, for Nietzsche the cure for Plato is the play by play account of a war which included "lawlessness and atrocities committed by Greek citizens on each other in the name of one side or another -- in the name of a justice war."

Heidegger: I wanted to cure Nietzsche of his deep-seated Platonism. I am ok with war. Carl Schmitt wrote to me in a letter the rather interesting translation: Heraclitus's *Fragmentum 53*: "War is the father of all things, the king of all things. Some he proves to be gods, others men; some he makes slaves, others free." August 22, 1933.

Nietzsche: Now, I really need some more hot strong tea, please if you have some.

Nāgārjuna: No soul or an eternal soul, the Buddha was silent on this question for good reasons. It is completely beside the point of suffering (Sanskrit दुःख *duḥkha* and in German the word is *Leiden*) and cessation of suffering for these humans on this planet. The Sanskrit word *duḥkha* should be linked to: impermanence (*aniccā*) and and not-self (*anattā*). Martin wanted Being's truth to have an ultimate value. I am not sure I understand the whole 'value' questions, since that has come up in Kant during the late 1700s, which was 1500 years after I had died. What does this mean the revaluation of all values? I do not give a value to suffering or its overcoming or cessation, or the blowing out of suffering by one person like the Buddha who means "awakened" or **bodhi** (Sanskrit: बोधि). It was like he got hit by lightning and was enlightened. But no self or no soul (*anatman*); hence, who was it that got enlightenment, since there is no one (no self) at home? In Sanskrit the Buddhist's word is *Śūnyatā* for emptiness or nothingness. Whereas in the Chinese *Daoist* words can be *xu* or *kong* or *taixu*. For *Daoist Xu* are connected to the words non action (*wuwei*) and non thinking (*wusi*). Remember the Buddha spoke in *Pāli* and so much has been translated back and forth into Sanskrit, Hindi, Chinese, Japanese, and of course Tibetan; so we get the Buddha's words in English or German that has come down over centuries of the art of hermeneutics and translation. But for most of 'us' the Buddha's message is clear for suffering humans.

Nāgārjuna (to Martin): Martin! You are with Parmenides and impossibility of thinking of non-Being. Supposedly, he wrote: "neither you could know what is not nor could you declare it". Indeed, the rest of the western philosophical history is: Plato's dialogue, the *Sophist* and stranger's position about non-Being and

the simple discussion of the semantics of non-Being; or Hegel's view of non-Being in the *Science of Logic* which is only thought in the general context of progress of the methodology of the "circles of circles". No wonder your remarks that "nothing nothings" (*Das Nichts nichtet*) is often thought of as your confusions. You started off with a chair with only one leg and that was unbalanced – this is the western approach which you had to deal with metaphysically. You got stuck too.

Nāgārjuna says on the way to here to the Black forest, I had an elegant dream of the Buddha coming to talk with me. I was actually asleep and dreaming -- but I dreamt, "I had awakened in the morning as was my normal custom to come down to the river *Ajitavati* and drink the cool water. As I turned to walk back up the hill I turned to see the Buddha walking down to the river, I assume to have a drink of cool water too. I turned to the Buddha and asked him if I could ask my deepest question. The Buddha laughed at me; he said there are no deep and hidden questions for me as I am a simple man with a simple message: the four essential truths and you should follow the eight steps. Ok, go ahead and ask your question – now be mindful of what you wish for it might be your future to live with the answer. Nāgārjuna asks, what is the nature of the two truths? Sanskrit words: *samvrtisatya* and *paramarthatatya*? My statement of the 'four essential truths' and you should follow the correct 'eight steps' (*āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*). This statement is a different kind of truth of how to make ghee from butter or how to *make masala chai* – yes? The Buddha and Nāgārjuna started laughing – since everyone can hear this practical and concrete message, there is nothing esoteric here. The Tibetans have come up with eighteen kinds of emptiness and the *Maitreya's Abhisamayalankara* (Ornament of Clear Realization) says there are sixteen kinds of emptiness – which one is right? The Buddha

laughed like no laughter I heard before. The scholarly mind always misses the point. Hence, that is why I was silent on these metaphysical questions – ask my elder friend Subhūti about silence. I saw the Buddha on Mount Holy Vulture with a bouquet of fig flowers in his hand; and only his friend Mahākāśyapa had a subtle smile and understands this simplest and unpretentious message. No words were spoken by the Buddha – obviously, for all good reasons. The cup needs to be empty and not full of “views” (no *darśana*.)” My dream was part of my own personal awakening, the sound of the river of life.

Nietzsche to Martin: You attacked my thoughts about value and value metaphysical systems and Nihilism too as some kind of subjectivity. We are humans and we use the rank of values to ascribe a value and a judgment to everything we encounter. Metaphysics in the past gave the foundation and ultimate support to our rank of values (God as the highest), I wanted to re-do that ranking and to put the meaning of the earth as the highest value and mankind is above all. Plus, the old sayings and words of the Christian God about blessed world, I wanted it to be gone! In fact, I need to wash my hands after coming into contact with these so called religious people. Image: wiping his hands dramatically in mid-air to make this his crucial point. Oh, sorry; sometimes I get carried away, please forgive me, you see that is why it was always best for me to write in private or on long walks in the country side. I did not mean to upset you; I appreciate your hospitality and did not mean to overstep the bounds of our dialogue and our attempts at thinking together. Nietzsche stands up and walks around the room a little and takes a few marching steps – I need to walk around and let my muscles celebrate.

Heidegger: Martin laughs, very charming; your little personal problems are no interest to us. You wrote a note about misplacing

your umbrella in one of your notebooks, and there has been no end of discussion about that written remark (Derrida's *Spurs*). What do you think about your umbrella remark now? It is funny no doubt, how little we really know about you as a teacher. You often lied in your letters about how sick you were, so the university would pay your stipend; and the whole story of rants against reading books when your personal letters suggested you were indeed reading a lot of books. So, Nietzsche we know that sometimes you are a little larger than life. In fact, I tried to put you center stage with the philosophical crowd of Germany and I even got Jasper to think about you and write a book. We have to "acquire" you by first waking up great and creative adversaries. Your life is just a group of parables like mine. Philosophers no longer philosophize from issues or from out their life's facticity; but only from the dusty books of their colleagues.

You know me too well, sir. At least, I did not suffer the same fate as that little ugly Socrates.

The old Philology Professor asks the question to Martin; can we know the will or just see the will in action?

Martin. The "will" is an ontological and ontic metaphysical confusion that I have been struck by and finally got the vaccine that saved my anti-metaphysical soul. Nietzsche you should have used your philological sharpness to see historical problems with Kant's and Schopenhauer's confusions about the concept of the 'will' including the will to life, will to power, and I call just the will to will. On one hand, Nietzsche you were the beginning of a new way of anti-metaphysical thinking; and yet, on the other hand – you were seriously stuck in the myriad of Platonism and reaction against it; plus, you did not twist your way free of planetary Nihilism (thanks to Ernst Jünger's for his insight).

Nietzsche: Are you suggesting that the concept of “will” is no longer available for us philosophers or should I put on my classical philological hat now?

Nāgārjuna: This will is just action of the intellect – so, a part of the confusing with the activity of the western philosophical core concept of spirit – right? You think there is a spirit in the person and nature that drives the rational spirit. Hegel has this idea in spades – no? More non-sense stuff with no practical importance to gain enlightenment – and certainly just an albino and empty metaphysical concept made up by someone. Spirit and souls – no wonder you western philosophers are the hand maidens of Christian theology and eschatology. Unless you do yoga (*yogash-citta-vrtti-nirodhah*) your mind is active and it is best to rid yourself of the suffering that comes out of your mind’s activity that leads to suffering. Patanjali’s *Yoga Sutra’s* (200 AD) second sutra is this definition of what is the essential nature of yoga. Namely, in Sanskrit the words are: *yogash-citta-vrtti-nirodhah* or yoga is the cessation of the fluctuation of the mind-stuff. Clear your mind of all of that ‘stuff’ that is overburden you with the heaviness – be rather light on your feet and in your mind. Martin and Friedrich, now do you see why the Buddha was silent on these kinds metaphysical questions? The question: is there eternal soul – deserves no answer; hence, the Buddha’s silence. Do not make up a conundrum here, since there is none. Just because there are rabbits, it does not mean you have to go down the rabbit hole (like Alice did).

Martin: Is for you not to say – yes?

Nāgārjuna (your doctor speaks): Right, your study of the history of philosophy or the meta-historical analysis shows the endless views and worldviews that have made up your western occidental philosophy. I call that a terrible sickness and disease of holding on

to views. Philosophy is not about constructing worldviews (examples of: Kantian, realism, leftist, liberal, ethical, or right-wing). Why one view or another view? In the west you have caught this dreaded disease and you seem to have little idea of treatments and a cure for your headaches. Traditionally the six schools (*āstika*) of Hindu philosophy are called: *darśana* which means ‘views’. The old Sanskrit term for a "philosopher" is the word: *dārśanika*. Catch the drift of these Sanskrit words? Philosophy in general as just a ‘worldview’ is indeed a very old notion or idea. Both in the eastern and western philosophy this needs to be totally rejected now, no more fear of flying – just flying now!

Friedrich: Yes. I tried to write about physics as just an interpretation and the fundamental issue of perspectivism. Most if not all philosophers suffer from paradigm paralysis and group-think. The whole idea of –isms (even perspectivism) or –ismology does not get to the matter for thinking, since it is just another worldview of how to deal with a whole set of philosophical questions and of course mostly it just “provides” so called ‘answers’ to these questions. But my friends: Lu Xun in China 1907, Karl Popper, Freud, Jung, Jasper, Adorno, Spengler, Mann, Hesse, Jünger, Sartre, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Dali, Picasso, and even this funny little guy Feyerabend; yes, they all took and stole my ideas. Incommensurability – oh, really? Come on where did this all begin? With me – [I am] Nietzsche of course. I was born posthumously...so many have read me cover to cover – no? Influence others – not my idea. I could not contain my thoughts, since they were much too powerful to remain unspoken. Martin maybe you and the Buddha could be silent, but I did not have that kind of awful strength of will.

Martin: My meta-history of philosophy was to find the single ontology and the same thought in all of the great philosophers. To find one comprehensive ontology or the lost and covering up of 'Being' as Being and the whole process of redefinition is just as universal. My best example is Hegel's *Science of Logic*, book one the doctrine of Being, Being (*Sein*) as just indeterminate immediacy, the empty and pure nothing. Rather, my Being is the rich fullness and it is not empty. Hegel maybe laughing now – but we have completely different sides on the questions of ontology and ontological thinking.

Nāgārjuna: Martin it seems that your notion of Being is the full Being, unlike and opposite of Hegel, and it is just like the Vedanta's Brahman. Can that be right? Gut check. Are we thinking yet?

Nietzsche: Ontology and concept of Being is just an empty fiction. You know I am on the side of Heraclitus who was forever right on this question mark.

Narrator: In fact, Nietzsche attacked all of this as the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood (*Dinglichkeit*), of substance, of permanence. The philosopher's "Reason" is the reason that falsifies our true testimony of the senses. That Being is an empty, blank, void, vacuously and is just a fiction or in German: *Dass das Sein eine leere Fiktion ist*. Hegel and Nietzsche are on the same side for a change – wow, such a thing we should keep track of and write down. Is it just so, Socrates?

Friedrich: I will take some hot cocoa now; since it is too late for tea. I will never sleep if I have tea this late in the day. I ask you, Martin why all of this hidden forests hut and so much provincialism in your appearance? You know there are these funny remarks of how you were dressed when you were in

conversation with Ernst Cassirer in Davos, Switzerland in March 1929. You were dressed as a peasant and Ernst had on a three piece suit. Let us just say it was a clash of cultures. Jimmy Buffett's Margaritaville versus the wall-street types. Did you belong to the Wandervögel movement? Is that why you were dress like that? Martin did you want to become a Gauleiter or like your teacher Joseph Sauer (1872-1949) the Papal House Prelate? Yes, I know, you were hung up on your Christian German culture worldview. Why does God not make an unbreakable heart?

Nietzsche (addressing Martin): "The most universal sign of the modern age: man has lost dignity in his own eyes to an incredible extent. For a long time the center and tragic hero of existence in general; then at least intent on proving himself closely related to the decisive and essentially valuable side of existence--like all metaphysicians who wish to cling to the dignity of man, with their faith that moral values are cardinal values. Those who have abandoned God, cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality."

Martin: You philologist, you are really attacking me now. My most hidden and sensitive thoughts are being pounced on by you.

Narrator: Heidegger plays Mozart's the "The Marriage of Figaro" on his record player. Heidegger added: "Mozart is God's string music". I like Karl Orff's opera "Anti-gone" too.

Martin: Something to drink? A mild Sylvaner wine perhaps?

Nāgārjuna: Just some warm water for me. The British brought tea to India from China long after I was in India. There is no tea traditionally in India; it was just used as a drug in traditional medicine in India which is called *Ayurveda* medicine. The East India Company started the first tea plantations in the lovely hill stations of Assam in 1835. These are high up and yet merely in the

foothills of the Himalayas. I will return to the state of Assam and help those gorgeous tea pickers by giving the gift of the Buddha's message.

Martin: The historical destiny of philosophy culminates in the recognition of the necessity of making *Hölderlin's* word be heard. Nietzsche, did you hear that in poetic thinking (song of fate: *Schicksalslied*) of *Hölderlin*? *Hölderlin* will save us? Or, is it *Hölderlin* will save us?

Nietzsche (states clearly): There is no prophet here. The irony is the fate of Germany was decided long before you born. Do not look to the past – forward to the future now! Even I had to read Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) on the nearness of the future. Can I also write these words in blood and the tears that I have for this age: “The wasteland grows: woe unto him that harbours wasteland” (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*).

Martin: Ones I said “all philosophy from first to last merely unfold its presupposition (*Voraussetzung* or *Vor-aussetzung*)”; and I find it an important methodological point to start with all of our presuppositions and to bring into question any of our foundational principals. This is not in the context of the Frege- Strawson tradition or the Karttunen/Schlenker presuppositions, since I am talking about metaphysical systems, philosophical schools, founders of philosophical traditions, and all of these crazy philosophicalworldviews. Maybe just ontology as a viewism?

Nietzsche (asks to Martin): What about ethics and morality?

Martin: As I have said, “I have already indicated that psychologism as a theory has not restricted itself to logic but has already played a role in ethics and aesthetics, insofar as people attempted to apprehend and understand the problem of ethics and aesthetics from psychology. Husserl's' criticism was directed

essentially at to psychologism in logic, although his criticism occasionally touch in passing on basic questions in ethics. In that context, Husserl shows that every ethics claims to be a science of norms, a science of correct acting, analogous to logic as science of the norms of correct thinking. Therefore, it presupposes as theoretical discipline as the foundational discipline for a normative science of norms – and that science cannot be psychology. Rather, just as logic deals with pure content of propositions, so analogously ethics must deal with pure content of norms, that is, values. In other words, Husserl's and critique of psychologism also opened the path to a critique of values. Max Scheler (1874-1928) has taken up this question, and in the field of ethics or practical philosophy has constructed an ethics of value." (November of 1925). This is my ethics or am I just confused? The fundamental concept of "value" has been broken-up and genealogical investigated.

Nāgārjuna – Please Martin; you are still working out a philosophical project as worldview, metaphysical goal setting, fate, and creating a value system or even an ethics – hence, everything you say you want to really drop and then get on with non-metaphysical thinking and in your case the second thinking of Being; but instead you are still stuck like a fly in the philosophical bottle looking for the way out. Look around for once: there is no Wittgenstein's bottle. Or is it rather like a geometer's nightmare: the Klein bottle? Felix Klein (1882) thought up a true four dimensional bottle with no inside, or is it no outside? Two Möbius loops are used to create a bottle that does not really exist; so image being inside a Klein bottle and no way out. "What is your aim in Philosophy? It is to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (*Philosophical Investigations*, #309) by Wittgenstein. *Was ist dein Ziel in der Philosophie?* What is the target, goal, aim, purpose,

finish or point of Philosophy? Then asked the famous Wittgenstein. For us Buddhist there is no bottle – but the way forward is the four truths and eightfold path toward *Nirvāṇa*(निर्वाण).

Narrator: Golessness is sometime translated from German as aimlessness. Nietzsche first used this term in 1875, and last time in a note from the Fall of 1887 – for twelve years. For Nietzsche the word ‘golessness’ (*Ziellosigkeit*) is a form and basic belief of Nihilist (*Will to Power*, #25). Heidegger wrote in the *Contributions*, “Nihilism in Nietzsche’s sense means that all goals are gone”. Later in this paragraph he talks of ‘admit the goallessness’ and then believing again in goals, for example: the volk (people), movies, seaside resort vacations. On the other hand, he also talks about his own goals in the *Contributions*; Heidegger remarks about the goal is just “seeking”. In *Contributions* he goes on to say, “In this way the inceptual mindfulness of thinking becomes necessarily genuine thinking, i.e., a thinking that sets goals. What gets set is not just any goal, and not the goal in general, but the one and only and thus singular goal of our history. This goal is the seeking itself, the seeking of ‘Being’ (*Sein*).” Heidegger is seeking a worldview of ‘Being’, the value of the highest is Being, the goal is seeking for fullness of Being. See, what is the fundamental conundrum and riddle here for us now?

Martin speaks thoughtful, in *Mindfulness (Besinnung* (1938/39, GA 66)) I am no longer talking about goals but I say in the poetic introduction “We do not know goals and are only a pathway.” Indeed, the whole notion of goals requires the will to a goal or even just a will; so as we are moving the will to power or the will to will out of metaphysics; hence, this means that process of setting goals also has to be left behind. He clearly saw this issue in the *Considerations(Überlegungen)* X section 52 according to Richard Polt’s review. I wrote in GA 95 (pages 330-331). “Nietzsche’s

goallessness "of life" is only the reversal of Platonism, of the purposes of the "idea" is being a role model and "goal". ("Nietzsches Ziellosigkeit »des Lebens« ist nur die Umkehrung des Platonismus, der das Sein im Sinne der »Idee« als Vorbild und »Ziel« setzt. ").

In terms of culture, this is seen in the goals setting of such ideals as: Plato's *Republic*, Karl Marx's communist utopia, or during in 1930s in Germany the so called "Thousand-Year Empire". Nietzsche was critical of the improvers of mankind in *Twilight of Idols* and other idols or ideals. Can we will non-willing as such? I no longer will a goal. A few days before Martin death in 1976, he came up with the motto for his collected writings (*Gesamtausgabe*). He engraved the words: "*Wege – nicht Werke*". Ways – not works. In the summer of 1946 when the city of Freiburg was a mess, I (Martin) started working with the Chinese philosopher, Paul Shih-yi Hsiao here at the cottage on translating from Chinese into German the famous book *Tao Te Ching, Dao De Jing*, or *Daodejing*—hence, Tao as the way. I learned much from the Chinese philosophy, but because of the difference in languages I was always afraid to step in to the deep. Crib a few notes – no?

Martin: The goallessness will not go away by its own account in any of our thinking. Can we affirm without a will, generally speaking no goals at all – how does that compress our way of doing philosophy? Can we just dismember the common sense view of philosophy now?

Nietzsche: "Without music, life would be a mistake". How about Nāgārjunacan you play on your new device with some excellent Indian music. Amazon Echo, Nāgārjuna says, "Alexa play the album the 3 Sisters - 30 Hits - Lata, Asha, Usha Lata Mangeshkar, Asha Bhosle & Usha Mangeshkar." The first song, Shri Ganeshay

Namah starts playing. New technology at work. The mood changes and for a brief time the three thinkers are active listeners.

Nietzsche (starts talking again): I once wrote: The entire idealism of mankind hitherto is on the point of changing suddenly into nihilism--into the belief in absolute valuelessness (*Wertlosigkeit*), i.e., meaninglessness (*Sinnlosigkeit*). (*Will to Power*, #617). Active Nihilism affirms the goallessness and affirms life without goals or values. Incomplete Nihilism is when revelations of values are incomplete or just when old values are re-inverted, which is the flip flop of core values. The idea of complete Nihilism no longer needs the concept of values at all. Nihilism has the will to the continuing return of nothingness-ing, valuelessness-ing, and goallessness-ing. We must take all the Indo-European languages abstract nouns and turn them in verbs, since we live in a ‘verbing’ world of process and change. Hegel, Nietzsche, Whitehead, the Hopi Indians in the southwest, they all want us to reject abstract and static nouns, since everything is becoming. Our language makes us confused about the world. Johann Herder (1744-1803) made some progress on this knot. Remember our real world without the Indo-European grammar: Heraclitus said you cannot step twice in the same river. Heidegger your lecture notes for a 1939 seminar that focused on J. G. Herder's treatise *On the Origin of Language* did not get very far, in fact, given the cheerleader build up – why are these notes not more famous? Perhaps 1939 was not a good year for you.

I am getting uptight. Heidegger goes on to say, I see in every western metaphysical system is indeed a system of value-estimations. I also remarked, to think against values therefore does not mean to beat the drum for valueslessness and nullity of beings. Values started with Plato and the ideal and/or the idea of the Form of the Good (*agathon*); and idea of values is now at the

historically end of western philosophy with Nietzsche and his revaluation of all values. But what is really next for us? Game on! Nietzsche says.

Nāgārjuna (looks around and says): Both of you should not get locked up with this stuff. Rid your minds of this crap. I know it sounds like a lapidary (made of stone) statement; but get with the program would you. Sometimes western philosophy is just simply gnarly with your disease and it ends up with just punching your way out of a paper bag. You and Sisyphus keep rolling the rock up the hill – creating these endless views and worldviews. Stuck in your recent cultural values and others with their common sense and common language. Even Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) thought that all philosophical problems are just pseudo-problems that are in fact outcome of a misuse of language and confusions.

Narrator: In 1932, Martin penned the words, "There is no point of viewlessness, there is only choice of point of view, strength of point of view, and courage of point of view." Supposedly, Heidegger came up with the German word "*Ansichtslosigkeit*". There is an interesting Sanskrit word that is related: *adr̥ṣṭavādīnī* translated as notviewism or non-viewism, Made by a- prefix meaning not, and *dr̥ṣṭi* - view, *vādīnī* or *vādin* which translation to -ism or school (doctrine or theory). The German word: *Ansichtslosigkeit-ismus* = (in Sanskrit *adr̥ṣṭavādīnī*) or, notviewism, non-viewism, viewless-ism, or viewlessness-ism.

Nāgārjuna(exclaims): I really like it when Martin's German ends up with a Sanskrit word. I know, I know it is just a few words but it is remarkable that it is your German word and the Sanskrit term are pointing and indicating to us – what is the core of the Buddha's viewlessness as our path. Both of should get on the bandwagon now.

Nietzsche: The last time, I was in wagon with *anyone* was in Lucerne (Switzerland) with my gorgeous lovely young Russian friend Ms. Lou von Salomé with a whip in her hand and my other friend Paul Rée during the spring in May 1882. There is a photo of us. But for the final record: I do not join any group or any organization at all. Some join groups like some kind of Socialism and formal religions. Even the Amish are better than getting involved in structured groups. Obviously, all of those notions are for the hopeless sheep; and I am always in first and foremost a hawk or a flying eagle – singular, unique, distinct, and just me. Is this in the Promenade of the puzzle? My aphorism fly off the face of the page, off of the screen and strike at the heart of all who hear me. Most of my adversary are on the ground before they know what hit them. My critical punches are just too powerful.

Heidegger(whispers in a soft voice): “Yet we must heed one thing: this standpoint of freedom-from-standpoints is of the opinion (*Meinung*) that it has overcome the one-sidedness and bias of prior philosophy, which always was, and is, defined by its standpoints. However, the standpoint of Standpointlessness (*Standpunktlosigkeit*) represents no overcoming (*Überwindung*). In truth it is the extreme consequence, affirmation, and final stage of that opinion concerning philosophy which locates all philosophy extrinsically in standpoints that are ultimately right in front of us, standpoints whose one-sidedness we can try to bring into equilibrium.”

In another place, in 1932; I wrote these words and thoughts on standpointlessness:

“The desire to philosophize from the standpoint of standpointlessness, as a purportedly genuine and superior objectivity, is either childish, or, as it usually the case, disingenuous...Not freedom from any standpoint (something

fantastic), but the right choice of standpoint, the courage to a standpoint, the setting in action of a standpoint and holding out within it, is the task: a task, admittedly, which can only be enacted *in* philosophical work...”

Some years before, during 1928 -- I had tried to make the point essentially: Heidegger says: *philosophy is a stance, not a standpoint*. I often thought of historical Socrates before Plato had his total way with him. Do we have the “courage to a standpoint”?

(Martin goes in to the other room and comes back with some cheese and bread. He sits down at the table with his friends. The evening is getting colder and darker now.)

Nietzsche: “This looks good to eat. I am a bit tired and exhausted.” Nietzsche goes on and says, in year 1886, I had drunk cognac twice; but before in December 1882, Lou’s created such darkness for me I took opium; but now I am cured of that darkness. “Alcohol does not agree with me; one glass of wine or beer a day is enough to turn life into a valley of tears for me; in Munich live my antipodes.”

Like the singer Madonna I needed to re-invent myself; and hence transformed my thinking into my wonderful *Zarathustra* and in ten days I wrote the first part. With regard to Lou and Rée, I once wrote, “In every conversation between three people, one person is superfluous and therefore prevents the depth of the conversation.” I was mistaken to make that a general rule, because our experience today has convinced me that three minds are indeed better than two. What do you think?

Heidegger (gives a pronouncement): Being here with you both now reminds me of the story that my precious Greek philosopher Aristotle wrote down: ‘Heraclitus said to some strangers who wanted to come visit him. Having arrived, they saw him warming himself at a stove. Surprised, they stood there in consternation—

above all because he encouraged them, the astounded ones, and called them to come in, with the words, ‘For here too the gods come to presence’ (in *De partibus animalium*). The cottage (*Die Hütte*) has brought the two of you here and now I have to ponder and reconsider what calls for us for thinking; and what simply calls for thinking. The most thought-provoking thing about the times we live in is that we still are not thinking.

Nietzsche: I have enjoyed spending some time with the both of you. For me, I would rather quote the great Roman poet, Horace (65 BC to 8 BC) from his letter, where he says: “Time will bring to light whatever is hidden; it will conceal and cover up what is now shining with the greatest splendor”. Thinking and learning may bring total un-concealment.

Nāgārjuna: takes out a figfruit from under his monk robe and opens the fig up; and holds up an extremely rare *udumbara* (उडुम्बर) flower... he has a mysterious and exalted smile on his face....but says nothing.

Narrator (end note):“The Buddha told Sāriputta, “A wonderful Dharma such as this is spoken only occasionally by the Buddhas, the Thus Come Ones, just as the udumbara flower appears but once in a great while.”*Sūtra on the White Lotus of the Sublime Dharma, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* (सद्धर्मपुण्डरीक सूत्र), short name: *Lotus Sūtra*, from chapter 2. Sāriputta was both the Dakkhinasāvaka and Paṭhamasāvaka disciple of the Gautama Buddha.



Tradition : A Philosophical Inquiry

Dr. Jai Singh*

*Purāṇamityeva na sādhu sarvaṁ, na chāpi kāvyam navamityavadyaṁ I
Sataḥ parikṣya nyatarabbhajante, muḍaḥ parapratyayaneyabuddhiḥ II¹*

The origin of the word tradition can be traced back to the Latin noun *traditio* (handing over), which is derived from the verb *tradere* (handover, deliver). The word *traditio* corresponds closely to the Greek word *paradosis*, which also has the same meaning. In ancient times, Latin and Greek theologians used *traditio* and *paradosis*, in the sense of “teaching” or “instruction”, very often to denote the body of teachings preserved and handed down by the church as “the catholic faith.” Thus “transmitting” and “handing over” had been the fundamental meaning of the initial Greek word *Paradosis* and Latin *tradere*. As the tradition played a critical role in the ancient society, there had been a continuous endeavor to express and pass on the transmitted beliefs and customs in a specific form and expression to others. This process is characterized by a tension between loyalty and creativity; thus by an urge for identification with tradition and the need to make it relevant in response to the prevailing (mostly changing) conditions.

Originally, the word “tradition had a religious meaning. The French “Robert²” dictionary defines it as a “religious or moral doctrine or practice that is handed down over the centuries by the word of the mouth or by example”. Later on with the covering of knowledge, morals, the arts and so on, tradition came to mean “a way or pattern or thinking, doing or taking action that is inherited

* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, MMV, BHU, Varanasi

from the past”. Thus tradition in addition to being a product of past is also a contemporary reality. The Dictionary of Ethology³ gives the following definition of tradition: “that which persists from the past into the present, where it is handed on and remains active and accepted by those receiving it, who hand it down from generation to generation”. Webster’s Third New International Unabridged Dictionary⁴, defines tradition as “the process of handing down information, opinions, beliefs, and customs by word of mouth or by example; transmission of knowledge and institutions through successive generations without written instruction”.

The Micropedia of the Encyclopedia Britannica⁵ defines tradition as “the aggregate of customs, beliefs and practices that give continuity to a culture, civilization, or social group and thus shape its views ...” (1986), leaving out any mention of oral transmission. Perhaps older and more conservative definitions contained oral transmission as a necessary part, but newer views have moved away from this perspective.

Tradition as the Ontological Roots

Being basically a moral and social concept, tradition also plays a vital role as an ontological and explanatory one. In order to explain the features of various works, actions and practices one has to locate them in the context of a particular tradition. The concept of tradition applies to every sphere of human culture including science, arts, letters, education, law, politics and religion since culture itself depends on teaching and learning which presuppose a tradition i.e. received from the hands, lips or the examples of the others. Tradition, structure, heritage or paradigm is thus integral to the understanding of human condition. Tradition penetrates every sphere of human life and culture. The process of socialization itself presumes an inherited set of shared understandings. This is not to say that tradition is an unchangeable category that determines or

even limits later performances but it can be extended, modified or even rejected in a way that might make it anything but constructive of beliefs and actions of the concerned people. It is a common practice in hermeneutic tradition to talk of tradition as integral to everything the individual ever does. It seems valid until we consider it as a necessary part of the background to everything any one believes or does. But it is not a necessary presence in all that people believe and do. Tradition is unavoidable as a starting point, not as a final destination.

Essentialists equate tradition with fixed essences to which they ascribe variations. They define traditions in terms of an unchanging core; that appears in different outer garbs from time to time and even from person to person. They might identify a tradition with a group of ideas widely shared by a number of individuals although no particular idea was held by all of them. Or they might identify a tradition with a group of ideas that was passed down from generation to generation, changing a little each time, so that no single idea persists from start to finish. The bearer of tradition might think of it as a unified whole possessing an essential core but this is not the case. In fact, a tradition is composed of a variety of parts, each of which can be reflected upon, and so accepted, modified, or rejected, by itself. There is a constant urge among people to improve their heritage by making it more coherent, more accurate and more relevant to contemporary issues, so rather than accepting a tradition as a whole they often do respond selectively to it; they accept some parts of it, modify others, and reject others. Furthermore, tradition is an outcome of a long historical process that works through others on the people. Individuals pick up their initial beliefs and practices by listening to and watching other people, including their parents, educators, the authors they read, and their peers. They in turn modify and pass

this always-changing set of beliefs and practices down to the next generation.

Beliefs, practices and hence tradition persists and develops through time as it passes from generation to generation. The bearer of a tradition might think of it as a unified whole possessing an essential core. In fact, however, it will be composed of a variety of parts, each of which can be reflected upon, and so accepted, modified, or rejected, by itself. Individuals can respond selectively to the different parts of the tradition they acquire as an inheritance. Indeed, because people usually want to improve their heritage by making it more coherent, more accurate, and more relevant to contemporary issues, they often do respond selectively to it; they accept some parts of it, modify others, and reject others. Traditions change as they are transmitted from person to person. Tradition is an influence that works through others on people, rather than a defining presence in all people believe and do. Individuals pick up their initial beliefs and practices by listening to and watching other people, including their parents, educators, the authors they read, and their peers. The learning process requires teachers who initiate and pupils who learn typically each individual will fulfil both of these roles at some point in time. The teachers once will have been pupils who acquired their initial beliefs and practices from earlier teachers, and the pupils later will become teachers who provide future pupils with initial beliefs and practices. It is because beliefs and practices thus pass from generation to generation that we can talk of teachers initiating pupils into a tradition that persists and develops through time.

Although pupils receive their inheritance from teachers during fairly brief moments in time, these moments always represent the culmination of a larger historical process. The teacher who transmits the inheritance is just the most recent link in a long

chain of people who began as pupils and ended as teachers, passing an always changing set of beliefs and practices down to each other. A long historical sequence lies behind the comparatively brief moment when a new pupil is initiated into a tradition.

Tradition as Beliefs and Practices

Tradition is a set of beliefs which are connected to each other both temporally as well as conceptually. The connection between belief and practice must be consistent and coherent. Both belief and practice must form an intelligible whole. There must be a minimum level of consistency between the beliefs and actions of an individual. Therefore, the tradition could not guide someone how to move until both parts of tradition i.e., beliefs and practice are integrated into a coherent whole. The same argument can be given for the inner consistency of the beliefs and practices in its sustentative content even if it also does so in a number of their other features, including an approach to certain objects, a mode of presentation, or an expression of allegiance. It must be noted that only a coherent set of beliefs and practices could provide a newcomer an initial entry into the world. It is fine that beliefs and practices in a tradition must show a degree of conceptual coherence but this coherence may not be absolute. Tradition is not just a set of random beliefs and actions which individuals normally held. If, for example, historians discovered that various people believed both that God came to earth and that our souls survived death, they could not talk of a tradition composed of these beliefs alone. But if the historians take these beliefs along with other beliefs such as that Christ, the son of God came to earth and taught his followers to have faith in afterlife, and then they could talk of a Christian tradition that is a set of consistent set of beliefs.

It may be noted here that though the beliefs within a tradition must be related both temporally and conceptually, their

substantive content is not important. All beliefs and practices must have their roots in tradition as tradition is inevitable. They must do so whether they are aesthetic or practical, sacred or secular, legendary or factual, pre-modern or scientific, valued because of their lineage or their reasonableness. It is not important whether they are transmitted in oral form or in a written form. Furthermore, such details like whether pupils recognize them on another's authority or through the vision of how to derive them from first principles are also unimportant. All beliefs and all practices must arise against the background of tradition. Any scientist trained in modern science does not work out appropriate procedures, reasoning, and accepted truths by themselves. Instead, they are initiated into a tradition of science by their teachers, and only after they have been thus initiated do they proceed to advance science through their own work. It cannot be denied that these scientists later can certainly challenge the accepted beliefs but they do so against the background of a tradition into which they already have been initiated.

Any description of a tradition will be incomplete without identifying a set of associated beliefs and habits that intentionally or unintentionally transferred from one generation to the next. Furthermore, if anyone wants to place oneself in a tradition then he or she has to defend a particular description of the temporal and conceptual relationships between the beliefs and practices of those one sees as his predecessors. Our interpretation and understanding, its development and orientation, all are dependent on the experience and insight of our predecessors. Today's science is the fruit of over centuries of controlled scientific investigation and deduction.

Tradition as the Immanent Principles of Universal Order

Tradition is the handing on of a complex of established means of facilitating our understanding of the immanent principles of universal order, since it has not been given to mankind to understand unaided the meaning of his existence. The term tradition can be understood in terms of the spiritual relationship between a master and a pupil. Intended for the general mass of the faithful, the doctrine split into three elements, dogma for the reason, morals for the mind, and rites and ceremonies for the body. We recognize the privileged centre as possessing an inexhaustibly rich store of possibilities which are mediated to us by means of symbols.

If we visualize tradition in its distorted sense, it means nothing but a dead weight. However, it should not be taken in the sense that a specific tradition did not contain timeless values and truths at the time it originated. But with time, its true meaning may be forgotten, the rituals involved may be mechanically repeated and thus the tradition becomes deadened. But it should not be forgotten that tradition might involve a meaningful truth, an experience, a custom that was valid at a certain time in history, under certain conditions and circumstances. But to continue the same customs under completely different circumstances where the meaning of this tradition has been lost is therefore a process of death, rather than of life. To carry on the tradition with no fresh thought, submitting oneself to senseless blind habits that fails to elucidate through acts or attitudes the divine truth contained in the tradition in question, signifies death. To be alive implies a dynamic thinking process and awareness.

Tradition can be an intensely meaningful reality, or it can be a meaningless, dead repetition of the past that no longer has any application in the now. In real terms, Tradition implies the

sustenance of faith in eternal truths and values. When a cosmic power manifests itself in human life, those who experience the inevitable beauty, goodness and rightness of this cosmic power wants to continue its expression. Any true tradition is a sustained experience of the same dynamic aliveness time and again. Tradition in its true sense implies adherence to eternal values or to certain aspects of these values, depending on which particular tradition we have in mind. It should be noted here that human responses to tradition are deeply embedded in the personality. All aspects of society are influenced by each individual's attitude to tradition. A person may be aware of the true sense of tradition in the present situation or he or she may be just repeating an act out of habit. Now there is a great deal of difference between these two situations.

Politics and religion are very clearly influenced by and also reflect a specific society's attitude to tradition. Tradition can said to be a body of undefined teaching. The contents and limits of this teaching are not available for inspection or study. This is in contrast to the Holy Scriptures, which anyone can read and examine for himself. If a claim is made that a particular teaching is biblical, anyone can verify or refute my claim by checking out the Bible.

Tradition as the Unwritten Story

Traditions are "unwritten". One cannot go to a library and read them for oneself. Since it is not possible to have pure experiences, therefore, we must necessarily construe our personal experiences in terms of a prior bundle of theories. It is not possible to arrive at beliefs through experiences unless we already have a

prior set of beliefs. The outcome of a set of beliefs out of experiences presupposes a set of beliefs in terms of which we can read out our experiences. Therefore, we cannot explain a belief by reference to the pure experiences of the relevant individual. All our experiences can take us to beliefs only because we already have access to sets of belief in the form of the traditions of our community through their participation in traditions individuals manage to acquire their beliefs.

It may not be difficult to understand now this relevant point that the inevitable influence of tradition does not mean that there is no human agency. It is perfectly alright that individuals must begin their journey against the background of tradition. But it is equally true that later they can modify that tradition. Although they are inescapably influenced by it, they are not determined by it. It is equally true that the ability to develop traditions is an essential part of our being in the world. In our day to day life we face novel situations that require us apply tradition in afresh way. Every time we attempt to apply a tradition, we have to reflect on it. We have to try to understand it afresh in the light of the relevant circumstances. Through such reflection, we necessarily open it up to possible innovation. In this way, the human agency certainly plays its important role. Therefore, both social backdrop of a person as well as the human agency plays the significant role. Therefore, the concept of tradition suggests that a social inheritance comes to each individual who, through their agency, then can give a new shape to this inheritance even as they pass it on to the succeeding generations.

Tradition as the Contingent and Evolving Entity

Tradition forms the inevitable background to human life. Tradition is the background, the foundation on which all others rest. Although tradition constitutes the inevitable background to all we say and do, but not a constitutive presence in all we say and do. Traditions are contingent and evolving entities that operate through teachers as influences on pupils, where the pupils then can extend and modify them in unlimited ways. The tradition, therefore, explains the set of beliefs and practices people carry on. It does not explain why they went on to change these initial beliefs and practices in the ways they did. But it can be fairly said that pupils sometimes remain faithful to their inheritance, they sometimes hold to beliefs and practices that correspond to a tradition imparted to them by others. For instance, when pupils learn something from a teacher, one way of explaining the beliefs and actions of the pupils is to say that they learnt them from a teacher. Thus, historians sometimes can explain why people believe or do something simply by saying that they learnt it from teachers who imparted a tradition to them. It is also an important point to note here that no belief or action can be self-supporting. Individuals always must locate their particular beliefs and actions in a larger set. Pupils must acquire a set of beliefs and actions in an initial process of socialization before they can modify.

At this point one can be reminded of the story of the five blind men and the elephant. Each of the blind men described the elephant accurately in terms of his own limited perceptions. Tradition has been used in scholarship as a tool in various limited contexts, all of which may be valid within their prescribed limits. The concept of tradition is multifaceted. It consists of many

separate elements which may never be found together as a whole in nature.

Traditions are evolving entities that play an instrumental role in our understanding. Traditions help us to explain a particular action or belief by relating it to past actions or beliefs. It is wrong to understand tradition as some fixed entity that enable us to evaluate particular beliefs and actions against an authentic set of experiences, actions, and beliefs.

There is no tradition that can be completely defined in terms of some particular set of beliefs, experiences, or actions. Historians must define traditions in terms of beliefs that were related to one another in an appropriate manner. Historians can identify a tradition only through a study of the beliefs and actions of the individuals within it. Only the beliefs and actions of individuals can acquaint them with traditions; only inference from the beliefs and actions of individuals can enable them to explore the nature of traditions; and only checks against the beliefs and actions of individuals can provide them with tests of their claims about traditions.

A number of ideas emanate from the analysis of the concept of tradition. It has both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. It means that the tradition consists of not only continuities, i.e., what is "handed down" through time but also consistencies, i.e., similarities in behavior across space. It is not individual but social or communal. Some aspects of culture are considered traditions, and value judgments are made about them. People learn, perform and actively transmit some traditions while only passively responding to others. Traditions define events, mark

major passages in life. They are used to express, reinforce and promote group identity. Traditions are symbolic constructions of the past in the present for the future. From the conservative point of view, 'tradition' is viewed as something that remains relatively constant and is endowed with a timeless authority. The tradition must not change if its integrity is to be maintained. Those who are criticizing the groups for changing their tradition often take the stance that any departure from the tradition is a betrayal. Another standpoint is that tradition is something which should relate to the present rather than the past. It is an organic process with change or evolution as an integral part of its nature as opposed to a fixed entity which, from their perspective, cannot avoid eventual ossification. According to this standpoint, tradition is something that is generated by individuals and their responses to a changing socio-cultural climate, rather than something which pre-exists as a product of some mythical collective 'folk'. An average mean of these two positions suggests that the traditions handed down by the elders should be respected and the integrity of the cultural heritage should be given due value. At the same time the tradition must keep on moving forward and developing contemporary forms of expression. Only then any tradition can said to be a living entity.

It would suffice to conclude with the observations made by George F. McLean: "The cumulative result of the extended process of learning and testing constitutes tradition, e.g. the historical and prophetic books of the Bible are an extended concrete account of the process of the people's discovery of wisdom in interaction with the divine". He further says, "Tradition is, then, not simply every thing that ever happened; it is rather what appears significant. It does not subsist in itself, but must be described properly and by

different voices in order to draw out its different aspects. It is not an object in itself but it is a rich source from where multiple themes can be drawn according to the motivation and interest of the inquirer”⁶.

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Knowledge and Scepticism

(An Analysis of the Debate between G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein)

Ms. Shruti Kapur^{1}*

In the present article, I propose to discuss two key epistemological issues in the Western philosophical tradition, namely, knowledge and skepticism, which creates a debate between Wittgenstein in his *On Certainty* and Moore in his “A Defense of Common Sense.” The debate is quite perplexing according to Wittgenstein. This is a unique debate where both Wittgenstein and Moore arrive at the same conclusion that the sceptic is wrong, but the arguments they advance are different from each other. Despite having the same goal, Wittgenstein is rather trying to criticize Moore’s these arguments and also his conception of certainty.

I divide the paper into five sections. In the first section, I shall discuss in brief the issues concerning knowledge, that is, the nature and characteristics of knowledge and the difference between “knowledge” and “belief.” In section two, I shall discuss sceptic’s position. Section three will cast light on Moore’s position. In the fourth section, Wittgenstein’s position in his text *On Certainty* will be elucidated where I shall concentrate on Wittgenstein’s central lines of argument, his characterization of sceptical doubt, and the argument that sceptical doubt so characterized is incoherent. In the fifth and the final section, I shall do a critical evaluation.

This article takes into consideration the following issues:

1. Knowledge

* Assistant Professor (Ad hoc), Kamla Nehru College, University of Delhi.

- Nature and Characteristics of Knowledge.
 - Distinction between knowledge and Belief.
2. Sceptics position
 - Scepticism defined.
 - Four-fold argument given by the sceptic and the four-fold reply by the opponent.
 3. Moore's position
 4. Wittgenstein's Position
 5. Conclusion – A brief critical evaluation.

Knowledge

Nature and Characteristics of knowledge

The problem of knowledge that is, the problem in epistemology is the central foundation of all philosophies because philosophy is primarily concerned with analyzing knowledge. The characteristics that knowledge must possess as opposed to belief are three in number. It must be true, certain and one who is claiming to say must have a right to certainty. Here evolves a question that what is there in 'belief' that is not there in 'knowledge'. So, a distinction has to be made between 'knowledge' and 'belief'.

Distinction between Knowledge and Belief

'Knowledge' and 'Belief' are two different things that is, the verb "I know" and "I believe" are two different things. To begin with, the verb "I know" can be used in a number of ways. It may refer to knowledge, ability, acquaintance, assurance, and so on. The word "I know" itself supplements an answer to the "How do I know?" The question about "I know" arises only in case where the question "How do I know?" arises. The word "I know" is also used in a context when someone else shows uncertainty

about the identity of any physical object. That is, “I know” is used as an expression of certainty or authentication.

The criterion of “Certainty” varies from one context to the other. “Certainty” is not something which is defined but context related or dependent and context is determined by a form of life (It is also related with rationality and it is the language game which determines rationality. The point is that “just as there are varieties of rationality, there are varieties of certainty”). To use this word, what is required is some kind of a language game or a form of life. And, form of life is something for which no justification is required. Without a context, the word “I know” has no meaning. It looks like a knowledge statement but it is not an expression of a knowledge claim at all (OC 359). For example, “I know that I am in pain” is not a knowledge statement but it is an expression of anger.

Moore according to Wittgenstein is using the word “I know” as “I believe”. In nutshell, “I know” and “I believe” has more or less same sense of communication but the only difference is that “I know” carries some amount of authenticity that is, the purpose of the use of “I know” is to reassert the truth of the proposition while the term “I believe” totally is without certainty.

The question of knowledge arises only within a form of life. That is, it is only within a form of life that “knowledge” or “belief” makes sense, outside the form of life, it has no meaning. In other words, according to Wittgenstein, if we talk about doubt, that also makes sense in a certain language game, system, environment or a form of life. And this can be better explained with the help of the following examples. “I believe that all snakes are dangerous but I am not certain”, “A medical doctor has a right to certainty but a doctor of philosophy doesn’t have a right to certainty and many more examples can be discussed in this light.

Having discussed the issues pertaining to knowledge, let us talk about the sceptic's position.

II

Sceptic's Position

Scepticism is the view that knowledge is impossible either in general or with respect to a particular domain or sphere. A sceptic is a person who thinks that knowledge is not possible and the precise argument given by a sceptic is that it is possible that there is 'truth' (which refers to something factual), 'certainty' (factual and psychological) but 'right to certainty' is not there that is, it is always doubtful. This statement can be explained with the help of an example of a 'table'. It is true that "this is a table" and "I" am certain that "this is a table" but one doesn't possess the right to certainty to say that there is a table lying outside. Even if the concept of table is known to us still one cannot say that it is a "table". To the sceptics, given the experience there is no right to certainty. For example, there is no qualitative difference between dream state and waking state or imagination because given the experience one cannot differentiate between reality and imagination. The nucleus of sceptics thinking vest with the notion of uncertainty of knowledge, to them it is the belief which is only possible.

There are two kinds of scepticism, antecedent and consequent. Hume, throughout the enquiry into human understanding has been employing a kind of consequent skepticism contrary to Descartes who is an antecedent sceptic because it warrants some definite starting point before any reasoning can begin. Modern scepticism is extracted from Descartes which is founded on the assumption that for a proposition to be known, it

must either be evident that is, self-evident or evident to the senses, or be adequately supported by evident propositions.

The four-fold argument

A sceptic lays down the four-fold argument for the impossibility of knowledge which is being discussed as under.

To begin with, sceptics maintain that “we cannot see things directly”. This statement can be explained with the example of a physical object such as “table”. The entire table cannot be seen that is, first of all, the front side of the table is seen, then the top, and so on. That is, by seeing a portion of the table, one cannot deduce that it is a “table”.

According to the sceptics, “what we directly see is the sense data and not the object” (sense data is defined as something which cannot be articulated).

Sceptics are of the view that “From what I directly see, I cannot deduce that there are objects or infer, for example, that it is a table”. According to the sceptics, the “table” is not given to us but it is only the sense data. That is, it is only a construct which is being framed in our mind. Resultantly, one can’t deduce that there are objects.

These are the four steps and the sceptics attack these on the basis of right to certainty. Corresponding to these four steps of sceptics the four-fold reply has been also given but none of them is found to be satisfactory.

Having discussed the sceptic’s position, I shall cast light on Moore’s position.

III

Moore's position

To begin with, G.E. Moore was one of the most influential British philosophers of the 20th century. In this section, I shall try to analyze the various kinds of propositions which constitute the common sense view of the existence of the external world which originates in the article 'A Defence of Common Sense' which was G.E. Moore's contribution to the collection of essays published in 1925 under the title *Contemporary British Philosophy*.

In his paper, 'A Defence of Common Sense' Moore makes efforts to denounce scepticism by arguing that at least some of our beliefs about the world are absolutely certain that is, to him, these beliefs are common sense. Here, Moore does not attempt to define the word 'common sense' or the phrase 'a common-sense proposition'. Rather he starts by laying down a long list of propositions that is, common sense beliefs, all of which he claims to know with certainty to be true. To Moore, the common-sense propositions which I shall discuss below are grounded on evidence, although one cannot tell what it is, and that they entail that there is a mind-independent world, and thus refute scepticism.

He gives a positive statement of his naïve realism that is a position of common sense with respect to the propositions such as, 'existence of physical objects', 'that the object one is pointing to is one's hand', 'the earth has existed for many years past' and propositions such as "time is unreal, "space is unreal", and "material objects are unreal" and also statements about the existence and behavior of his own body. That is, 'I am a human being'; 'There exists at present a living human body, which is my body'; 'This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since'. 'At every moment since it was

born, there have also existed many other things, having shape and size in three dimensions, from which it has been at various distances, also there have existed some other things of this kind with which it was in contact and so on.

To begin with, the proposition 'The earth has existed for many years past' conveys some meaning. 'Do you believe that the earth has existed for many years past?' is a basic question which should be met by a categorical 'yes', a categorical 'no' or a categorical 'I can't make up my mind'. According to Moore, the statement, 'The earth has existed for many years past' is a crystal clear proposition and does not need any authenticity. Moore takes it for sure that there is a commonplace, non philosophical symbol of certainty.¹ In other words; he announces that each of us knows these things to be true of himself, and that it would be really absurd to talk about these common sense beliefs in a disrespectful manner.

Moore is trying to show that paradoxical or absurd statements made by other philosophers were false not by conflicting with the everyday use of language that is, by being improperly expressed but rather by conflicting with propositions whose truth is beyond doubt. The reason for declaring these statements as false is that it conflicts with the common sense proposition that events are temporally related to each other. For example, in our daily life, we all believe that we have often got out of bed, then dressed up, and after that gone off to work. If statements of the form 'First I did x, then after that I did y, then still later I did z' are true, then the statements like, "Time is unreal" in Moore's view is most certainly false.² So, for Moore, the propositions which can't be questioned are common-sense propositions, which we all know to be true.

Moreover, he maintained that these common-sense truisms provide a rigorous proof for the existence of the external world,

since the premises are known for certain and entail the conclusion. For example, he held up his two hands and said ‘Here is one hand and here is another’, so there exist at least two material things. He discusses how common sense propositions like “Here is my hand” are to be analyzed.

Moore considers three alternative kinds of answers that appears to him and he notices serious objections. To start with, he is only able to spot one kind of answer to the first alternative. He maintains that what one can only ascertain is that the sense-datum itself is part of the surface of a human hand. Alternatively, it can be put in this way that even though one cannot perceive one’s hand directly, but one can only perceive the sense-datum which is itself a part of its surface.³

Secondly, what one is really knowing with regard to the sense-datum which is of that surface is not that it is itself part of the surface of a human hand, but that there is some relation such that what one is knowing with regard to the sense datum is either ‘there is only one thing and only one thing of which it is true. That is, it is a part of the surface of human hand and that it has a relation to this sense-datum, or else there are a set of things of which it is true are part of the surface of a human hand, and also that each member of the set has relation to this sense datum, and that nothing which is not a member of the set has relation to it.’

And, the third alternative answer is that what one is really knowing with regard to the sense-datum which is the principal subject of such a fact as ‘This is the part of a surface of human hand’ is not that it is itself part of the surface of a human hand but rather a whole set of hypothetical facts each of which is a fact of the form: ‘if these conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum in this way, if these other conditions had

been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum intrinsically related to this sense-datum in this other way.'

Then, he raises very grave objections to each proposed analysis and asserts that none of them is certain. But this situation could in no way remove the certainty with which he knew the proposition that 'This is a human hand' on the commonsensical level. For Moore, analysis never supplants common sense. There are no universally and compulsively held beliefs about the relation of sense-data to material objects.⁴

On the level of common sense, Moore insists that propositions about the world are not easily understood, they are also immediately recognizable as true or false without a tedious investigation. Such propositions are derived from experiences which are common to all. All of us have sensed objects which are external to our minds and bodies, for example, and have had no difficulty either in understanding or accepting as true our own or some other person's claims to be seeing, touching, or otherwise sensing some external material object and also have no difficulty in understanding and accepting as true propositions about the spatial or temporal relations obtaining among such objects.

Moore is one who claims certain knowledge about the existence of his hands, fingers, head, and other persons on the common sense level, yet he was cautious in the extreme about many philosophical issues relating to the analysis of propositions which are about the existence of such material objects.

In his article, Moore points out one of the significant ways in which he differs from many other philosophers is that he is not at all sceptical as to the truth of the propositions which assert the existence of material things such as, 'this is a human hand', 'I see an apple', 'Many human bodies have lived for many years upon

the earth'. Rather he is sceptical as to what the correct analysis of such propositions is.

To sum up, Moore's article 'A Defence of Common Sense' shows a way of doing philosophy, or a conception of philosophical inquiry, which is in many respects sharply different from Wittgenstein's idea of philosophy. Moore maintains that there are propositions in which right to certainty is possible. He is in many ways like Descartes because he was making endeavors to find a synthetic proposition such as, 'Here is one hand' which is immune from doubt but not like *cogito* because he realizes that it is an analytic proposition. In other words, Moore falls in the category of people who were in search of propositions which are synthetic in nature, incorrigible and self-evident.

Having explained Moore's position which is discussed in his article 'A Defence of Common Sense', I shall now elucidate Wittgenstein's position that is, how Wittgenstein criticizes Moore's propositions saying that the propositions which Moore thinks to be certain are not certain.

IV

Wittgenstein's Position

Wittgenstein in *On Certainty* deals with a central, traditional philosophical problem that is the problem of scepticism and knowledge and tries to formulate a refutation of scepticism and characterization of knowledge and its justification. That is, Wittgenstein's conceptions of doubt, certainty and knowledge, his persistent conflation throughout the text *On Certainty* of contingent propositions and his revealing conflation of skepticism with idealism are central to understanding the themes of *On Certainty*.

On Certainty's inspiration was Moore's 'Defence of Common Sense' and Wittgenstein believes that Moore was right in his philosophical attitude but wrong in the way he argued for it. The primary aim of *On Certainty* is to avoid the mistake of "countering the assertion that one cannot know that [for example: that's a tree], by saying "I do know it" and to steer a course between the sceptic's doubt and Moore's dogmatism.⁵

Wittgenstein quotes several propositions which Moore discusses in his article 'A Defence of Common Sense' such as "the earth existed long before my birth", "here is a hand", "I know that is a tree" stand at the nucleus of Wittgenstein's investigations.⁶ He takes it for sure that one can be certain of these common-sense truisms that is, they are without an iota of doubt because they constitute the framework of the discourse within which more particular claims of knowledge and expressions of doubt make sense.

Wittgenstein returns to these propositions again and again because according to him, they play an important role for a better understanding of human language, thought and language-games. In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein is interested in the role in our lives by the propositions which Moore says, we do not question. In other words, Wittgenstein takes examples from Moore's 'Defence of Common Sense' to show that grounding is the basic fundamental axiom that is, our form of life is grounded somewhere and that grounding is taken for granted by us. For example, 'I know I am breathing right now' which means that "Breathing" is that in which my life is grounded.

Wittgenstein in *On Certainty* has also mentioned a famous metaphor of the river-bed. He maintains that the river-bed of thoughts distinguishes between 'the movement of the waters on the

river-bed' (changes in empirical beliefs), 'the shift of the bed itself' (conceptual changes brought about by adopting new grammatical rules), and the 'hard rock' of the river-bank which is not subject to alteration, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited. In other words, it means that the river-bed is only relatively stable with respect to the water flowing over it, because it is worn away with time, and shifts its course.

In simple parlance, according to Wittgenstein, when we take something to be the criterion of knowledge, that criterion of knowledge or the concept of knowledge like any other concept varies from one context to the other. Minus the context, it is neither "knowledge" nor "not knowledge". For example, the concept of beauty of blacks is different from the concept of beauty of a pure black society.

Here, Wittgenstein refers to "knowledge" as a "river". Just as the river- bed shifts its course, in the same way, the concept of knowledge also varies from one context to the other context. But that does not mean that 'knowledge' has no meaning that is, 'knowledge' still has meaning but we are not aware of the kind of meaning it conveys. It is only in a context that it has meaning. In order for knowledge to be possible, it must have the three elements that is, truth, certainty and right to certainty and also what makes them those elements will vary from one context to the other.⁷

And this arguably shows that relativism implicit in this aspect is of a classic or standard type. Relativism is the view that truth and knowledge are not absolute or constant but it is dependent upon view point, circumstances or historical conditions.

What is true for one individual might not be true for the other, what counts as knowledge from one perspective might not do so from another or what is true at one time is false at another.

To Wittgenstein, there are certain empirical propositions whose contrary or negation never comes into consideration, those for whom any doubt, any question ‘is it true or false’, is ruled out. And were this not so, there would be no language game. To justify this statement, Wittgenstein takes various examples such as, ‘I know that my name is L.W.’, ‘that I have lived in this house for months’, ‘that I have a brain’, etc. are the kind of statements which sound a bit odd which means that we do not utter and think them in the form in which we just wrote them. ‘I’ just accept them in so far as ‘I’ act. For example,

The child doesn’t learn that there are books, there are armchairs, etc., rather, he learns to fetch books, and sits in armchairs, etc. together these propositions (ways of acting, facts) constitute a system or a whole.⁸

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein quite often talks about ‘logic’ and ‘a logical question’, ‘a logical insight’, and so on as the entire book is a discussion of what logic is and what logical principles are. To him, logic is a formal system of principles. While, the discussion of what logic is goes all the way back to the *Tractatus* where he had something like “Our business is not the construction of formal systems, but rather: what is that makes any such construction possible”.

But in *On Certainty* he says something very different. ‘If you demand a rule from which it follows that there can’t be a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this

through a rule, but by learning to calculate.’⁹ And then: ‘what sort of proposition is: “What could a mistake here be like!”? It is a logical proposition, for it does describe the conceptual situation.’¹⁰

Here, Wittgenstein is describing what belongs to a language game. He maintains that everything descriptive of a language game is a part of logic.

Now I shall talk about Wittgenstein’s theory of hinge propositions, a theory which he formulates to attempt to salvage what he takes to be an important insight contained in Moore’s article ‘A Defence of Common Sense’.

To begin with, Wittgenstein defines “Hinge propositions” as the propositions which no sensible person would doubt.¹¹ They are so fundamental or basic in our activities that to imagine them as doubtful is to imagine everything to be plunged into chaos.¹² Wittgenstein’s most important claim about hinge propositions is that they can neither be justified nor doubted, since their certainty is presupposed in all judging. In other words, a basic proposition or hinge proposition is neither true nor false nor non-sensical that is, it is something which is taken as self-evident. Examples of hinge propositions are, ‘I have two hands’, ‘My name is L.W.’, and ‘ $12 \times 12 = 144$ ’, ‘Good morning’ are propositions for which no justification is needed.

J.W. Cook in his article “Notes on Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty*” defines hinge propositions not as things we normally talk about but rather as propositions which are implied by what we say. To Wittgenstein, they are the foundation, the substratum, the scaffolding or framework of our thoughts, the assumptions of our language games and he also maintains that they are never called or

taken into consideration or question, perhaps not even ever formulated. Wittgenstein's point is that 'if they are ever formulated', they are free from doubt¹³ and like *Philosophical Investigations* states that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts.

Hinge propositions play an important role in our linguistic practice. Wittgenstein claims that 'Hinge' propositions like facts of nature are overlooked because they form a part of the background of our language-games.

Among the world picture or hinge propositions discussed by Moore and Wittgenstein, there are four kinds of hinge propositions.

The hinge propositions of the trans-historical kind are not based on investigation or analysis and are not supported by evidence because there are no more fundamental propositions on the basis of which they could be believed. For example, 'the earth has existed for a long time' and 'cats don't grow on trees'. They belong to our scaffolding of our thoughts. Hinge propositions are also known as basic propositions. There is evidence for these propositions in the sense that they could be defended by offering certain considerations. For example, geological and evolutionary evidence can be given, for example, for the proposition 'world has existed for a hundred years'. Our belief in them is something 'animal'. . . . (OC: 359, 475). While, the sceptic has gone wrong by failing to recognize that there are propositions of this kind.

The second kind of hinge proposition is that which change with time. They were originally supported or discovered by evidence, but once established, occupy a pivotal role in relation to

others such as that there is a brain in the human skull. The first two types of propositions are termed as impersonal hinge propositions.

Third type of hinge proposition is that about which each person is certain for himself, for example, 'I have two hands' and 'My name is L.W. and the fourth kind of propositions are those which are a part of one's specific world picture. And, they are also known as person specific propositions. For example, 'I have spent most of my life in Germany'.¹⁴

In nutshell, Wittgenstein makes a variety of claims about hinge propositions. They are certain not just for individuals but for every person. For example, the claim that in a certain part of England there is a village called so-and-so.¹⁵

Wittgenstein maintains that *On Certainty* revives the *Tractatus's* saying / showing distinction and asserts that 'Hinge' propositions can only show themselves in our practice. For example, 'Existence' is something which cannot be questioned but something which can only be shown. Thus, to Wittgenstein, 'Hinge proposition' is something which is at the level of 'showing' and not 'saying'. The moment one reaches a point where all explanation comes to an end is the point where we replace 'explanation' with 'showing'. For example, there is no explanation for the letter 'D' that is, it can only be shown.

V

Conclusion – A Brief Critical Evaluation

From the preceding discussion, the filtered or crystallized view is that according to Wittgenstein, Moore is taking a naïve realist position. His main task is to point out to Moore that he has

fallen into the trap of the sceptics by taking the first step, saying that the proposition 'I have two hands' is a certain proposition that is, it does not require any justification. Moore's argument is that for certain things, no criterion is required. He has fallen into the category of people who are trying to find a proposition which is synthetic in nature and immune from doubt. And he maintains that if the proposition 'here is one hand' is proved, then the external world is automatically proved. While, to Wittgenstein, there can never be a proposition which is always incorrigible, self-evident or immune from doubt. Even the most obvious proposition 'I have two hands' is subject to doubt or uncertainty.

Moore is giving an ontological argument that is, a correspondence theory of truth whereas Wittgenstein believes in a semantic theory of truth. Wittgenstein challenges the question of truth that is, there is no correspondence theory of truth, that in a particular situation, we can say that, this is true and this is not true. In a context alone, a proposition can be true. Wittgenstein is trying to show in *On Certainty* that 'what is fundamental is the form of life' that is, our growth into a language. Form of life and language are interwoven terms. As form of life will grow, language also grows. And once we grow, the question will not be 'right to certainty' but 'rights to certainties'. Wittgenstein with the help of the examples cited earlier is trying to show that we must base ourselves in a 'form of life'. To Wittgenstein, language, the concepts, the conceptual framework etc is not something which is fixed but it is constantly in the process of evolution. This can be explained with the help of the following example, "Cry is the natural expression of pain" for which no justification is required.

Asking for justification is a nonsensical question because we have grown into a particular form of life.

According to Wittgenstein, the whole issue sceptic is taking is a language generated problem and so it has to be dissolved. Both, Moore and Wittgenstein claim at the same thing that is, the sceptic is wrong but the arguments laid down by both of them are different. Moore believes in the determined picture of the world but Wittgenstein does not.

The target Wittgenstein was aiming the point where doubt becomes senseless, the point of attack at which he believed Moore to have made an accurate attack. He believes that it is not justifiable to doubt everything and this is true not only for practical reasons, like insufficient time but it is true for the intrinsic logical reason that is, 'A doubt without an end is not even a doubt'. But we do reach that end with statements that begin with 'I know...'. And, he believes that such statements have a use only in a 'stream of life' outside a form of life, it has no meaning.

Wittgenstein argues that both sceptics and their opponent use words such as "doubt" and "know" in different ways in their debates. In ordinary language we use words such as "doubt" and "know" to describe things about which we can be uncertain, so it is misuse of ordinary language to assert that "I doubt that I have two hands" or even "I know that I have two hands". Likewise, the word "uncertain" is not ordinarily applied to fundamental commonsense beliefs, such as the belief in an external world. If we want to know what is certain and what is uncertain, we only need to look at how these terms are ordinarily used.

The sceptics maintain about the uncertainty of knowledge of the existence of an external world and continue to suggest the suspicion about the existence of even our own bodies. And those who are opposed to them endeavors to establish that scepticism is wrong by establishing proofs for the existence of the external world. But, to Wittgenstein, the thinking of both the groups is wrong.

On Certainty performs a three-concerned argument with Moore and the sceptic. Wittgenstein grants that Moore is certain of the common-sense truisms which are discussed in his article “A Defence of Common Sense” but denies that he knows them. Wittgenstein also denounces Moore’s claim to have justified the philosophical proposition that ‘there are physical objects’. For the sceptic, a doubt remains, namely ‘why should looking at my hands guarantee anything?’ Basically, he is not remonstrating a move within our established language-games, for example, that Pluto exists. He believes that this kind of doubt can be sorted out by observations and calculations. By denying that there are any ways of making sure, he is challenging the whole language-game of physical-object discourse. In claiming to know that he has two hands, Moore takes for granted the conceptual framework which the sceptic attacks.¹⁶ But, Wittgenstein tries to weaken both the positions by attacking the sense of the very proposition ‘There are physical objects.’

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The Message of the Bhagvadgītā

*Dr. Sharda Kusum Mishra**

The *Gītā* is the most widely known work of Hindu Religion and Philosophy in the whole world. It is not a Book merely for the Hindus; its message has a universal application. It is as fresh today as it was centuries ago. *Gītā* is called an *Upaniṣad* for it derives its main inspiration from that remarkable group of scriptures; the Upanishads.

Sarvopaniṣdo gāvo dogdhā gopālnandanah

Pārtho vatsah sudhir bhoktā dugdham gūtāmṛtaṁ mahat .¹

"The popular verse from the *Vaiṣṇviya Tantrasār* makes out that the *Gītā* restates the central teaching of the Upaniṣads . The Upaniṣads are the cows and the cowherd's son Kṛṣṇa is the milker; *Arjuna* is the calf, the wise man is the drinker and the nectar-like *Gītā* is the excellent milk."

Modern man is in need of the message of the Bhagvadgita if he is to find freedom from the tension and anxieties brought into his life by the scientific and technological development of today.

The message of the *Gītā* has an important and practical bearing on the problem of the modern age. Though the *Gītā* gives us a vision of Truth, impressive and profound, though it opens up paths for the mind of man. The *Gītā* the divine song of the Lord occurs in the *Bhīṣma Parva* of the *Mahābhāra*, is the teaching of Lord Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna who was hesitant to fight with the *Kaurwas*, thinking them his family members and who thought that the victory after defeating the *Kaurwas* would be meaningless. Thus to

* Research Associate, J. Krishnamurti Study Centre, Vasana college for women, Rajghat Varanasi-221001

the confused mind of Arjuna the Lord gave the lesson of *karmyoga* based on the *Jnanayoga* and the *Bhaktiyoga*; which is decidedly the lesson against the escapism, materialism and cowardice and it is so that the Philosophy and teaching of the *Gītā* are meant for the whole humanity.

Looking at the *kurukśetra* war from a psychological standpoint, we perceive a new meaning in teaching of the *Gītā*. Kśetra means region. Kuru is derived from the root 'kr', to do; to act. So Kuruśetra can be interpreted by as the field of action. Though the teachings were given thousands of years ago and though it was given by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna and given on a battle field, it is applicable for all time to one and all and applicable in all spheres and walks of life. In fact the *Gītā* is classic as the science (Principal) and Art (technique) of Living offering a solution to all humans problems- individual & social- and showing the way to self-fulfilment through living the worldly life unattached on the understanding that though appearing to be the body we are in essence the spirit, the body being only our outer covering or clothing. And even as we keep our clothes clean, so too we must keep the body and mind pure so that they may not corrupt our soul. The twin dirt tends to our mind are- (1) body identification- the false idea that we are the body and (2) attachment (to the world).

If we try to digest properly the *Gītā*'s advice in the light of Vedic lore, it becomes amply clear how action performed without egocentric desire purge the mind of its deep seated impression and makes it increasing subtle in its purification and preparation for greater flights in the infinite beyond.

***Prajhāti yadā kāmān sarvānpārtha manogatān
Ātmany evātmanā tuṣṭaḥ sthitaprajñas tado cyate.²***

Since the true nature of mind is happiness therefore we should not to get tempted to perform action attached for the sake of happiness. Happiness & Calmness is a fact which is already accomplished with mind. When the mind is calm and unconditioned peace is already there in the mind. But generally we are provoked by the experiences of ups and down of our life and these experiences become the extractors of our Spirit (*ātman*) which is by nature calm and happy. The problem of Happiness seems to have been misstated.

Yadā te mohkalilam buddhir vytitariṣyati

tadā gantāsi nirvedam śrotavyasya śrutasya ca.³

It is not how to acquire happiness but how to not lose it, while driving the car of our life through the temptation and provocation of worldly living.

Desire and Anger make us drive car rashly so that we lose control and collide with the temptation and provocation on the way thus losing innate Equanimity and Happiness. We can maintain our peace and bless by reminding us our real form or the self and asking us to remain perpetually aware of it.

Yadā Samharate cā yañ kūrmo ngānīva sarvaśḥ

Indriāni indriyarthebhyas tasya prajñā pratiṣṭhitā.⁴

Dr. Radhakrisnan commented on this verse:

“He who draws always the senses from the objects of sense on every ride as a tortoise draws in his limbs into the shell; his intelligence is firmly set in wisdom.”⁵

The *Gītā* helps us to overcome Desire and Anger which are the only enemies in the way of our Peace and Happiness. Therefore in the arena of life he is the true fighters who face the temptation and provocation of the world squarely and not run away. Therefore

one should maintain peace of mind through inaction or give away yield to them through willful action.

The *Gītā* enacts the human drama highlighting: Man's struggle with temptations (action) and Provocation (reactions) in performing the duties of life and his evolution there through materially and spiritually. Failures there will be in plenty and relapses too but that's how we advance towards perfection.

Adharmaṁ dharmīṁ iti yā manyate tamsa vrta

Sarvārthan viprītāmśca buddhiḥ sā pārtha tāmāsī .⁶

"The type of understanding which brings sorrow to everyone including the individual himself is the understanding of the dull (*Tāmsīc*). Actually it is no understanding at all; it can at best, be called only chronic bundle of misunderstandings".⁷

The verse of the *Gītā* overhauls of our senses, of our values and of our order of priorities. It is not the world as such that rules us but our idea or the value we assign to any objects or event therein, and most of our ideas are false. Looking at the world and ourselves from the wrong ends of the (mental) telescope, we misjudge. Things – Mistaking the unreal for the real and vice versa – and so abandoning the Real (the spiritual true self) we go after unreal things delighting ever false gains and grieving over the false losses.

Such an intellect runs into its own conclusion only. It has such a totally perverted understanding that it recognizes *Adharma* as *Dharma*; the wrong as Right. This facility of coming to wrong judgments is remarkably seen in the dull because their entire reasoning capacity is enveloped by complete darkness and egoistic darkness.

"As the colophon indicates the Bhagvadgītā is both: Metaphysics and Ethics, Brahmavidyā and Yogshāshtra. It is the Science of Reality and the art of union with the reality. The truth of spirit can be apprehended only by those who prepare themselves for their reception by regions discipline. We must clean the mind of all distraction and purge the heart from all corruption to acquire spiritual wisdom."⁸

Gītā as Way of Life: Apart from the lower modes or levels of Realization which are too numerous to mention, there are broadly four well known approaches to Reality entitled *Jñānayoga* (the path of knowledge) *Bhaktiyoga* (the path of Devotion), *Karm Yoga* (the path of duty), and treated and treated at length in the Gītā. The major emphasis is on 'Karma' (Action) for without 'Karma' *Jñāna* (Knowledge) *Bhakti* (Devotion) and *Dhyāna* (Meditation) would be merely theoretical. The Gītā therefore insist that whatever Path one chooses, one must do one's duties and do them devotedly and disinterestedly in order to poster materially and progress spiritually.

"Be not so cowardly" Arjuna such faint – heartedness doth not become tree"

As Sri Kṛṣṇa Says –

Klaibyaṁ mā smā gamaḥ pārtha naitat tvayyupapadyate

Kṣūdrām hṛdayadaurbalyam tyaktvottiṣṭha parantapa.ṽ

"The world Klaibyam means, the mental attitude of one who is neither masculine enough to feel a passionate courage and daring, nor womanly enough to feel the soft emotions of hesitation and despair- From the above exhortation of Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna, it might appear as if the Gītā were glorifying war. But viewed in the context of Kṛṣṇa teaching as a whole Gītā neither Sanctions war nor condemns it. It merely says "Do your duty whether it be to

wage war or to keep peace." and it is purely on accident that in Arjuna's case this duty happens to be to fight. If at all the Gītā summons us to war, it is to war with ourselves to an encounter with our self will) – rather than will the world at large.”¹⁰

Sri Kṛṣṇa says :

***Mayi Sarvāṇi Karmāṇi sannyasyādhyātmacetasā
Nirāśīrṇirmamo bhutvā yudhyasva vigatajvaraḥ .***¹¹

The enemies are all within. There are no enemies outside unless are creates them by one's own enmity with oneself.

In the word of Shri Kṛṣṇa :

***Bandhuratmatmanastasya yenaivaivaatmana jītaḥ
anatmanastu struṭive vartatātmaiva satruvat .***¹²

For that self who has mastered oneself by oneself, the self alone is friend of oneself whereas, for the Self who has not mastered one self, the self alone would remain in the status of an enemy like an enemy. A restless of war of conflicts lies in the heart. If the war is banished from within (heart), it gets automatically banished from without (battle field) at least for ourselves as there is then no need to fight. Self conquest leads to world conquest”¹³This is the moral, rearmament of the Gītā to put our own house in order if we are right with ourselves, we cannot be wrong with the world. And if we are right with the world, the world cannot be wrong with us for long.

Ihai vatair jītaḥ sargo yeṣāṃ samyase sthitaṃ manaḥ

Nirdoṣaṃ hi samaṃ brahma tasmād brahmaṇi te sīthitaḥ.¹⁴

Such an Individual who has conquered his mind and has come to live in perfect equinity, in all conditions of life in all the relationships, Kṛṣṇa Vehemently asserts, "He indeed rests in Brahman". Kṛṣṇa further says: "Since Brahman is even and ever perfect.

The beauty of the life is consists in living it cooperatively with others as a family, for the advancement of the universe so that all become happy by taking their rightful place there in.

In willful living, based on desire we only think about our own development therefore we come into conflicts with society. The willful living includes both willful action and willful enjoyment. Both action and enjoyment should be spiritual living. Hence whether expounding *Jñāna yoga* and *Bhakti yoga* – the *Gītā* present a way of life which leads to self realization in through worldly living; in fact worldly duties are designated by Lord Kṛṣṇa as '*Svadharmā*':

Śreyān Svadharmo Viguṇaḥ, Paradharmāt Svanuṭhitat

***Svadharme Nidhanaṁ Sreyah, paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ.*¹⁵**

“Better is one’s own law (*Dharma*) although it is imperfect but one should not choose the law of another although it is perfect. Better is death in the fulfillment of one’s own law for to follow another’s law is perilous.” These verses have very significant message.

Shri Aurbindo has commented on this *svadharmā* or individual’s duty in his book ‘The *Gītā*’, here he supports the idea of dispassionate act, reasonable performance free from blind faith and rash emotion. He writes: Man has a conscious intelligent will, a *buddhi*, and to that he must refer his actions. If he does not do so, if he acts blindly according to impulses and passions, then the law of his being is not rightly worked out. He acts not as a man but as an animal.”¹⁶

The *Gītā* does not favor *Samnyāsa* (renunciation of the world) at any stage of life, not even towards the end of life. How can on earth is *Samnyāsa* possible when one has lived a life of attachment all though and of what use too is mere formal adoption

of the ascetic order by change a dress, if the mind is in fact unascetic.

The *Samnyāsa* of *Gītā* is true, all time renunciations practiced from moment to moment in the course of one's worldly living through the performance of all acts in a spirit of abandonment (non attachment). The house holder is no less spiritual for the domestic duties performed. In other words *Samnyāsa* of the *Gītā* is mental not physical.

Anāśritaḥ Karmaphalaṁ Kāryam karma Karoti yah

***sa samnyāsī ca yagi ca na niragnirnacā kriyaḥ* "**

He who does the work which he ought to do without seeking its fruits, he is the, *Samnyāsa* he is the *yogin*, not he who does not light the sacred fire, and performs no rites. This verse says that disciplined activity (*yoga*) is just as good as *Samnyāsa*.

This is the socialism of the *Gītā* to visualize all as one self spiritually and therefore to treat all as oneself by being friendly charitable to all social good being seen to be our own individual good and to see all materially as part of one homogenous.

According to the *Bhagvadgītā* every individual has a particular need and capacity to do particular job. One should not do a job because it is more fruitful or because somebody else has done it. One is the best judge of one self's. He should be open minded in getting good advices and opinions regarding the process he is going to apply and the policy he is going to pursue, but he must weigh his own needs, inclination , and ability in connection to those undertakings. The four groups of mankind –*Brahamins* or teachers, *Ksatriyas* or warriors, *Vaisyas* or traders, *Śudras* or *sevak* or unskilled workers- were created by God with their respective nature and aptitude. The *Gītā* says:

*Cāturvarṇyam mayā sṛstam Guṇahkarmavibhāgasah*¹⁸**Conclusion**

The *Gītā* is basically a manual of self culture so its primary emphasis is on the individual and only through him on society (equality).

In an age significant due to the impacts of political, economic and social forces, the *Gītā* brings to man a message of hope and cheer, for it shows a way of life, which leads to the regaining of his lost significance. The spiritual regeneration of man is indeed the way to the creation of happy society.

That is why the holy *Gītā* has an important and practical bearing on the problems of the modern age it shows a way out of the complexities of the mind to complete and unfettered freedom of the unconditioned mind. This path is not meant only for the few it can be trodden by all who seek freedom from life entanglements.

Modern man is indeed besieged with great inner conflicts and these conflicts, which have caused the utter disintegration and unhappiness. Without the search of inner integration man cannot solve their problems and for this integration there can be no better guide than the teachings of the *BhagwadGītā*.

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A DIALOGUE

We find the long and very rich tradition in Indian and Western Philosophy. Dialogue is a medium which can make intelligible very deep and obscure concepts. It is of permanent feature of Journal of Darśana. In this volume of Journal of Darśana Dr. Rajesh Kumar Chaurasia with Prof. P. Krishna talk about the scientific and religious quest. Only two quests are fundamental one is about the external world and the other is about the self or about internal world. I believe that a student of philosophy will find some significant thought provoking concepts in these dialogues.



Professor Padmanabhan Krishna is a unique scholar with an acute scientific mind and a great spiritual sensitivity. He did his masters in Physics in 1959 and his Ph.D. in 1962 from the Banaras Hindu University. His Ph.D. was published by John Wiley and Sons, New York as a book entitled “Polymorphism and Polytypism Crystals” in 1966. He has conducted Post Doctoral Research at the University of Cambridge, the University of Wisconsin, and the Cambridge Research Labs in Boston and the University of Bristol in England during the career as scientist. He worked as a faculty of the Physics Department at Banaras Hindu University till 1986. In 1986, at the persuasion of J. Krishnamurti he took voluntary retirement from the University and joined the Rajghat Education Centre as its Rector since 1986, he is giving his valuable services to the Krishnamurti Foundation of India. **Prof Ravi Ravindra**, Professor Emeritus at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada; rightly points out that Prof Krishna is the best living expositor of J. Krishnamurti’s Teachings. At present he is working as an Advisor of Rajghat Education Centre, Varanasi.

The Religious and Scientific Quest

(A Dialogue with Prof. Padmanabhan Krishna)

Rajesh: As a student of Philosophy I personally feel immense possibilities of philosophy in J. Krishnamurti's teachings but he himself said again and again that his teachings are not philosophy. Can we begin with this?

Prof. Krishna: Why not? The true meaning of the word philosophy is love of truth. But the concept of truth as understood in philosophy now is different from the truth which is regarded as truth by Krishnamurti. To him truth is not a correct idea because ideas do not transform consciousness. A professor of philosophy knows everything that the Buddha said, that the Christ said and he can give you a good talk about them but his consciousness is neither the consciousness of Buddha nor the consciousness of Christ. So, the knowledge, though it changes his ideas and opinions does not transform the consciousness. Now what is important about the Buddha and about Jesus is that they came upon the consciousness which had love and compassion and which was free from all the negative emotions the human consciousness is normally subject to. That is the real purpose of religious inquiry- to come upon liberation, which is variously called as *Nirvana*, *Moksha*, *Samadhi* and so on. Socrates called it order in consciousness. You do not come upon it because you have the logic and the correct definitions of words or correct ideas about things. To Krishnamurti truth was at the level of perception, something which one realized from one's own perception of what is true and what is false, as distinct from an idea acquired from a book or a teacher. Take for instance Buddha's statement that desire is the cause of sorrow. You can explain it logically but the

explanation is not the perception of the truth. It is only a way of communicating an idea about truth.

Rajesh: You mean to say that for Krishnamurti Philosophy was a body of knowledge; that is why he said again and again that his teachings are not philosophy?

Prof. Krishna: He said, it has become a body of knowledge but the original meaning of philosophy is not that. The original meaning of philosophy was love of truth and if you really understood what the Buddha was trying to communicate you would come upon the Buddha- consciousness, not just ideas about it. So he distinguished between the description of the truth and the perception of the truth. The intellectual understanding of the truth is not the realization of that truth. For the realization of the truth he said one must take a statement as a question, investigate it in one's own life, explore deeper into its meaning and find out for oneself whether it is true. Buddha also said "You have to be a light unto yourself. Ideas can be obtained from a book or through a guru, but according to Krishnamurti truth cannot be obtained from any book or teacher. It has to be perceived by oneself. Only then it becomes truth for you and then it becomes something real not just an idea and therefore it transforms consciousness.

Krishnamurti said the root meaning of the word 'idea' was 'to see'; later it got corrupted and became 'to think'. Truth comes into existence when a consciousness perceives the fact, without any distortion. That is very different from thinking or agreeing.

Rajesh: The word for philosophy in *Sanskrit* is *Darśana* and I think that no one can say that his teachings are not *Darśana*.

Prof. Krishna: No, but it is for true philosophy. Even Socrates when he talked about Virtue he said it is order in consciousness. He was the first one, much before Krishnamurti who used the

phrase 'order in consciousnesses'. He said that there is only one virtue and that is 'order in consciousness', which means absence of all conflicts, absence of all negative emotions. Such a consciousness is an orderly state with love, compassion, joy, happiness and so on. It means, you have freed yourself from all forms of sorrow. That was the true purpose of philosophy. But now philosophy has become merely logical conclusions like in science. In science you do not need to come upon the insights which Newton and Einstein had. It is enough to learn the logic and the correct equations. In the scientific quest that is good enough as it works but not so in the religious quest, as it will not transform your consciousness.

If you read Vivekananda's book- 'What is Religion?', he says that the entire purpose of religion is to come upon liberation from negative emotions like anger, violence, jealousy, conflict, sorrow and fear etc. It is a different consciousness, not just different ideas. So the religious quest for truth is different from the philosophic quest for truth. Krishnamurti said that philosophy now has become just talks about other people's ideas and he was not interested in that.

Rajesh: Sir! If we compare the word philosophy with the Sanskrit word *Darśana* they have different meanings and one can say that his teachings are not a philosophy but no one can say that his teachings are not a *Darśana*.

Prof. Krishna: *Darśana* means *Pratyakśha Darśana* or direct perception.

Rajesh: Yes, it means looking at something, observation, insight etc.

Prof. Krishna: Yes that is the true meaning of philosophy for Krishnamurti also.

Rajesh: The difference between *Darśana* and Philosophy is important even the origin of the two is different. Plato said that origin of philosophy is wonder and Aristotle said that the origin of philosophy is curiosity. But in India origin of *Darśana* is not wonder or curiosity; it is spiritual discontent. When a philosophy originates from spiritual discontent it cannot be mere ideation but it slowly comes to be understood as mere ideation.

Prof. Krishna: You see, even in the field of academic knowledge there is a great value of insight. Let's take the example of relativity which Einstein discovered. He was educated into classical physics. Since at that time modern physics did not exist; time and space were considered to be completely separate entities with no connection between them. Mass was considered to be the quantity of matter in the material and so on. These were certain concepts which were the basis of classical physics and he was educated in that. Based on those assumptions they built the entire world of Newtonian Physics by applying logic and mathematics. It explained many things but some observations did not fit. So Einstein knew that something somewhere was wrong in classical Physics.

That set him wondering and as he grappled with the problem he had a sudden flash of insight that space and time must be connected, not independent of each other. It is quite mysterious how such insights occur in human consciousness. That fact was not in Einstein's knowledge, it was not also in his experience but the insight brought something completely unknown into the field of the known. Thereafter it was subjected to analysis and tests to verify if it was true. All completely new discoveries are the result of such insights. That insight is not a thought process, it is a new perception. Computers can also think, they can calculate faster

than human beings but they cannot have insights. That is unique about human consciousness.

So there is a role of insight in academic philosophy also but in the religious quest it has much greater value, a different dimension. In religion it is not enough to have a good understanding of the Buddha's teaching. You can teach the Buddha's teaching but will you be free from sorrow? The consciousness of the professor of philosophy is not the consciousness of the sage and the religious quest is for transformation of consciousness, not simply ideation. May be originally philosophy meant the religious quest but now philosophy has been reduced to a mere intellectual exercise.

Rajesh: Sir, in India they are one. Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist religion, *Vedanta* philosophy and *Vedanta* religion are one here.

Prof. Krishna: Yes, but the professor of Buddhist philosophy is not a Buddha.

Rajesh: It is the same with the Buddhist monk who also does not have the consciousness of the Buddha.

Prof. Krishna: A true monk is partly in that because that is his aim. In philosophy the individual is not even aiming at the transformation of consciousness; he/she is satisfied with the intellectual understanding. Therefore the two quests are different. The scientist also, is interested in obtaining an equation to explain how nature functions and so on. He is happy with the explanation. He is also not demanding a transformation in consciousness. In the same way the modern philosopher is not demanding transformation either. That is the difference between a religious man and a philosopher/ scientist. By a religious man I do not mean a pseudo-religious man who merely puts on some paint on his forehead and

dresses in a particular way or lights a lamp in a particular way; that is all very superficial. The deeper meaning of religion is freedom from all negative emotions. Unless you come upon that you are not really a religious man. You may be pretending to be a religious man.

Rajesh: Sir! Somewhere you said that the religious quest and the scientific quest both are parallel, complementary to each other but I believe that they are very different. Can we discuss this?

Prof. Krishna: Yes, they are different because their areas and aims are different but the approach can be similar: positing the truth as the unknown, not accepting on authority or belief, giving importance to observation and inquiry, doubting all conclusions in short approaching both the external world and the inner world of our consciousness with a learning mind. Science deals with the measurable and the religious mind with consciousness which is not measurable. But both the measurable and the immeasurable are a part of existence; in that sense the two quests for truth are complementary. The scientific quest is a quest for understanding how the order of nature functions, what are the laws which govern that order and so on; but you cannot change that order. You can only understand how it functions. Nature is already in order; some of which you understand as causation but there is a huge part of nature which we do not understand. Scientific knowledge does not require any change. It requires only intellectual understanding of how nature functions. If you ask a scientist why nature is orderly and why it follows these laws; he cannot answer these questions. He will say I am a student of nature, I find that nature is orderly and there are definite causes and effects. Nature follows certain laws and the logic of mathematics. In the religious quest, quite distinct from the philosophical quest, you do not want just an explanation of how disorder originates in your consciousness; you

want to end it. You want the ending of the disorder and therefore you want an actual change in consciousness. So there is something concrete to be achieved in the religious quest. In the scientific and philosophical quest the achievement is only at the level of ideation.

The scientist has the correct idea of how nature functions and how the universe began, and how different species came into existence etc but there is nothing to be changed. The aim is to arrive at the correct knowledge about phenomena. Nature is already in order. When it comes to our consciousness it is not in order. There is a lot of disorder in the form of hatred, conflict, violence, fears, frustration, worries, sorrow etc. So you have to end the disorder in order to come upon an orderly consciousness. That is the religious quest. The Buddha said that the disorder in the consciousness can end because it has a cause and the cause is illusory, therefore it can be ended. Illusion means you are taking something as true which is not true; it is not a fact of nature. It is simply a mental construct made by some human being and you are accepting that construct as true. For example casteism in India or the male attitude towards women, nationalism, superstitions or competition; these are learnt from the propaganda in society. These are not facts of nature. If we have such illusions; the illusion produces division and violence and produces greed, selfishness and so on. So if you free your mind from illusion that means you see things as they are and not through the ideation of your mind. It is the religious quest in which you are in direct contact with life, not through beliefs and thoughts.

Rajesh: Sir! I find some fundamental differences between the scientific quest and the religious quest for example in the scientific quest the observer is never the observed. In the religious quest they are both the same. The scientific quest is about external objects

which are not the part of subject but in the religious quest the subject and the object are one and the same.

Prof. Krishna: Not always, for example you can find the relation between energy and mass or force and acceleration and so on, these things are constructs in the human mind.

Rajesh: But here, sir, activity of the mind comes in later as reason.

Prof. Krishna: Natural laws are connected with constructs of the human mind in the scientific quest, like force is proportional to acceleration and the mass is the constant proportionally between these two. It is the human mind which has defined the force and how to measure force and acceleration and so on. Then a scientist does an experiment and finds that they are proportional and defines mass out of that and so on, it means that lots of conceptual things are also there in science.

Rajesh: You are right sir conceptual thing as reason are there but the reason comes later in this activity and its role is quite different from that in the religious inquiry. In scientific inquiry reason can expand the knowledge but in religious quest reason cannot expand the self knowledge, it only explains it.

Prof. Krishna: In the religious inquiry also reason can expand the knowledge as a logical explanation. For example one can explain how desire can produce sorrow etc. But I am not freed from desire by the logical explanation. So there is a step needed beyond logical explanation, namely the direct perception of that truth. The explanation is not wrong, logical explanations are correct but the problem is it is only in the head. It cannot transform the desire and all the complications of desire. One can give the analysis how it happens and that analysis is correct as philosophy. If you have a desire either it will be fulfilled or it will not be fulfilled, if it will not be fulfilled you will feel frustration. That is the nature of

desire: I want something and if I do not get it, it will produce disappointment, frustration and so on. If I get it, I momentarily feel great satisfaction but then boredom sets in because desire was energizing you and when it ends the energy will go until another desire is born. So you go to a state of low energy which is stagnation. Now, stagnation and boredom are both sorrows. So, if you are caught in this vicious circle of desire you will live either with boredom or with frustration. This explanation is logically correct so I can give it as philosophy but it does not mean that I am free from desire, I may still be trapped in the vicious cycle. Oscar Wilde put this in his inimitable words, “There are only two tragedies in life: one is not to get what you want; the other is to get it!”

Rajesh: You are right sir. Whole reality is conditioned as Krishnamurti pointed out in the book named ‘Truth and Actuality’¹. He said the word ‘Reality’ comes from ‘*res*’ means thing, and that anything that thought operates on or reflects about is reality. Therefore spiritual or scientific, all explanations are conditioned by thought; they may be real but are not true. But even at the level of reality, I see a basic difference between the scientific and religious quests.

Prof. Krishna: They are different because the area of their study is different. Science is not studying consciousness, science is studying nature as the external world and you are right that it is objective and the observer which is consciousness is separate from it. They eliminate observer therefore basic science cannot study the observer because the observer is eliminated. So any subjective experience is not a part of science. In the religious quest you are watching and learning about your own consciousness, so here the

1 J. Krishnamurti, “Truth and Actuality”, Krishnamurti Foundation India Publication Chennai, 2008, Page 15.

observer is not different from the observed. The observed is a part of the observer. When I am watching myself, the watcher is not different from the watched. I am learning how things happen in my own consciousness; but here too you can discover cause and effect and this knowledge of cause and effect can be called philosophy; but it is still not religion. Religion requires that you should end this causation so that the effect of this causation ends. This means if you end boredom, if you end frustration then you are free from sorrow but this ending requires something more than the explanation of the cause and effect: it requires a deeper perception of the truth.

Take another example. I can explain how conflict arises due to differences in beliefs. The Hindu is attached to his beliefs and the Muslim to his. They both believe that their belief is superior hence the conflict. This explanation is not wrong but it does not remove that division. They require a deeper perception that this whole thing is born of illusion and they do not really know what the truth is. Neither of them knows what God is. Each is merely asserting what he has been told about god and they are attached to their own assertions. This attachment creates division and from there comes hatred and violence and so on. So the whole thing is arising out of illusion and they are not aware of it. They take it for granted that their concept of God is correct and superior when the fact is they do not know what God is. If only they had the humility to admit that they do not know what God is then they would become friends and say we have been told different things. Let us try to find out what the truth is. The division is comes from attachment to illusion.

Rajesh: Two more things I want to add in this inquiry: one is that a question is never an answer in a scientific quest but in the spiritual or religious quest the question itself is answer because the

whole inquiry is subjective. The second thing is that in the scientific inquiry doubt is always logical but it is not so in the religious quest. In the religious quest it is psychological.

Prof. Krishna: In certain ways the scientific quest and the religious quest are parallel and in other ways they are not parallel. The parallel is that you are positing truth as the unknown both in science and in religion. For example in science we do not really know what the electron is. We only check its behaviour and find that sometimes it behaves like a particle and in other experiments it behaves like a wave. So we are trying to find out what the reality is but do not know it; so we posit it as the unknown and we are trying to approximate an idealized picture to the reality. But we cannot claim to know reality. What we explain in science is an approximate reality. So the scientific quest progresses through successive approximations to reality but never actually touches reality except in experiment. In experiment we are dealing with reality, with nature but in a theory we deal with a model which is a construct of the human mind. They have developed an objective method to determine how closely the model corresponds to reality.

Science does not deal with values but in applying the scientific method they have developed several values which now constitute the scientific temper. Science cannot answer whether you should be a kind person or an unkind, cruel person. This is a religious question; it is not a scientific question. The scientific temper says that posit reality as the unknown, observe the phenomenon you are studying carefully, measure what you can and collect data, find correlations between different measured parameters and try to explain how these correlations are arising. Then guess an underlying model of reality behind it. So we have a model of universe, a model of the atom, a model of solid, liquid and gas. In theory science is always dealing with models. Then

they check whether these models approximate to reality and to what extent. For this they apply the known laws of physics and logic including mathematics and create a theory. That theory must predict new observations which must exist. One must experiment and check whether those predictions are true or not. If those productions are found to be wrong, you know that your model is not correct. Then you start all over again and guess a new model of reality because the previous model was not true. On the other hand if the theory explains the observations approximately then you know that the model is not completely wrong. And you try to refine it. So, the concept behind the theory goes on changing but the test is always the same, namely whether the new model which you are constructing can explain all the experimentally observed facts. If you can, then science considers that model to be a close approximation to reality.

So in science the truth has to be based on evidence, it has to be logical and you should be able to demonstrate it to everybody. It is not something like a dream you saw but you cannot show to others; that will not be accepted in science. You should be able to prove it to everybody. Then because science posits the truth as the unknown, it encourages inquiry; a scientist will say that all conclusions can be questioned and doubted. Science does not accept anything on authority of one scientist, however great he may be. There is an international dialogue going on throughout the world because we are saying that there is only one science, the reality is same for everybody but we do not know it completely. Therefore there is humility because we know that we do not know what reality is, there is enquiry and there is great importance of observation and experiment. . All this is a part of the scientific temper.

According to Krishnamurti the same approach is applicable to religious inquiry too; not the same experimental method but the same approach, the same mindset. Here also the truth is not different for different persons; it is universal. The truth about desire and frustration which we talked about is the same for an American, a Frenchman or an Indian. Just as there is no American science, Indian science or African science and so on, there is also only one religious mind. That there are so many different religions in the world is due to mistaking religion for belief and accepting belief on authority. Therefore Krishnamurti questions the different religions of the world and suggests that there is only one religious mind which is a mind free from the disorders of consciousness.

Rajesh: May be the differences among Religions are due to mere the different expressions of the truth.

Prof. Krishna: Expression is merely a language. It is a means of communication. So when a sage comes upon a truth he wants to communicate that to people; somebody may communicate it as poetry, somebody as parables, and somebody through songs and somebody may give lectures and explain it logically. So you find that Kabir expresses it differently and Ramana does it differently, Krishnamurti does it differently. One can choose a method for expression but the truth they come upon cannot be different. There is only one truth; there is no such thing as Christian truth, Hindu truth and Buddhist truth. Truth has to be one.

Rajesh: Sir! Religious truth is non-verbal truth, untouched by thought but when it is expressed through a language it becomes the subject of thought that's why the language matters here.

Prof. Krishna: Let me define the truth. Krishnamurti does not define it this way but having read Krishnamurti and being a scientist, I have tried to define truth. The religious truth is not just

a correct idea or a correct definition. It comes into existence when a consciousness perceives 'what is', namely the fact, without any distortion. Now the distortion comes from your own mind and therefore you have to free the mind from this distortion; before that your perception is not a true perception. Otherwise, even the same external phenomenon different observers observe differently. They see the same scene selectively and their response to it is completely different. Take an example of Sania Mirza playing tennis. The Muslim clergy watching her play reacts angrily that a Muslim girl is exposing her legs which is immoral and so on. So, his belief system produces all kinds of dislike and he issues a *fatwa*. He is not able to watch the tennis. The press photographer comes with a desire to have a sexy picture for his magazine and so he is also not able to watch the tennis. He is also looking from his own point of the view and his observation is coloured by his desire. The umpire has to watch whether the ball falls inside the line or outside, whether the player made a foul and so on. So he is also observing the game from his point of view. None of these people is able to just enjoy the beauty of the game. So each observer seeing the same thing is seeing something different because he is focusing on certain aspect of the game. It is only an observer who sits there not trying to do anything except watch what is going on who really enjoys and watches the game. That is the great value of the witness consciousness which is watching without a motive. It has great value for both the scientific mind and the true religious mind.

So Krishnamurti says to learn about yourself, watch yourself with acute but passive awareness. Here passive means that you watch without any motive and do not interfere with what you are watching. You just see and when you see with a learning mind which is interested in coming upon a truth then you observe how

anger arises; what is the source from which it comes, how it develops, what it does to your consciousness and how it gradually dies. You are just observing, not interfering, not suppressing and you are not saying it is moral or immoral. When you are just observing and learning about yourself that kind of learning Krishnamurti says is a religious learning. Because then you are not projecting your own ideas into the observation; otherwise you are not observing the fact. So you do not perceive the truth, you perceive your own ideas.

Rajesh: Sir! May I ask you that what is the relationship between these two enquiries- religious and scientific- is it a one way relation or is it a two way relation?

Prof. Krishna: It is very easy to be objective in the scientific inquiry but in religious inquiry it is very difficult. All our religious, social, political and cultural beliefs are colouring our observation here. We come to it with all our opinions, our conditioning; therefore it becomes very difficult to be objective in religious inquiry. It is very easy in a scientific inquiry because if I am looking at a pendulum I am not involving my belief system or desires. I am able to look at it with a witness consciousness.

Rajesh: The religious inquiry is related with truth and the scientific inquiry is related with reality and we are discussing the relation between both inquiries. J. Krishnamurti suggested in 'truth and actuality' that it is a one way relation that "truth loves this (reality) but this does not love truth."¹ It means that religious inquiry has a broader aspect and it includes scientific inquiry but scientific inquiry does not include religious inquiry. It is a one way relation.

¹ J. Krishnamurti, "Truth and Actuality", page 26

Prof. Krishna: To answer that question we must first clearly understand what is meant by the religious quest. The scientific quest is fairly clearly understood but sometimes technology is mistaken for being its aim. Technology is only a by-product. The aim of the scientific quest is to understand the truth about how Nature functions. When Faraday discovered electromagnetism, he demonstrated the connection between electricity and magnetism by pushing a magnet along the axis of a metal coil and showing that it produced an electric current. At the end of his lecture someone at the back asked him, “all this is very well but of what use is this discovery?” His reply was, “It is a new-born child. Of what use is a new-born child?” He was doing his research not in order to run fans or engines or to generate power; he was doing it just to discover a truth of all the engineering applications of the discovery were by-products.

About the religious quest there is a lot of confusion. In the west, religion is considered synonymous with belief and faith because in Christianity doubt and inquiry were treated as heresy and forbidden. Before that the Greeks had promoted inquiry into truth, notably Socrates who regarded self-knowledge as the only true knowledge and advocated questioning. He even said that there is only one virtue and that is order in consciousness. However, Galileo was persecuted because some of his scientific findings contradicted the beliefs of the Christian church. From that day there developed a clear divide between science and religion in the west since science does not accept belief. In the eastern religions there was belief and ritual and worship but there has also been this long lineage of religious inquiry into truth, starting with the dialogues in the Upanishads followed by the inquiry promoted by the Buddha/ Mahavira/ Confucius/ Lao Tsu and so on. Belief was regarded as a private matter and different Hindu Gurus grew under

different beliefs. There were even groups that were totally materialistic and denied God. They were not ex-communicated like in Christianity. You could choose any wise man as your Guru to follow.

In the 20th century Vivekananda, Krishnamurti, Nisargadatta and Ramana Maharshi all promoted religious inquiry as the essence of religion, regarding belief and rituals as historical cultural accretions. The Theosophists said all religions are different paths to the same truth and the quest for that truth is the wisdom-religion. Krishnamurti pointed out that there is no path to truth, it comes to the mind as an insight and one must learn not to block that insight by having strong beliefs opinions or attachment.

With this definition of religion as an inquiry into the discovery of truth it ceases to be antagonistic to science and becomes a complementary quest for truth. The scientific method is then a part of the truth regarding the measurable aspects of our life while the religious quest is for the truth about the immeasurable aspects of our life, pertaining essentially to consciousness phenomena. Science is the search for the truth about matter, energy, space and time in the external world of Nature while religion is a quest for the truth about our consciousness. Both the external world and the inner world of our consciousness are part of a single reality.

If I may quote Krishnamurti about the relationship between the religious and scientific minds, he said, “The religious mind has no belief, no dogma; it moves from fact to fact. Therefore the religious mind is a scientific mind but the scientific mind is not the religious mind. The religious mind includes the scientific mind but a mind that is trained in the knowledge of science is not a religious mind.”

The religious quest for truth is really a quest for ending all illusions and can therefore be regarded as the quest for unlearning the false. Since disorder in consciousness arises from illusions it is also the quest for ending of disorder in consciousness, which is the same as coming upon wisdom and virtue in consciousness. The scientific quest also says that the way things appear to be to our senses is not the truth about nature. One has to investigate deeply to discover the truth. The two quests are similar in that sense. It is strange that there is tremendous order in Nature (which science tries to determine) except in human consciousness. Apparently our own thoughts and imagination create the disorder and we need to learn what is the right use of these faculties- memory, thought, language and imagination which evolution has endowed us with. In that sense one can say that the religious quest is a quest for coming upon a consciousness which is in harmony with the order of Nature. We human beings do not know what right living is and we need to discover that.

The existence of illusion in human mind is a fact. It is true that there is illusion in the human mind and it has certain consequences. But illusion itself is a construct, it is not a fact. Illusion has no existence in Nature, it is constructed by the mind. I can construct an imaginary ghost and then feel afraid of that ghost but the ghost is not a fact of nature. So, we ourselves are the authors of our sorrows but we are not aware of this. We think that circumstances alone create our sorrows. The Buddha pointed this out long ago. He revealed three great truths like the three laws of Newton in science. He said through his observation that sorrow exists in human consciousness that is the first truth. Second, that it has a cause: ignorance is the cause of sorrow, ignorance not as lack of knowledge but as illusion. Psychological suffering arises out of illusion (not physical or biological pain). The third truth is that it

can be eliminated by discerning what is true and what is false. When that is seen false ends and the cause of sorrow is eliminated. I see a parallel between this and the scientific inquiry. In the scientific quest also they are saying that what we see is not necessarily true. We see the earth as flat but actually it is a sphere. We see that the sun and stars go round the earth but actually the earth is rotating around its axis. Like that you see the sky as blue and it looks like we have a big roof on top of the world but actually there is no roof there, it is just an effect of the scattering of sunlight. So science says that find out the truth by doing experiment, by enquiring, etc. Here in the religious quest also it is the same. You may think that this man is a Muslim therefore he must be like this and like that but that division which you feel is coming from illusion; it is not based on facts. Similarly the whole earth is one but we have divided it as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, America and so on. Actually there are no boundaries on earth; it is all in our mind. I call one country as country and therefore it becomes very important for me and we create the propaganda of patriotisms and I feel I must defend this land against all others.

The result is that the forests go through those borders, the dogs go through those borders, birds fly across, rivers go through but I cannot go. I have to get a visa to cross these imaginary borders. Those borders are not on earth, they are in our heads therefore they are illusions. All that division and war comes out of this illusion. That is what it means that ignorance is the cause of our sorrow. Now this explanation is correct and therefore it is a part of philosophy but am I actually free from division? That is a religious question. If I have not freed myself of this division, I am only a scholar. It is not that religious inquiry does not create knowledge; it creates knowledge but if it ends with knowledge it is only philosophy.

Rajesh: Sir! Socrates said that knowledge is virtue and I also think that it is true that knowledge itself is a virtue.

Prof. Krishna: No, but what did he mean by knowledge? He said that only true knowledge is self-knowledge. Self knowledge is that knowledge which you obtain through your own perceptions.

Rajesh: He said *know thy self*.

Prof. Krishna: Yes! *Know thy self*, through self-knowledge, not through bookish knowledge. He even did not consider knowledge of the world as knowledge. The Buddhists call that lower form of knowledge and regard self-knowledge as a higher knowledge.

Rajesh: Sir! You only talked about three noble truths of the Buddha. You did not talk about the fourth novel truth that there is a path for *Nirvana*. Krishnamurti does not consider any path to truth. It means one can obtain truth without any specific *sadhana*, only through debates and discussions. The philosophers also believe that *vade-vade jayate tattva bodhah*.

Prof. Krishna: No, it is not only debate and discussion. He said that you must observe yourself in the mirror of relationship. Not only the relationship with the people but the relationship; with nature, with property, with money, with ideas because in all relationships your consciousness is revealed. Your anger, your hatred and so on, everything comes out in that relationship. There you can learn about yourself through watching, observation, not through arguments and books. The arguments and books have the value of creating questions but if you take the answers from there, it is only knowledge; it does not transform consciousness. Knowledge does have the value of communicating questions and the questions are jewels but the answers are not jewels. The answers are only intellectual understanding. If you find the answers through the exploration of the questions by watching

yourself in relationship, you can go from the intellectual understanding to the realization of the truth.

Let me explain the difference. You do not need a lot of arguments to know that you should not put your finger in the fire. Everybody knows it even the animals know it. Because you sense that it will burn immediately; it is so clear that you do not need any arguments. It is direct perception when it is through sensing. Actually I can give a scientific explanation for it but you do not need any explanation. The explanation is that this is made of carbohydrate and when you put your finger into fire at 1500 degree centigrade, this thing will heat up and combine with oxygen in the air. That burning is an exo-thermic reaction so the heat will further increase and therefore burning will go on happening. The sensory nerves carry this information to the brain and the brain will order the motor nerves to withdraw the finger. Although this explanation is correct but you do not need it to know that one should not put one's finger in the fire. Leadbeater said that no engineer ever makes a model on the assumption that water will run up the hill. It is so clear that one will never make a model on that basis. But in the religious quest we find that many people say things and what they are doing is just contrary to it. That is the problem that you have an idea but you are not living according to that idea. There is hypocrisy. We talk about non violence but we are violent. The idea of non violence will not remove the violence; but violence has a cause and if you understand the cause and free yourself from the causation then violence will end. Then you do not need to practice non violence. So, the true non-violence implies the ending of violence from our consciousness. Krishnamurti made the famous statement that virtue cannot be practiced, because it is a state of being, not a decision.

Rajesh: Sir! Here the important question is why we do not see the danger of our ego, danger of our hatred as we can see clearly the danger of fire.

Prof. Krishna: Two three things. First of all these questions are not planted into our mind through education. So when you do not pay attention to a certain area or certain questions you cannot discover those truths. Your attention is directed into science, into sociology into geography, into history and you read eight hours every day for 20 years to know how a rocket goes to the moon and so on. How many hours do we spend with the child to ask whether love is same thing as attachment? Is pleasure same thing as happiness? So these questions are not even planted in our mind, neither by our family nor by our education system. We think that these questions are not essential. We think other things are necessary because you have to earn a living and they gain importance but understanding oneself was never given importance. So, the minds are directed to studying the external world and therefore avoid looking into the internal world of our consciousness. Even the professors in the university are as ignorant as the gardener or the uneducated man (as far as his inner being is concerned) because they have never paid attention to that. That is one reason, the other is what we said earlier that the observer is the observed and therefore the interaction of the observer with the observation is very intimate. Therefore it is very difficult to be objective in the field of consciousness because our own desires, our beliefs etc distort our perception. So it is very difficult to come upon truth here. It is easier in science. A third reason is that the work of the previous people as knowledge does not help here. In science it helps. Newton's work helps the present scientists. So it is like accumulating knowledge. Einstein made the statement that we are standing on the shoulders of great ancestors when we are trying

to understand the universe. Because lots of previous work is done and if you understand that you will understand more and you can build new thing on it. But in the field of the spiritual quest Buddha's work does not enrich his son. He has to start his journey from the again from the bottom of the pit because what the Buddha's son learns from the Buddha can change only his ideas but not his consciousness. How do you go to realization of the truth from the knowledge that is the real question? It requires an insight and insight is not a thought process, neither in science and nor in religion. But in science even if you do not have the insight which Einstein had you can use the mathematics and the equations work. In the religious quest if you do not have insight, you have ashes. The analysis and explanations do not transform consciousness. You can have all the logic, all the knowledge of the four noble truths but you cannot end your sorrow through knowledge and mere logical analysis.

Rajesh: Sir! If it is true that we cannot reach the truth through mere knowledge and logical analysis then what is the significance of teaching philosophy in universities. Why we should teach the teaching of the Buddha and Krishnamurti in the colleges and universities?

Prof. Krishna: We must understand both what the value of knowledge is and what its limitations are. Even in science if Einstein was very attached to Newtonian concepts he could not have had a totally new perception. The value of knowledge is that it creates valid questions in our mind that is why Krishnamurti said that questions are the jewels. But you must hold that knowledge lightly and live with a learning mind which stays with questions and not with answers or conclusions. That applies to both quests.

Rajesh: Sir! Would you like to give some concluding remarks on the problem we are talking?

Prof. Krishna: Scientists are now discovering that even physical reality is not comprehensible by the human mind because the mind is conditioned by its experience which is limited by our senses. For example we have never encountered an entity which is both a particle and a wave. So we cannot really imagine what an electron or for that matter any elementary particle is really like. Similarly we are familiar with three dimensional space and when we are told space is curved by mass our mind finds it very difficult to imagine that. What scientists are saying is that the models we imagine are only a help for explaining how things work and should not themselves be regarded as reality. So the conditioning of the mind distorts perception and prevents us from seeing even physical reality as it is.

Imagine, for example how you would explain to a man blind from birth what colour is. It is impossible. Whatever explanation you give will create an illusion in the mind of the blind man because he will interpret it in terms of what he knows. We are literally like the seven blind men who touched the elephant in different parts and came to different conclusions!

If even physical reality is so difficult to conceive of, imagine how much more difficult the religious quest is where the interaction of the observer with the observed is infinitely greater.

No wonder then that only a handful of people have come upon total freedom from disorder in consciousness. On the other hand wise people are not so rare. So, I think one should not make enlightenment the aim of the religious quest. We know how we grow in knowledge; we should ask ourselves how a human being grows in wisdom. Clearly a mind that is filled with illusions has very little wisdom, so we should concern ourselves with the ending of illusions. The difficulty is that the mind that is in illusion is not

aware that it has an illusion since it takes that to be true. It is therefore important to approach oneself with a learning mind.

A learning mind is aware that it does not know the truth. Therefore it is not sure of its opinions and holds them lightly, like a scientist holds a theory, willing to drop it instantly if it does not represent the truth. It listens diligently to any opinion being expressed without either agreeing or disagreeing with it. Asks itself what it means and whether that is true? Does not answer that question from its knowledge but explores it by watching itself in the 'mirror of relationship'. Such a learning mind is not attached to tradition, always willing to re-examine any issue afresh and always open to something new, open to change. Real change is a by-product of understanding, not of will and control. Understanding comes from discovering the true meaning and true place of everything in life. What society calls religion is not real religion, what it considers is education is not real education, what it considers is love is not true love. When one lives with superficial meanings one lives with illusion. One thinks one knows when one does not know. Therefore it is important to re-examine the true meaning and true place of everything in life without assuming one already knows.

That is the only way to end illusion and grow in wisdom. If we have the capacity to end one illusion we have potentially the capacity to end all illusions. Ultimately one has to live with the wisdom one has but our wisdom does not have to be static, it keeps growing if one lives with a learning mind. Krishnamurti said such a learning mind is the true religious mind.

THIRD BHĀVANĀKRAMA (TEXT)

By **Kamalaśīla** and its Romanized Text by **Giuseppe Tucci**

Kamalaśīla (740–795) was an Indian Buddhist of Nalanda Mahavihara who accompanied Śāntarakṣita (725–788) to Tibet at the request of Trisong Detsen.

The Indian pandits, represented mainly by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and his disciple Ye-śes-dbang-po, form a known group. These scholars were all defenders of the *Madhyamaka* school, which is based upon Nāgārjuna's teachings. First of all, however, they taught the ten rules of behaviour of the Buddhist ethics (śīla) and a summary of the teachings according to the canonic Sūtras of the Mahāyāna, as well as the virtuous works of the six *pāramitās*. These exercises are supposed to lead, in a long seemingly endless way, to the gradual ascent to the acquisition of higher intellectual abilities finally culminating in Buddhahood. This trend was intensified after the debate of bSam-yas had taken place in the years 792 to 794; the exact outcome of this debate is still debatable.

Giuseppe Tucci (Italian pronunciation: [dzu'zeppe 'tuttʃi]; 5 June 1894 – 5 April 1984) was Italy's foremost scholar of the East, with such diverse research interests ranging from ancient Iranian religion to Chinese philosophy. He taught primarily at the University of Rome but was a visiting scholar at institutions throughout Europe and Asia. In 1931, the University of Naples made him its first Chair of Chinese Language and Literature. In 1933 he promoted the foundation the *Italian Institute for the Middle and Far East - IsMEO (Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente)*, based in Rome. The IsMEO was established as a "Moral body directly depending on Mussolini". Until 1945, when the IsMEO was closed, Gentile was its President and Tucci was its Managing Vice-President and, later, Director of the courses of languages.

Tucci officially visited Japan for the first time in November 1936, and remained there for over two months until January 1937, when he attended at the opening of the Italian-Japanese Institute (Istituto Italo-nipponico) in Tokyo.^[2] Tucci traveled all over Japan giving lectures on Tibet and "racial purity".

He organised several pioneering archaeological digs throughout Asia, such as in Swat in Pakistan, Ghazni in Afghanistan, Persepolis in Iran and in the Himalayas. He was also the promoter of the National Museum of Oriental Art. In 1978 he received the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding, in 1979 the Balzan Prize for History (ex aequo with Ernest Labrousse). During the course of his life, he wrote over 360 books and articles.

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§ 1. - *Śamatha and vipaśyanā.*

namas tārāyai | mahāyānasūtrāntanayapravṛttānāṃ saṃkṣepato
bhāvanākramaḥ kathyate | tatra yady api bo(dhisatt*vānām apa)-
rimito 'pramāṇādibhedena bhagavatā samādhir upadiṣṭaḥ, tathāpi
śamathavipaśyanābhyāṃ sarve samādhayo vyāptā iti | sa eva śamatha-
vipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgas tāvat kathyate [ṭ. 56 a] | uk-
taṃ ca bhagavatā:

nimittabandhanāj jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt |
vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayitvā śamathāñ ca vimu(cyata* iti)

tasmāt sakalāvaraṇaprahāṇārthinā śamathavi-
paśyane sevanīye | śamathabalena svālabane cittam aprakam-
pyaṃ bhavati nivāsthitapradipavat | (vipaśyanayā yathāvad dhar-
matattvāvagamāt) samyagjñānālokaḥ samutpadyate | tataḥ saka-
lam āvaraṇaṃ prahiyate | andhakāravād ālokodayāt | ata eva bha-
gavatā catvāry ālambanavastūni yogināṃ nirdiṣṭāni | a) (nirvi*kalpa)-
pratibimbakam | b) savikalpapratibimbakam | c) vastuparyantatā |
d) kāryapariniṣpattiś ca | tatra a) śamathena yat sarvadharmapra-
tibimbakaṃ buddhādirūpaṃ cādhimucyālambyate tan nirvikalppa-
pratibimbakam ucyate | tatra bhūtārthanirūpaṇā vikalpābhāvān nirvikal-

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pakam ucyate | yathāśrutodgrhītānāñ ca dharmāṇāṃ (prati*bimba-
kam a) dhimucyālambyata iti kṛtvā pratibimbakam ucyate | b) tad
eva pratibimbakaṃ yadā vipaśyanayā vicārayati yogī tattvādhiga-
mārthaṃ tadā savikalppapratibimbakam ucyate | tattvanirūpaṇāvikal-
pasya vupaśyanālakṣaṇasya tatra samudbhavāt | c) tasyaiva ca pra-
tibimbasya svabhāvaṃ nirūpayan yogī, darpa(ṇāntarga*tasvamu)-
khapratibimbapratyavekṣaṇena svamukhagatavairūpyāṇāṃ vini-
ścayavat, sarvadharmāṇāṃ yathāvat svabhāvāvagamāt | yadā vastu-
paryantatālakṣaṇāṃ tathatāṃ prativudhyati, tadā vastuparyantatā-
vagamāt prathamāyāṃ bhūmau vastuparyantatālabhanam ucyate [ṭe .
56, b] | d) tato bhāvanāmārgaṇa pa(riśiṣṭāsu bhūmiṣ*v oṣadhi) rasī) ras
yanopayogād iva kramaṇa viśuddhataratamakṣaṇodayād^(a), āśraya- va-
parāvṛttau satyām, āvaraṇaprahāṇalakṣaṇā kāryaparisaṃpattir ya-
dā bhavati, tadā buddhabhūmau tad eva (jñānaṃ) kāryapariniṣpat-
tyālabhanam ucyate | tad evam, anena kiṃ darśitaṃ bhavati?
śamathavipaśyanābhyāṃ samastavastuparyantatāshigamo bha-
(vati | *tena cāva) raṇaprahāṇalakṣaṇā kāryapariniṣpattir avā-
pyate | tad eva ca buddhatvam | ato buddhatvādhigamārthinā
śamathavipaśyane sevanīye | yas tu te na sevate tasya naiva vastu-

(a) ms. °ratalakṣa°.

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paryantatādhiḡamo rāpi kāryapariniṣpattir iti | tatra śamathas
cittaikāgratā | vipaśyanā bhūtapratyavekṣeti saṃkṣepād ārya-
ratna(meghādau* bhagavatā) śamathavipaśyanayor lakṣanam
uktam |

§ 2. - *How to practice śamatha and vipaśyanā.*

tatra yoginā^(a) śilaviśuddhyādau śamathavipaśyanā-
saṃbhāre sthitenā sarvasattveṣu mahākaruṇām utpādyā, samu-
tpāditabodhicittena śrutacintābhāvanāyāṃ prayoktavyam^(b) | ta-
tra prathamam tāvad yogī bhāvanābalena^(c) sarvam itikaraṇī-
yam parisamāpya^(d), kṛtamūtrapurīṣa^(e) kaṇṭaka*svarā) dira-
hite mano'nukūle pradeśe sthitvā^(f) [mayā] sarvasattvā
bodhimaṇḍe niṣpādayitavyā iti viniścayan, sakalajagadabhyuddhara-
ṇāśyo^(g) mahākaruṇām āmukhī[kṛtya,] daśadigavasthitān sar-
vabuddhabodhisattvān pañcāṅgena praṇipatyāgrato buddhabodhisatt-
vān paṭādau sthāpayitvā [anyatra] vā yathāvat tebhyaś ca ya-

(^a) ms. yoniginā.

(^b) ms. prayoktamvyam.

(^c) ms. balena.

(^d) ms. parisamāpya.

(^e) ms. pūri°.

(^f) ms. stvā only.

(^g) ms. janagadārtha.

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thārucci pūjā(sta*va)naṃ kṛtvā, svapāpaṃ pradeśya, sakalasya
jagataḥ puṇyam[T. 57, a] anumodya, mṛdutarasukhāsane vairocana-
bhaṭṭārakabaddhaparyāṅken[ārdhaparyāṅkena] vā niṣadya nāty-
unmilite [nātinimilite] nāsikāgravinyaste cakṣuṣī kṛtvā, nātinamraṃ
nānistabdham ṛjukāyaṃ praṇidhāyāntarmukhāvarjitasmṛtir upaviśet |
tataḥ skandhau samau sthāpayet | śīro (nonnatam* nāvana-
tam eka)pārśve [niścalaṃ] sthāpayitavyam | kiṃ tarhi
nābhipraguṇā nāsikā sthāpayitavyā | dantoṣṭham mṛdu sthāpa-
nīyam | jihvā copari dantamūle sthāpanīyā | āśvāsapraśvāsā tu
na saśabdā nāpi sthūlā^(a) nāpi tvaritāḥ karaṇīyāḥ | kiṃ tv asaṃ-
likṣyamāṇā^(b) mandam mandam anābhogena yathā praviśeyur
nirgaccheyur vā tathā (karaṇīyam) | tatra prathamam tāvad yo-
gī yathādrṣṭaśrute tathāgatavigrahe cittam sthāpayitā śamatham
niṣpādayet | tañ ca tathāgatavigraham uttaptakanakāvadātam
lakṣaṇānuvyañjanālamkṛtam parṣanmaṇḍalamadhyagatam nānāvi-
dhair upāyaiḥ sattvārtham kurvantaṃ prābandhikena manasikāreṇa
tadguṇābhilāṣam samupā(dāya*laya-)uddhatyādīn vyupaśamayya tā-

vad dhyāyed yāvat sphuṭataraṃ puro' vasthitam iva taṃ paśyet |

(^a) ms. sthalā. *Kādambari*, ed. Kāśināth Pāṇḍurang Parab, Bombay 1948, p. 76 sthūlaṃ sthūlaṃ śvasataḥ.

(^b) ms. līkyamoṇā.

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tatas tasya tathāgatavigrahapratibimbakasyāgati(gati)nirūpa-
ṇato vipaśyanā bhavet | tatas caivaṃvidhaṃ vicintayet | yathedaṃ
tathāgatavigrahapratibimbakaṃ na kutaścid āgataṃ nāpi kvacid
gamiṣyati tiṣṭhad api svabhāva(śūnyam āt*mātmiya)rahitam
tathāiva sarvadharmāḥ svabhāvaśūnyā āgatigatirahitāḥ pratibim-
bopamā bhāvādirūparahitā iti vicāryoparatavicāreṇa nirjalpaika-
rasena manasā tattvaṃ bhāvayan yāvadiccham [T. 57, b] tiṣṭhet |
ayaṃ ca samādhiḥ pratyupannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhinir-
diṣṭaḥ | asya cānuśaṃsā vistara[ta]s (^a) tatraiva sūtre bodh(ayita-
vyā | *etā)vatā prakāreṇa sarvadharmasaṃgraho bhavati | tatra
cittam upanibandhya layauddhatyādiprasāmena śamathaṃ niṣpādayet |
rūpyarūpibhedena ca saṃkṣepāt sarvadharmasaṃgrahaḥ | tatra
rūpaskandhasaṃgrhītā rūpiṇaḥ | vedanādiskandhasvabhāvā arūpi-
ṇaḥ | tatra bālā bhāvādirahābhiniveśād viparyastadhiyaḥ saṃ-
sā(re paribhra*manti) | teṣāṃ viparyāsāpanayanāya, teṣu ca
mahākaraṇaṃ āmukhīkṛtya, niṣpannaśamatho yogī tattvādhigamāya
tato vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayet | bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate |
bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyaṃ | tatra pudgalanairāt-
myaṃ yā skandhānām ātmātmiyarahitatā | dharmanairātmyaṃ yā
teṣāṃ eva māyo(pam*atā | tatravaṃ) yogī nirūpayet | na tāvad
rūpādivyatiriktaḥ pudgalo' sti | tasya pratibhāsanāt(^b) | rūpādiṣv
evāham iti pratyayotpattiś ca | na cāpi rūpādiskandhasvabhāvāḥ

(^a) ms. vistaraś tatraiva.

(^b) ms. tasyāpra.

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pudgalaḥ | teṣāṃ rūpādīnām anityānekasvabhāvatvāt | pudgalasya
ca nityaika-rūpeṇa parair upakalpita-tvāt | nāpi tattvānyatvā(bhyāṃ
anabhi*lāpyapu)dgalaśya vastutvaṃ yuktam | vastusataḥ prakā-
rāntarābhāvāt | tasmād alīkavibhrama [T. 58, a] evāyaṃ loka-
sya yadutāhaṃ mameti niścayaṃ prati[pannasya] | tato rūpiṇo 'pi
dharmān dharmanairātmyādhigamāya vicārayet | kim ete cittavyati-
rekeṇa paramārthasantaḥ sthitāḥ | āhosvic cittam eva rūpādinirbhā-
(saṃ svapnāvasthāyāṃ pratibhāsa)*vat pratibhāsata iti | sa tān
paramāṇuśo nirūpayan, paramāṇuś ca bhāgaśaḥ pratyavekṣamāṇo
nopalabhate | tathā cānupalabhamānas teṣv astināstitvavikalpān
nivartayati | cittamātraṃ ca traidhātukam avatarati nānyathā |

atha coktaṃ laṅkāvatāre |
 aṅuśo vibhajati dravyaṃ na caiva rūpaṃ vikalpayet |
 cittamātravyavasthānaṃ kudrṣṭyā na prasīdatīti |

tasyaivaṃ bhavati: cittam evānādi-
 kālikavitatharūpādyabhiniveśavaśāt svapnopalabhyamānarūpādipra-
 tibhāsavad bālānāṃ bahir vicchinnaṃ iva rūpādipratibhāsaṃ
 khyāti | tasmāc cittamātram eva traidhātukam | sa evaṃ cit-
 tam eva sakalaprajñaptiṃ niścītya (tatra pratyavekṣya) ca
 sarvadharmāṇāṃ svabhāvaḥ pratyavekṣito bhavatīti cittasvabhāvam
 api pratyavekṣate | sa evaṃ vicārayati | cittam api paramār-

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thato māyāvad anutpannam | yadā hy alikasvabhāvarūpādyākāro-
 pagraheṇa cittam eva citrākāraṃ pratibhāsate, tadāsyāpi rūpādivat
 tadavyatirekāt satyatvaṃ kutra (bhavat? ya*thā ci) trākāratayā
 rūpādayo (naikānekasvabhāvāḥ), tathā cittam api tadavyatirekeṇa
 naikānekasvabhāvam | nāpi cittam utpāduamānaṃ kutaścīd āgac-
 chati | [T. 58, b] nāpi nirudhyamānaṃ kvacid gacchati | nāpi
 svaparobhayataḥ paramārthenāsyotpādo yuktaḥ^(a) | tasmān māyo
 pamam eva cittam | yathā cittam evaṃ sarvadharmā māyāvat para-
 mārthato 'nutpannāḥ |

yenāpi citte(na prat'yavekṣate) yogi tasyāpi svabhāvaṃ
 parikṣamāṇo nopalabhate | tad evaṃ yatra yatrālbane yogināś
 cittam prasaret tasya tasya svabhāvaṃ parikṣamāṇo 'sau yadā nopala-
 bhate tadā sarvam eva vastu vicārya kadalīskandhavad asāram
 avagamyā, tataś cittam nivartayati^(b) | tato bhāvādivikalpoparatau
 (sarva*prapañca)vigatam ānimittaṃ yogaṃ pratilabhate | tathā
 coktaṃ āryaratnameghe | sa evam apakṣālakuśalaḥ sarvaprapañca-
 vigamāya śūnyatābhāvanāyā yogaṃ āpadyate | sa śūnyatābhāva-
 nābahulo yeṣu yeṣu sthāneṣu cittam prasaratī, cittam abhīramate tāni
 tāni sthānāni svabhāvataḥ parigaveṣamāṇo^(c) (śūnyaṃ pra*)-
 tividhyati | yad api tac cittam tad api parikṣyamāṇaṃ śūnyaṃ prati-
 vidhyati | yenāpi cittena parikṣate tad api svabhāvataḥ parigave-
 ṣyamāṇaṃ śūnyaṃ prativudhyati | sa evam upaparikṣamāṇo nirni-

^(a) Mādhyamika-vṛtti p. 76.

^(b) ms. nivarttāyati.

^(c) ms. māno ni.

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mittatāyāṃ yogaṃ āpadyate | tad eva^(a) anenaivaṃ darśitaṃ^(b)
 bhavati | yas tu nopaparikṣate tasya nāsti nirni(mittat*āyāṃ) prave-
 śa itī^(c) | sa evaṃ dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvam upaparikṣamāṇo yadā
 nopalabhate, tadāstīti na vikalpayati nāstīti na vikalpayati | yo

'sau nāstīti kalpyate tasya buddhau sarvadaivāpratibhāsanāt | yadi hi bhāvaḥ kadācid dṛṣṭo bhavet, tadā tasya pratiśedhān^(d) nāstīti kalpayet | yadā^(e) kālatraye 'pi(yo*gi)nā prajñayā nirūpayatā bhāvo nopalabdhas, tadā kasya pratiśedhān nāstīti kalpayet | evam [T. 59, a] anye vikalpās tasya tadānīm na santy eva | bhāvābhāvavikalpābhyām sarvasya vikalpasya vyāptatvāt | evaṃ vyāpakābhā(vād* vyā)-pyasyāpy abhāvaḥ | evaṃ sati niṣprapañcanirvikalpatām avatīrṇo bhavati rūpādiṣu cānīśrito bhavati | prajñayā ca nirūpayataḥ sakalavastusvabhāvānupalambhāt prajñottaradhyāyī bhavati | sa evaṃ pudgaladharmanairātmyamayam^(f) tattvam avatīrṇaḥ, aparasya parīkṣaṇīyasya cābhāvād, uparatavucāreṇa nirvikalpaikarasena mana(sā * sva)rasavāhinā, anabhisamskāratas tad eva tattvaṃ sphuṭataram avadhārayan yogī tiṣṭhet |

(a) ms. tad evam.

(b) ms. darśayatam.

(c) ms. praveśayati.

(d) ms. dhonnastī.

(e) ms. twice, but in the repetition: vikalpaṃ kurvitā.

(f) ms. naitmya.

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§ 3. - *Distractions to be avoided: how to be counteracted.*

tatra ca sthitas citta-bandhaṃ na vikṣipet | yadāntarā cittam bahirdhā vikṣiptam paśyet, tadā tatsvabhāvapratyavekṣaṇena vikṣepam śamayya, punas tatraiva cittam upary samādher guṇada(rśanā*d a)bhīratīm tatra bhāvayet | vikṣepe ca doṣadarśanād aratīm praśamayet | atha styānamiddhābhībhāvād yadā pracāratayā līnam cittam paśyet, layābhīśāṅkitam vā tadā prāmogyavastu buddharūpādikam ālokaśamjñam vā manasikṛtya layam upaśamayet | tatas tad eva tattvaṃ dṛdhataram grhṇīyāt | yadā tu jātyandhavad andhakā(ra*pravi)ṣṭapurūṣavad vinimilitākṣavat sphuṭataram tattvaṃ nāvadhārayed yogī, tadā tasya līnam cittam veditavyam vipaśyanārahitam ca | atha yathāpūrvānubhūtavīṣayasprhayā cittam antarā samuddhatam paśyed auddhatyābhīśāṅkitam vā tadānityatādisamvegavastumanasikārād [T.59,b] auddhatyam śamayt | tataḥ punas tatraiva tattve(citta*)-nabhisamskāravāhitāyām yatnam kurvita | yadā ca vikṣiptapurūṣavad vānaravad vānavasthitavṛtti cittam bhavet, tad auddhatyam boddhavyam śamatharahitam ca | atha yadā layauddhatyābhyām viviktarayā samapravṛttam svarasavāhi spuṭataram tatraiva tattve cittam utpādhyte, tadābhogaśīthilikaraṇād upekṣānyam | tadā ca śamathavipa(śyanāyu*gana)ddhavāhī mārgo niṣpanno veditavyaḥ | yadā ca vipaśyanam bhāvayet prajñātīrīktatarā bhavet, tadā śama-

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thasyālpavāt pravāstasthitapradīpavat pracalatvāc cittasya na
sphuṭaṭaraṃ [tattva] darśanaṃ bhavet | atas tadā śamatho bhā-
vayitavyaḥ | śamathasyābhyādhikye middhāvaṣṭabdhapurūṣasyeva
sphuṭataraṃ tattvadarśanaṃ na syāt | tasmāt tadā (pra*jnā)
bhāvayitavyā | yadā samapravṛtte dve api bhavato yuganad-
dhavāhibalīvardadvayavat tadānabhisamskāreṇaiva tāvat sthātavyaṃ
yāvat kāyacittapīḍā na bhavet |

samkṣepataḥ sarvasyaiva samādheḥ ṣaḍ doṣā bhavanti | kau-
sīdyam | ālambanasampramoṣaḥ | layaḥ | auddhatyam |
anābhogaḥ | ābhogaś ceti | eṣāṃ pratipakṣeṇaṣṭau prahāṇasaṃ-
(skā*rā) bhāvanīyāḥ | śraddhā | chandaḥ | vyāyāmaḥ |
prasrabdhīḥ | smṛtiḥ | samprajanyam | cetanā | upekṣā ceti |
tatrādyāś catvāraḥ kausīdyapratipakṣāḥ | tathā hi samādhi-
guṇeṣv abhisampratyayalakṣaṇayā śraddhayā yogino 'bhilāṣaḥ samut-
padyate | tato 'bhilāṣavān vīryam ārabhate | tato vīryāmbaṇāt
kāyacittayoḥ karmaṇya(tām* bhāva)yati | tataḥ prasrabdhakā-
yacetasāḥ kausīdyam vyāvartate | tataḥ [T. 60, a] śraddhādayaḥ
prabhavantīti | tadarthaṃ te bhāvanīyaḥ | smṛtir ālambanasam-
pramoṣasya pratipakṣaḥ | samprajanyaṃ layauddhatyayoḥ pratipa-
kṣaḥ | tayos tena samupekṣya parivarjanāt | layauddhatyapraśa-
manakāle tu anābhogadoṣaḥ | tatas tatpratipakṣeṇa cetanā bhā-
vanīyā | (layauddha)tyapraśame sati, yadā praśaṭhavāhi cittaṃ
bhavet, tadābhogadoṣaḥ | tasya pratipakṣas tadānīm upekṣā bhā-

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vanīyā | yadi, samapravṛtte eitte, ābhogaḥ kriyate, tadā cittaṃ vik-
ṣipyate | line 'pi citte sati, yady ābhogo na kriyate, tadā vipaśyanāra-
hitatvād andhapuruṣavac cittaṃ līnaṃ syāt | tasmāl līnacittaṃ nigṛ-
hṇīyād, uddha(tam pra*śamayet) | punaḥ samaprāptam upekṣeta |
tato yāvadicchāṃ yogī tāvad anabhisamskāreṇaiva tattvaṃ bhāva-
yaṃ tiṣṭhet | satyāṃ tu kāyādīpīḍāyām, punaḥ punar antarā
sakalam eva lokaṃ vyavalokya māyājalacandropamapratibhāsam
avataret | tathā cōktaṃ avikalpapraveśe | lokottareṇa jñāne-
nākāśasamatalān sarvadharmān pa(śya*ti | pṛṣṭha)labdhena
punar māyāmaricīsvapnodakacandropamān paśyatīti | tad evaṃ
māyopamaṃ jagad avagamyā, sattveṣu mahākaruṇām āmukhīkṛ-
tyaivam anuvicintayet | evaṃvidhaṃ dharmagāmbhīryam anava-
gacchanto 'mī bālabuddhaya ādisānteṣv eva dharmeṣu bhāvādisamā-
ropaviparyastā vividhakarmakleśān upacinvanti | tataḥ saṃsāre
paribhra*manti | tato 'haṃ kariṣyāmi yathaitān evaṃvidhaṃ dhar-
magāmbhīryam avabodhayeyam iti [T. 60. b] tato viśramya
punar api tathaiva sarvadharmānirābhāsaṃ samādhim avataret |
cittakhede sati, tathaiva viśramya punar avataret | evam anena kra-
meṇa ghaṭikām ekapraharaṃ vā yāvantaṃ kālāṃ śaknoti

tāvantaṃ kālaṃ tiṣṭhet |

§ 4. - *How to get up from samādhi.*

*tata icchayā sa(mādhē utthātum pary)-
aṅkam abhittvaivam^(a) anuvicintayet | yadi nāmāmī dharmāḥ

^(a) ms. tuaiva evam.

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sarva eva paramārthato 'nutpannās, tathāpi māyāvat pratiniyatavi-
vidhahetupratyayasāmagrivaśena vicitrā evāvīcāraramaṇīyāḥ pravara-
tante | tena nocchedadrṣṭiprasaṅgo nāpy apavādāntasya |
yataś ca prajñayā vicāryamāṇā nopalabhyante, tena na śāśvatadrṣṭi-
(prasaṅgo * nāpi) samāropāntasya | tatra ye prajñācakṣurvikalatayā
viparyastamataya ātmābhiniṣṭā vividhāni karmāṇi kurvanti
te saṃsāre paribhramanti | ye punar ekāntena saṃsāravimukhā
mahākāruṇyavikalatayā ca na dānādīpāramitāḥ paripūrayanti
ātmānaṃ damayanti te sattvā upāyavikalatayā śrāvakaḥpratyeka-
buddha(bodhau pata)nti | ye tu asvabhāvaṃ jagad avagamyā
mahākāruṇyabalena sakalajagadabhyuddharaṇakṛtānīścayā māyā-
kāravat aviparyastadhiyo vipulapuṇyajñānasambhāraṃ samupāyanti
te tathāgatāṃ padaṃ prāpyāsaṃsāram aśeṣasya jagataḥ sarvākāraṃ
hitasukhāni saṃpādayantas tiṣṭhanti^(a) | te ca jñānabalena kleśa-
prahāṇān na saṃsāre pa(tan*ti sarva)sattvāpekṣayā ca samu-
pārjitavipulāprameyapuṇyasambhāraśeṣena na nirvāṇe patanti [T.
61, a] | sarvasattvopajīvyāś ca bhavanti | tasmān mayā sakalasa-
tvahitasukhādhānārthīnā 'pratiṣṭhitanirvāṇam adhigantukāmena vi-
pulapuṇyajñānasambhāropārjane 'bhiyogaḥ karaṇīyaḥ | ta-
thā coktam āryatathāgataguhyasūtre | jñ(ānasa*ṃbhāraḥ) sar-
vakleśaprahāṇāya saṃvartate | puṇyasambhāraḥ sarvasattvopajīvi-
tāyai saṃvartate | tasmāt tarhi, bhagavan, bodhisattvena mahāsat-

^(a) ms. tiṣṭayanti.

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tvena puṇyasambhāre jñānasambhāre ca sarvadābhiyogaḥ karaṇīya
[iti] | āryatathāgatotpattisambhavasūtre coktam | sa khalu pu-
nar eṣa tathāgatānāṃ sambhavo naikena kāraṇena bhavati | tat
kasya he(toḥ | samudā*gatais) tāvad bho jinaputrāprameyaśata-
sahasra[daśa]kāranais tathāgatāḥ samudāgacchanti katamair da-
śabhir yadutāprameyapuṇyajñānasambhārāṅgāḥpratisamudāgamakāraṇeneti
vistarāḥ | āryavimalakīrtinirdeśe coktam | śatapūṇyanirjātāḥ sar-
vakuśaladharmanirjātā apramāṇakuśalamūlakarmanirjātāḥ^(a) kāyās^(b)
tathā(ga*tasyeti) vistarāḥ |

tad evaṃ kṛtvā śanaiḥ paryāṅkaṃ bhittvā daśadigvyava-

sthitān sarvabuddhabodhisattvān praṇipatyā tebhyaś ca pūjāstrotropahāraṃ kṛtvāryabhadracaryādi praṇidhānaṃ praṇidadhita^(c) | tataḥ śūnyatākaruṇāgarbhānuttarasambodhipariṇāmitasakaladānādīpūnyasambhāropārjanābhīyukto bhavet [T. 61, b]

§ 5. - *Thesis of the Hva śāñ.*

yas tu maṇya^{(te*} | cittavikalpa) samutthāpitaśubhāśubhakarmavaśena sattvāḥ svargādi karmaphalam anubhavantaḥ saṃsāre saṃ-

(^a) ms. kuśalakuśaladharmā.

(^b) ms. mārgās.

(^c) ms. praṇidadhīt.

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saranti | ye punar na kiṃcic^(a) cintayanti nāpi kiṃcit karma kurvanti te parimucyante saṃsārāt | tasmān na kiṃcic cintayitavyam | nāpi dānādikuśalacaryā kartavyā | kevalaṃ mūrkhajanam adhi-kṛtya dānādikuśalacaryā nirdiṣṭeti |

§ 6. - *Refutation.*

a) *General implications of such a thesis.*

tena * sakalamahāyānaṃ pratikṣiptaṃ bhavet | mahāyānamūlatvāc ca sarvayānānāṃ tatpratīkṣeṇa sarvam eva yānaṃ pratikṣiptaṃ syāt |

tathā hi na kiṃcic cintayitavyam iti bruvatā bhūtapratyavekṣā-samyagjñānasya | tatpratīkṣepāl lokattarāpi prajñā pratikṣiptā bhavet | tatpratīkṣepāt^(b) sarvākārajñātā pra(tikṣi*ptā bha)vet |

nāpi dānādīcaryā kartavyeti vadatā copāyo dānādīḥ sphuṭataram eva pratikṣiptaḥ; etāvad eva ca saṃkṣiptaṃ mahāyānaṃ yaduta prajñopāyaś ca | yathoktam āryagayāśīrṣe | dvāv imau bodhisattvānāṃ saṃkṣiptau mārgau | katamau dvau | yad uta prajñā copāya(ś ca * | ā)ryatathāgataguhyasūtre cuktam | imau ca prajñopāyau bodhisattvānāṃ sarvapāramitāsaṃgrahāya saṃvarteta iti | tataś

(^a) ms. kaṃcic.

(^b) ms. tatpratīkṣepāl lokattarāpi pratīkṣijñā pratīkṣiptā bhavet tatpratīpakṣepāt.

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ca mahāyānaṃ pratīkṣiptā mahat karmāvaraṇaṃ kṛtaṃ syāt | tasmād asyānupāsītavidvajjanasyānavadhāritatathāgatapravacananīteḥ svayaṃ vīnaṣṭasya parān api nāśayato yuktyāgama*dūṣitatvāt, [viśasaṃ-

sṛṣṭavacanam] saviṣabhojanam [iva] ātmakāmena [T. 62, a]
dhīmatā dūrata eva parihartavyam | tathā hy anena bhūtapratya-
veṣāṃ pratikṣipatā dharmapracayākhyam pradhānam eva
bodhyaṅgaṃ pratikṣiptam syāt | vinā ca bhūtapratyaveṣayā,
yoginaḥ katham anādikālābhyastarūpādibhāvābhiniveśasya cittam
nirvikalpatāṃ praviśet?

*b) Inconsistency of the objection that one can reach nirvikalpa
by means of mere asmṛti and amanasikāra.*

* sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtyamanasikāreṇa
praviśatīti cet | tad syuktam | na hi vinā bhūtapratya(ve)kṣayā-
nubhūyamāneṣv api sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtir amanasikāro vā śakyate
kartum | yadi ca nāmāmi dharmā mayā 'smartavyā nāpi manasi-
kartavyā ity evaṃ bhāvayann asmṛtīmanasikārau^(a) teṣu bhāvayet,
tadā sutarām eva tena te smṛtā manasikṛtās ca * syuḥ |

atha smṛtīmanasikārābhāvamātram asmṛtyamanasikārāv abhi-
pretau, tadā tayor abhāvaḥ kena prakāreṇa bhavati etad eva vicā-
ryate | na cābhāvaḥ kāraṇam yuktam yena tato nirvikalpatā

^(a) ms. °nasikārān.

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bhavet | saṃmūrchitasyāpi smṛtīmanasikārābhāvān nirvikalpatā-
praveśaprasaṅgaḥ | na ca bhūtapratyaveṣāṃ vinānya * upāyo
'sti yena prakāreṇāsmṛtyamanasikārau kuryāt |

saty api cāsmṛtyamanasikārasaṃbhave, vinā bhūtapratya-
veṣayā niḥsvabhāvatā dharmāṅgaṃ katham avagatā bhavet | na
hi svabhāvata eva dharmāḥ śūnyāḥ sthitā ity evaṃ vinā tatpratya-
veṣayā tacchūnyatāprativedho bhavet | nāpi vinā śūnyatāprativedhena
(āva*raṇaprahāṇam) saṃbhavati | sarvatra [T. 62, b] sarveṣāṃ
muktīprasaṅgāt |

kiṃ ca tasya yogino yadi sarvadharmeṣu muṣitasmṛtitayā mū-
ḍhatayā vā smṛtīmanasikārau na pravartete, tadā 'tyantamūḍhaḥ
katham asau yogī bhavet | vinā ca bhūtapratyaveṣayā tatrāsmṛ-
tīmanasikāraṃ cābhyasyatā moha^(a) evābhyasto bhavet | ta(ta
eva samy*agjñā) nāloko dūrikṛtaḥ syāt | athāsau na muṣitasmṛtir
nāpi mūḍhaḥ | tadā ka(th)am tatrāsmaraṇam amanasikāraṃ kar-
tum śaknuyāt vinā bhūtapratyaveṣayā | na hi smarann eva na sma-
rati, paśyan eva na paśyatīti yuktam abhidhātum | asmṛtyamana-
sikārābhyāsāc ca ketham pūrvanivāsānusmṛtyādibuddhadharmo-
dayo bhavet | vi(ro)dhāt |) na hy uṣṇaviruddham śītam āse-
vamānasya uṣṇasparśasaṃvedanaṃ bhavet | kiṃ ca samādhisa-
māpannasya yogino yadi manovijñānam asti, tadā 'vaśyam tena
kiṃcid ālambayitavyam | na hi pṛthagjanānāṃ sahasā nirālamba-
naṃ jñānaṃ bhavet | atha nāsti, tadā katham niḥsvabhāvatā dhar-

māṇām^(b) avagatā bhavet ? kena^(c) ca pratipakṣeṇa kl*eśāvara-

^(a) ms. poḥa.

^(b) ms. dharmān.

^(c) ms. tena.

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ṇam prahīyate ? na ca caturthadyānālābhinaḥ^(a) pṛthagjanasya
cittanīrodhaḥ sambhavati |

c) Necessity of bhūtapratyavekṣā.

tasmāt saddharme yāv asmr̥tyama-
nasikārau paṭhitau tau bhūtapratyavekṣāpūrvakau draṣṭavyau |

asmād bhūtapratyavekṣayā 'smṛtir amanasikāras ca śakya-
te kartum | nānyathā | tathā hi yadā nirūpayan samyakpraj-
ñayā yogī kālatra*ye paramārthataḥ samutpannam na kaṃcid dharm-
aṃ paśyati, tadā tatra kathaṃ smṛtīmanasikārau kuryāt [T. 63, a] |
yo hi kālatraye' py asattvān nānubhūtaḥ para mārthataḥ sa kathaṃ
smaryeta, manasi vā kriyeta | tato 'sau sarvaprapañcōpaśamaṃ^(b)
nirvikakpaṃ jñānaṃ praviṣṭo bhavet | tatpraveśāc ca śūnyatāṃ pra-
tividyati | tatprativedhāc ca prahīnasaka*lakudṛṣṭilālo bhavati |
upāyayuktaḥ prajñāsavanataś ca samyak samvṛtiparamārthasatya-
kuśalo bhavati |

ato 'nāvaraṇajñānalābhāt, sarvān eva buddhadharmān adhi-
gacchati | tasmān na vinā bhūtapratyavekṣayā samyagjñānodayo
nāpi kleśāvaraṇa[prahāṇam]^(c)

d) Confirmation by Buddhavacana.

tathā coktaṃ mañjuśrīvikurvi-
tasūtre | kathaṃ, dārike, bodhisattvo vijitasamgrāmo(bhava*ti)? |
aha |

^(a) ms. °nalābh°.

^(b) ms. °opamaśam.

^(c) ms. kleśāvaraṇam only.

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yo, mañjuśrīḥ, vicīya vicīya sarvadharmān nopalabhata iti |
tasmād visphāritajñānacakṣuḥ prajñāśastreṇa kleśārīn nirjitya, nirbhayo
viharān yogī, na tu kātarapuruṣa iva vinimilitākṣaḥ | āryasamā-
dhirāje 'py uktam |

nairātmyadharmān yadi pratyavekṣate |
tān^(b) pratyavekṣya yadi bhāvayet |

sa hetu nirvā(ṇapha*la) prāptaye |
yo 'nyahetū na sa bhoti śāntaya iti

sūtrasamuccaye^(c) coktam | ātmanā
vipaśyanāyogam anuyukto viharati | parāṃś ca vipaśyanāyāṃ nā-
bhiyojayatīti mārakarmeti | vipaśyanā ca bhūtapratyavekṣāsabhāvā
āryaratnameghasandhinirmocanādau | āryaratnameghe ca vipaśyanā*
(nirūpa) yato niḥsvabhāvatāprativedhād ānimittapraveśa uktaḥ |
[T. 63, b] āryalaṅkāvatāre coktam | yasmāt, mahāmate, buddhyā
vicāryamāṇānāṃ svasāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ bhāvānāṃ nāvadhāryate |
tenocyante niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā iti | tatra tatra sūtre yā bha-
gavatā (nānā*prakārā) pratyavekṣā nirdiṣṭā sā virudhyate, yadi
bhūtapratyavekṣā na kartavyā | tasmād evaṃ yuktam vaktum: vayam
alpaprajñā alpavīryāś ca na śaknumo bāhuśrūtyaṃ paryeṣitum iti |
na hi tatpratikṣepo yukto, bhagavatā bahudhā bāhuśrūtyasya varṇi-

^(a) ms. °śrī.

^(b) ms. tānapra°.

^(c) ms. °mucaye.

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tatvāt | tat punar (brahma)paripṛchāyām uktam | ye tv acin-
tyeṣu dharmeṣu viprayuktās teṣā(m* ayoni)śa iti | tatrāpi ye
paramārthato 'nutpannānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ utpādaṃ parikakpyānitya-
duḥkhādirūpeṇa śrāvakādivac cintāṃ prakurvanti, teṣaṃ samāro-
pāvādāntena cintāṃ pravartayatām ayoniśas tad bhavatīti tatpra-
tiṣedhāya yad uktam na bhūtapratyavekṣāyāḥ sa pratiṣedhaḥ |
tasyāḥ sarvasūtreṣv anujñānāt | tathā ca tatrai(va* brahma)-
paripṛchāyām uktam | cittaśūro bodhisattva āha | yaś cittena
sarvadharmāṃś cintayati tatra cākṣato 'nupahataḥ sa tenocyate
bodhisattva iti | tatraivoktam | kathaṃ vīryavanto^(a) bhavanti |
yadā sarvajñatācittaṃ vicīyamānā nopalabhanta iti | punas tatrai-
voktam | matimantaś ca te bhaviṣyanti yoniśo dharmān praty-
avekṣanataye(ti | (punas tatraivoktam) pravicinanti te dhar-
mān^(b) yathāmāyāmarīcīketi | tad evaṃ yatra yatrācintyādipra-
pañcaḥ^(c) śrūyate [T. 64, a], tatra tatra śrutacintāmātreṇaiva tat-
tvādhigamaṃ ye^(d) manyante, teṣāṃ abhimānapratīṣedhena pra-
(tyātma)^(e)vedanīyatvaṃ dharmāṇāṃ pratipādyate | 'yoniśas^(f)

^(a) ms. viyoktavanto.

^(b) ms. dharmānaya°.

^(c) ms. yatrātrā°.

^(d) ms. yena.

^(e) ms. pratima°.

^(f) ms. yoni°.

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ca cittapraṭiṣedhaḥ kriyata iti boddhavyaṃ, na bhūtapratya-
vekṣāyāḥ praṭiṣedhaḥ | (anya*thā) bahutaraṃ yuktyāgamavirud-
dhaṃ syāt | yathoktaṃ prāk | kiṃ ca yad eva śruta[cintā]mayyā
prajñayā viditaṃ tad eva bhāvanāmayyā prajñayā bhāvaniyaṃ
nānyat | saṃdiṣṭa [dhāvana]bhūmyaśvadhāvanavat^(a) |
tasmāt bhūtapratyavekṣā kartavyā | yadi nāmāsau vikalpasva
bhāvā tathāpi yoniso manasikārasvabhāvavāt, tato bhūtanirvikalpa-
jñāno(daya * i)ti kṛtvā tajjñānārthinā sā sevaniyā | nirvikalpe
ca bhūtajñānāgnau samutpanne sati, kāśṭhadvayanigharṣasaṃjātava-
hniṇā tatkāśṭhadvayadāhavat, sāpi paścāt tenaiva dahyata evety
uktam āryaratnakūṭe |

*e) Mukti is not caused only by destruction of karma
but by elimination of kleśas.*

yac cāpy ucyate | na kiṃcit kuśalā-
dikarma kartavyam iti | tatraivaivaṃvadatā karmakṣayān muktir
ity ājīvakavā(dābhyu*pagamo) bhavet | na hi bhagavatpra[va]
cane karmakṣayān muktir iṣyate | kiṃ tarhi kleśakṣayāt |
anādikālopacitasya hi karmaṇo na śakyate kṣayaḥ kartuṃ tasyānan-
tatyāt | apāyādiṣu ca tatphalaṃ bhuñjānasyāparasyāpi karmaṇaḥ

^(a) sandiṣitabhūmityaśva.

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prasūteḥ, kleśeṣu cāvikaḷeṣu tatkaranaṭatayā sthiteṣu, karmaṇo nirod-
dhum aśakyatvāt | (pradī*pāni)rodhe tatprabhāyā anirodhavat |
na cāpi tasya vipaśyanāpavādiṇaḥ kleśakṣayaḥ saṃbhavatiṭy uktam
prāk | atha kleśakṣayārthaṃ vipaśyanā sevaniyeti manyate | tadā
[T. 64, b] kleśakṣayād eva muktiḥ sidhyatiṭi karmakṣaye tarhi vyarthāḥ
śramaḥ, | akuśalakarma na kartavyam iti yuktam etat | kuśalaṃ
tu kim iti pra*(tiṣidhyate) | saṃsārāvāhakatvāt praṭiṣidhyata iti
cet | tad ayuktam | yad eva bāhyātmādiviparyāsasamutthāpitam
akuśalaṃ tad eva saṃsārāvāhakaṃ bhavati | na tu bodhisattvā-
nāṃ mahākaruṇāsamutthāpitam anuttarasāṃbodhipariṇāmitam
api | tathā daśabhūmake eta eva daśakuśalakarmapathāḥ pariṇāma-
nādi(pari*ka)rmavuşeṣeṇa śrāvakaṃpratyekabuddhabodhisattvabud-
dhatvāvāhakā bhavantiṭi nirdiṣṭam | āryaratnakūṭe ca | sarvama-
hānadīnāṃ mahāsamudre praviṣṭānāṃ^(a) pa[yaḥ]skandhavad^(b)
bodhisattvānāṃ nānāmukhopacitaṃ kuśalamūlaṃ sarvajñatā-
pariṇāmitaṃ sarvajñataikaraṣaṃ bhavatiṭi varṇitam^(c) | yā
ca buddhabodhisattvānāṃ rūpakāyakṣetrapa^(d)(riśu*ddhi)pra-
bhāparivāramahābhogātādisaṃpattir dānādipuṇyasāṃbhāraphalasat-

^(a) ms. °viṣṭā |

(^b) ms. pakṣandhavat.

(^c) ms. vāñcitam.

(^d) ms. pra^o.

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tvena tatra tatra sūtre varṇitā bhagavatā sāpi vi(ru)dhyate |
kuśalacaryāpratiṣedhe ca prātimokṣasaṃvarādir api pratikṣiptaḥ syāt |
tato vyartham eva tasya śirastuṇḍitakāśyadhāraṇādi prasajyet |
kuśalakarmābhisaṃskāra(vaimu*khye) ca sati saṃsāravaimukhyaṃ
sattvārthakriyāvaimukhyaṃ ca sevitaṃ bhavet | tato bodhis
tasya dūre bhavet | uktaṃ hy āryasaṃdhnirmocane [T. 65, a]
ekāntasattvārthavimukhasya ekāntasaṃsārābhisaṃskāravimukhasya
[nā]nuttarā samyaksambodhir uktā mayeti | āryopālipariṣcchā-
dau ca saṃsāre vaimukhyaṃ bodhi(sattv*ānām) paradauḥśilyam iti
varṇitam | saṃsārapariṣrahas tu paramaṃ śīlam | uktam āryavi-
malakīrtinirdeśe(^a) copāyād bhavati [saṃsāra]gamaṇaṃ bodhisat-
tvānām mokṣaḥ | upāyarahitā ca prajñā bandhaḥ | prajñārahitaś
copāyo bandhaḥ | prajñāsaḥita upāyo mokṣaḥ | upāyasaḥita prajñā
mokṣa iti varṇitam | āryagaganaga(ñje u*ktam) saṃsāraparikhe-
do(bodhisattvānām māra karma iti | sūtrasamuccaye ca) asaṃ-
skṛtaṃ ca pratyavekṣate | saṃskṛtaiś ca kuśalaiḥ parikhidyata iti
māra karma iti | bodhimārgaṃ prajānāti pāramitāmārgaṃ ca na
paryeṣata iti māra karma iti | yat punas tatraivoktaṃ dānacittābhi-
niveśo yāvat prajñācittābhīniveśo māra karma iti tatra na dānādi-
nām sevāpratiṣedhaḥ, (kiṃ tv*a)haṃkāramamakāracittābhīniviṣṭa-
sya grāhyagrāhakacittābhīniviṣṭasya caupalambhikasya yo viparītā-
bhīniveśo dānādau tasya pratiṣedhaḥ | viparītābhīniveśasamutthā-

(^a) ms. °niśe.

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pitā hi dānādayo 'pariśuddhā bhavanti kṛtvā māra karmety uktam(^a) |
anyathā dhyānam api na sevaniyaṃ syāt | ta(tḥā ca kathaṃ *
muktir bhavet [T. 65, b] | ata evaupalambhikasya sattvanānā-
tvasaṃjñayā yad dānādi tad a pariśuddham iti pratipādanāya
āryagaganagañje 'pi sattvanānātvasaṃjñino dānādi māra karmety
uktam | yac cāpi puṇyaskandhapariṇāmaṇāyām(^b) uktaṃ | sar-
vam eva dān(^c)aśīlakṣāntiviryadhyanāpra(jñā)samatām ajānatopa-
lambhayati | tena (paryeṣti*tadānena) parāṃṣṭaśīrena śī-
laṃ rakṣitam | ātmaparasamjñinā kṣāntir bhāvitetyādi | tat prati-
deśayāmīti | tatrāpy aupalambhikasya nānātvasaṃjñino vipa-
rītābhīniveśasamutthāpitā dānādayo 'pariśuddhā(^b) bhavanti etā-
vanmātraṃ pratipāditam | na tu sarvathā dānādīnām seva-
nāpratiṣedhaḥ | anyathā sarvasyaiva (dānāder* avi)śeṣe-
ṇa pratideśanā kṛta syāt | nānupalambhādīpatitasyaiva |

- (^a) ms. uktaḥ.
 (^b) ms. °ayām.
 (^c) ms. dānādi T. om.
 (^d) ms. pariśuddha.

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yac cāpi brahmapariṣcchāyām uktam | yāvati caryā sarvā parikalpyā(^a) | niḥparikalpyā ca bodhir ityādi | tatrāpy utpādādivikalpacaryāyāḥ prakṛtatvāt tasyāḥ parikalpatvam uktam | ānimit-tavihāre cānabhisamskāravāhina sthitasya (bo*dhi)sattvasya vyākaraṇam bhavati | nānyasyety etāvanmātram pratipāditam | sarveṣāṃ ca dānādīnām paramārthato ’nutpannatvam ca paridīpitam | na tu caryā na kartavyety abhihitam | anyathā hi dīpaṅkarāvādāne ye buddhā bhagavatā(^b) paryupāsītā yeṣāṃ tu [T. 66, a] kalpam api bhagavatā bhāṣamāṇena na śakyam nāmaparikīrta(nam ka*tham teṣāṃ) bhagavatā bodhisattvāvasthāyām caryāpratiṣedho na kṛtaḥ | dīpaṅkareṇāpi tadānīm bhagavataś caryāpratiṣedho na kṛta eva | kiṃ tu yadā śāntānimittavihāre(^c) ’ṣṭamyām bhūmau sthito ’sau dṛṣṭas tadāsau vyākṛto bhagavatā | tatra tasya caryā apratiṣiddhā | sā cānimittavihāraparamatā bodhisattvānām (aṣṭamyām*bhū)mau daśabhūmike buddhaiḥ pratiṣiddhā mā bhūd etad eva teṣāṃ parinirvāṇam iti kṛtvā | yadi tu sarvathā caryā na kartavyā bhavet pūrvoktam sarvaṃ virudhyeta(^d) | yac ca tatraiva brahmapariṣcchāyām uktam | dānam ca dadāti tac cāvīpākābhikāṅkṣī śīlam ca rakṣati tac cāsamāropita ityādi | caturbhir brahmadharmaīḥ(^e) (samanv*)ā-

- (^a) ms. ’parikalpya.
 (^b) ms. bhagavantaḥ.
 (^c) ms. śāntanim°.
 (^d) ms. °dhyet.
 (^e) ms. yac caturbhir bramaiḥ hyuna.

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gatā bodhisattvā avaiivarttikā bhavanti buddhadharmeṣu | kata-maiś caturbhiḥ | aparimitasaṃsāraparigraheṇa | aparimitabuddhōpsthānapūjayetyādi sarvaṃ virudhyeta | nāpi mṛdvindriyeṇaiva caryā kartavyā na tu tīkṣṇendriy(eṇ)eti yuktaṃ vaktum | yataḥ prathamām bhūmim upādāya yāvad daśamībhūmipratiṣṭhitānām bodhisattvānām (dānā*dicaryā utpa)dyate | na ca pariśiṣṭāsu na samudācaratīti vacanāt | na hi bhūmipraviṣṭā api mṛdvindriyā yuktāḥ | āryopālīpariṣcchāyām anutpattikadharmakṣāntipratiṣṭhite-naiva tyāgamahātyāgātityāgāḥ(^a) kartavyā iti varṇitam | sūtra-samuccaye ca ṣaṭpāramitādīpratīpattimān [T. 66, b] bodhisattvas tathāgatarddhigatīka itī varṇitam | na(ca tathāgatar*ddhi-gater a)nyā(^b) śīghratarā gatiḥ astī | nāpi ṣaṭpāramitādaśabhū-

mivyatirekeṇānyo bhodisattvānāṃ mārgo 'sti yaḥ śīghrataravāhī syāt |
krameṇaiva ca cittasamṭateḥ kanakaśuddhiva[t] śuddhir bhavatīti
sūtre varṇitam | tathatāyāṃ yadā sthito bodhisattvo bhavati, tadā
prathamāyāṃ bhūmau praviṣṭo bhavati | tataḥ krameṇai(va pūr*
vabhūmi)ḥ pariśodhya tathāgatabhūmiṃ praviśatīti | ato nā-
sti bhūmipāramitāvvyatirekeṇa buddhatvaprapraveśe^(c) (anyan mu-
khaṃ) nāpi bhagavatā kvacid (sūtrādau) deśitam | dhyāna eva
ṣaṭpāramitāntargamāt tatsevanād eva sarvapāramitāḥ sevītā bhavanty

(a) ms. °tem evaṃ tyāgātyārthatyāgāḥ.

(b) ms. °ḥyā.

(c) ms. after praveśe black space for five or six akṣaras then: nnāpi.

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ato na dānādayaḥ pṛthak sevityā iti cet | tad ayuktam |
evaṃ hi buddhe go(mayama*ṇḍale)^(a) 'pi ṣaṭpāramitāntargamān
maṇḍalakam eva kartavyaṃ syāt na dhyānādayaḥ | śrāvakasyāpi
nirodhasamādhisamāpannasyānimittād eva asamudācārāt^(b) tadā
ṣaṭpāramitāparipūriprasaṅgaḥ | tataś ca na śrāvakebhyo bodhisattvā-
nāṃ (bhedaḥ) pratipādito bhavet | sarvāvasthāyāṃ eva tu bo-
dhisattvena ṣaṭpāramitāḥ (pari*pūra) yitavyā iti saṃdarśanārtham
ekaikapāramitāntarbhāvaḥ sarvapāramitānāṃ bhagavatā saṃdarśitaḥ |
na punar ekaiva pāramitā sevānīyeti [T. 67, a] | tathā coktaṃ sarva-
dharmavaipulye | yo'pyayaṃ, maitreya, ṣaṭpāramitāsamudāgamo
bodhisattvānāṃ saṃbodhāya taṃ te mohapuruṣā evaṃ vakṣyanti |
prajñāpāramitāyāṃ e(va bodhi*sattve) na śikṣitavyam | kiṃ śeṣā-
bhiḥ^(c) pāramitābhir iti te' nyāḥ pāramitā dūṣayitavyā maṃsyante^(d) |
tat kiṃ manyase, ajita, duḥprajñāḥ sa kāśirājo' bhūt, yena kapotār-
thena^(e) śyenāya svamāṃsāni dattāni? maitreya āha | no hīdaṃ,
bhagavan | bhagavān āha | yāni mayā, maitreya, bodhisattvacaryāṃ
caratā ṣaṭ(pāramitā * pratisaṃ) yuktāni kuśalamūlāny upacitāni,
apakṛtaṃ nu taiḥ kuśalamūlaiḥ | maitreya āha | no hīdaṃ, bhagavan |

(a) ms. daṇa for dala?

(b) ms. samudācārāt.

(c) ms. kim viśeṣāḥ.

(d) ss. p. 97 manyante.

(e) ss. p. 97 °tārtham.

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bhagavān āha | tvaṃ [tāvad]^(a), ajita, ṣaṭpāramitānāṃ pāramitā-
mitāyāṃ samudāgataḥ | evaṃ yāvat ṣaṭpāramitānāṃ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ
samudāgataḥ | tat te mohapuruṣā evaṃ vakṣyanti | ekanayenaiva bo-
dhir yaduta(śū*nyatāna) yaneneti te caryāpariśuddhā bhavantītyādi |
kevalaṃ sūnyatām eva sevamānāḥ śrāvakavan^(c) nirvāṇe patanti |

§ 7. - Conclusion.

ata upāyasahitā prajñā sevaniyā | ata evācāryanā-
gārjunapādaiḥ sūtrasamuccaye 'bhitam | na copāyakaūsalarahi-
tena^(d) bodhisattvena gambhīradharmatāyām abhiyoktavyam iti |
atra ā(ryavi*mala)kirtinirdeśādijñāpakas tair upanyastah [T. 67, b]
na cācāryanāgārjunapādīyaṃ vacanaṃ yuktyāgamopetaṃ tyaktvā
bhagavadvacanaṃ ca parityajyānyasya mūrkhajanasya vacanaṃ pre-
kṣāvātā grahītum yuktam | āryaratnakūṭe ca sakaladānādikuśalo-
petatayā sarvākāraropetaśūnyatā sevaniyetu uktam na tu ke-
valā | (ārya*ratna)kūṭe cuktam^(e) | tadyathā kāśyapāmātyasaṃgṛhitā
rājānaḥ sarvakāryāṇi kurvanti, evam evopāyakaūsalyasaṃgṛhitā bo-
dhisattvasya prajñā sarvabuddhakāryāṇi^(f) karoti | ata eva keva-

(a) ms. tvantuāvajita or tvannuava° or tvantu (-nnu) | avo.

(b) ms. ṣaṣṭikalpān.

(c) ms. kan nirvā.

(d) ms. °tenaḥ bo.

(e) ms. °ku co.

(f) ms. kāryāṇi twice.

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lāṃ śūnyatāṃ sevamānasya mā bhūn nirvāṇapraveśa iti | bha-
gavatā cāryatathāgataguhyasūtre cuktam | naikāntanir(ālam*ba-
naṃ) cittamātrasevanaṃ kartavyam api | upāyakaūsalyam api
sevaniyam iti pradarśanārtham uktam | tadyathāpi nāma, kulaputra,
agnir upādānāj jvalati | anupādānaḥ śāmyati | evam evāramba-
ṇataś cittaṃ jvalati | anārambaṇaṃ śāmyati | tatropāyakaūsalo bo-
dhisattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāpariśuddhārambaṇopa(śam*am api) jā-
nāti | kuśalamūlārambaṇaṃ ca na śamayati | kleśārambaṇaṃ ca
notthāpayati | pāramitārambaṇaṃ cotthāpayati | śūnyatāram-
baṇaṃ ca pratyavekṣate (sarvasattvamahākaruṇārambaṇaṃ ca prekṣa-
te) iti hi ku(la)putra, upāyakaūsalaḥ prajñāpāramitāpariśuddho bodhi-
sattvo 'nārambaṇe vaśitāṃ pratilabhata iti vistaram uktvā pu(nar
ca va*da)ty(evam) hi nāsti tat kiṃcid ārambaṇaṃ bodhisattvasya yat^(a)
sarvajñānābhinirhārāya na saṃtiṣṭhate [T. 68, a] | yasya bodhi-
sattvasya sarvārambaṇāni bodhipariṇāmitāni, ayaṃ bodhisattva upā-
yakūsalaḥ sarvadharmān bodhyanugatān paśyati^(b) | tadyathāpi nāma,
kulaputra, nāsti tat trisāhasramahāsāhasre lokadhā(tau yat na s*attvā)-
nām^(c) upabhogāya (na syād), evam eva, kulaputra, nāsti tat kiṃ-
cid ārambaṇaṃ yad upāyakaūsalo bodhisattvo bodhāya copakāri-

(a) ms. yaḥ.

(b) ms. paśyanti.

(c) ms. yanām.

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bhūtaṃ (na) paśyatīti vistaraḥ | evam anantasūtrānteṣu^(a)
 bodhisattvānāṃ prajñopāyapratipattir nirdiṣṭā | tatra yadi nāma
 svayaṃ na śakyate dānādipuṇyasambhāravīryam ārabdhuṃ tathāpi
 (anyeṣ*ām evam u)padeśo dātum na yuktaṃ ceti svaparadrohaḥ
 kṛtaḥ syāt | tad evaṃ yuktyāgamābhyāṃ pratipāditaṃ ya-
 thā (bodhi)^(b)sattvenāvaśyaṃ bhūtapratyavekṣā kartavyā sakala-
 dānādipuṇyasambhāraś copārajayitavyaḥ | tataḥ prekṣāvataḥpaśru-
 tānāṃ ābhimānikānāṃ vacanaṃ viṣam ivāvdhūyāryanāgārjunā(di)-
 vidvajjanavacanā(ṃrtānu*gatena) sakalasattveṣu^(c) mahākaraṇāṃ
 upajanayya māyākāravād aviparyastenānuttarasambodhipariṇā-
 mitasakaladānādikuśalacaryāyām aśeṣajagaduddharaṇe cābhiyuktēna
 bhavitavyam | yathoktam āryadharmasaṃgītau |
 māyākāro yathā kaścin nirmitaṃ moktum udyataḥ |
 na cāśya^(d) nirmite saṅgo jñātapūrvo yato * [sya saḥ]
 (tri)bhavaṃ nirmitaprakhyāṃ jñātvā sambodhipāragāḥ^(e)
 sannahyanti jagaddhetoḥ jñātapūrve jage tathā |

(e) ms. sambidhiśūrayaḥ. But see I Bhk, p. 219.

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iti tasyaivaṃ
 prajñāṃ [T. 68, b] upāyaṃ ca satataṃ satkṛtyābhyasyataḥ krameṇa
 saṃtatiparipākād uttarottaraviśuddhataratamakṣaṇodayād bhū-
 tārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantagamane sakalalakpanājālarahitaṃ
 sphuṭataṃ dharmadhā(tvadhiga*maṃ vima)laṃ niścalanivā-
 tadīpaval lokottarajñānam utpadyate | tadā ca vastuparyantatā-
 lambanaṃ pratilabdhaṃ bhavati | darśanamārgaṃ ca praviṣṭo bha-
 vati | prathamā ca bhūmiḥ prāptā bhavati | tatas taduttarā bhū-
 miḥ pariśodhayan krameṇa kanakavad aśeṣāvaraṇāpagame saty, asa-
 ktam (a)pratihatam^(a) jñānaṃ pratilabhya buddha(bhūmim *
 aśeṣaguṇā)dhārāṃ prāpto bhavati | kāryapariniṣpattiṃ cālamba-
 naṃ pratilabhate | tasmād buddha tvādhigamārthinā^(b) ma-
 dhyama^(c)paddhatau tāvad abhiyogaḥ karaṇīya iti |

prakāśya yat prāpi mayā śubham asamapaddhitam |
 puṇyam astu janas tena prāpto madhyamapaddhitam |
 dūrikṛterṣyādimalā^(d) [hi] santo guṇairatṛptāḥ(salilair ivā)bdhiḥ |

(a) ms. āprati°.

(b) ms. adhigamāyarthinā.

(c) ms. madhyamayā (space) ddhatāvad.

(d) ms. malādīsa.

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vivecya gr̥hṇanti subhāṣitāni haṃsāḥ payo ya[t]^(a) payasi
 prahr̥ṣṭāḥ |
 pākṣapātākulaṃ tasmād dūrikṛtaṃ mano budhaiḥ |
 sarvam eva grahitavyaṃ bālād api subhāṣitam |
 ācāryakamalaśilanibaddho bhāvanākramaḥ samāptaḥ |

(^a) ms. payoya.

[page 33]

REFERENCE TO THE VOLUME AND PAGE
 OF THE SUTRAS AND OTHER CANONICAL TEXTS
 QUOTED IN THE THIRD BHK

- p. 7 Aryaratnamegha. Vol. 35, p.211, 3-1
 p. 11 Avikalpapraveśa. Vol. 32, p. 231, 4-8
 p. 12 Aryatathāgataguhyasūtra. Vol. 22, p. 48, 4-3 and 49, 2-2
 p. 13 Aryatathāgatotpattisaṃbhavasūtra. Vol. 26, p. 34, 2-7
 p. 13 Aryavimalakīrtinirdeśa. Vol. 34, p. 77, 5-7
 p. 14 Aryagayāśirṣa. Vol. 29, p. 129, 1-2. Cfr. Bhk. I^o, p. 194
 p. 14 Aryatathāgataguhyasūtra. Vol. 22, p. 49, 2-3
 p. 17 Mañjuśrīvikurvitasūtra. Vol. 27, p. 259, 2-3
 p. 18 Aryasamādhirāja. Vol. 31, p. 248, 1-5.
 Cfr. Bhk. I, p. 198; SR p. 105, v. 31
 p. 19 Brahmapariṣcchā. Vol. 33, p. 191, 4-2
 Vol. 33, p. 205, 5-7
 Vol. 33, p. 192, 5-2
 Vol. 33, p. 196, 1-8
 p. 20 Aryaratnakūṭa. Vol. 24, p. 194, 5-7
 p. 21 Daśabhūmaka. Vol. 25, p. 251, 3-6
 p. 21 Aryaratnakaṭa. Vol. 24, p. 192, 5-5
 p. 22 Aryasaṃdhinirmocana. Vol. 29, p. 10, 5-2
 Partially quoted Bhk. I, p. 194
 p. 22 Aryopālipariṣcchā. Vol. 24, p. 50, 3-6

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REFERENCE (continued)

- p. 22 Aryavimalakīrtinirdeśa. Vol. 34, p. 85, 3-5

- p. 22 Aryagaganagañja. Vol. 33, p. 14, 5-7
p. 22 Sūtrasamuccaya. Vol. 102, p. 88, 5-6
Vol. 102, p. 89, 1-1
p. 22 Sūtrasamuccaya. Vol. 102, p. 88, 4-1
p. 23 Aryagaganagañja. Vol. 33, p. 14, 5-5
p. 23 Puṇyaskandhāparināmaṇā. Vol. 37, p. 115, 2-8
- p. 24 Brahmapariṣcchā. Vol. 33, p. 202, 3-7
p. 24 Brahmapariṣcchā. Vol. 33, p. 215, 4-3
p. 25 Aryopālipariṣcchā. Vol. 24, p. 48, 4-3
p. 25 Sūtrasamuccaya. Vol. 102, p. 88, 1-8
p. 27 Sūtrasamuccaya. Vol. 102, p. 109, 4-7
p. 27 Aryaratnakūṭa. Vol. 24, p. 231, 4-7
p. 27 Aryaratnakūṭa. Vol. 27, p. 193, 1-3
p. 28 Aryatathāgataguhyasūtra. Vol. 22, p. 76, 4-3

Bhāvanākṛm III (Translation)

Robert F. Olson and Masao Ichisima***

INTRODUCTION

This is an English translation of the third *Bhāvanākrama* by Indian Pandit Kamalaśīla(-778 CE) translated into English by Dr. Robert Olson, and Rev. Masao Ichisima at Tendai Missin of Hawaii in 1974. The Buddhist English Translation Seminar of Hawaii was organized in Honolulu, Hawaii as a joint project of both the Religion Department of the University of Hawaii, and the Tendai Mission of Hawaii. As part one of this project, we translated the *T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-t'i*⁽¹⁾, originally written in China by the Korean monk Chegwan, in the late tenth century. This translation of the third *Bhāvanākrama* is a result of the second part of the project.

The basis for our work was Professor Giuseppe Tucci's *Minor Buddhist Texts, Part III, Third Bhāvanākrama*, Serie Oriental Roma XLIII, Rome, 1971. We translated from the Romanized Sanskrit text, using both the Tibetan and Chinese texts⁽²⁾ as cross-references. According to the Tibetan Shastras (*Bstan hgyur*⁽³⁾), there is a series of three *Bhk* texts attributed to Kamalaśīla. Among them, the first and third texts were published in the form of Sanskrit Romanized texts by Professor G. Tucci⁽⁴⁾, and the commemorative Nepalese text of Dr. E. E. Obermiller⁽⁵⁾ was published in Moscow. Dr. Obermiller pointed out how the *History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, by Bu-ston(1290-1364 CE), followed closely the original text of the third *Bhk* by Kmlaśīla⁽⁶⁾. For instance, in chapter five, "The Thesis of the Hva śāṅ," and the chapter six, "Refutation by Kmlaśīla," Bu-ston quotes directly from the *Bhk*. In the light of this, I felt it of some importance to briefly describe in the Introduction the situation surrounding this third and influential text.

[abbr:]

Bhk : the Bhāvanākrama
 DE : Derge Edition, Tohoku
 DG : Sde-dge Edition
 NE : Narthan Edition
 PED : Peking Edition of the Tibetan Cannon
 T : Taisho Chinese Cannon

* Late Prof. Robert F. Olson, Department of Religion, University of Hawaii

** Professor of Emeritus of Taisho University Japan .

E-mail: ichisima@senzoji.jp

(1) Historical Background of the Debate Between the Hva śaṅ and Kamalaśīla

During the reign of King K'ri sron lde bstan(718-780 CE) there were two different streams of Buddhism in Tibet. One was the Chinese tradition of meditation, the Sudden Path (*Ton-mum*), the other being of Indian origin, commonly referred to as the Gradual Path (*Tsen-min*). The Hva śaṅ represented the Sudden Path, while Kamalaśīla, invited to Tibet from India, argued on behalf of the Gradual Path. The debate was held at Sam-yas monastery in the presence of King K'ri sron lde bstan, sometime during 768-770 CE, according to recent research done by Professor Syuki Yoshimura⁽⁹⁾. The debate was held as follows:

The king seated himself in the middle the Hva śaṅ was given a place to his right and the teacher Kamalaśīla to his left side. The *Tsen-min* was placed to as to form the retinue of Kamalaśīla. The king, having handed to both wreaths of flowers, declared: "Ye two are to hold a controversy. To him who conquers, the vanquished must present his wreath and dare no longer abide here (Tibet)!⁽¹⁰⁾"

Thus the debate began with the Hva śaṅ:

By acting according to the Doctrine, by virtuous acts of body and speech, one cannot become a Buddha. One attains the state of the latter by abiding in perfect inactivity⁽⁹⁾. If one commits virtuous or sinful deeds, one comes to blissful or to evil births (respectively). In such a way the deliverance from the Saṃsāra is impossible, and there will be always impediments to the attainment of Buddhahood. The virtuous and the sinful deeds are just like white and black clouds which alike obscure the sky. But he, who has no thoughts and inclinations at all, can be fully delivered from Phenomenal Life. The absence of any thought, search, or investigation brings about the non-perception (*anupalambha*) of the reality of separate entities. In such a manner one can attain the 10th Stage⁽¹⁰⁾...

To this Kamalaśīla himself answered as follows:

Thou sayest thus that one ought not to think about anything whatever. But this means the negation (or rejection) of the Highest Analytic Wisdom (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*). Now the latter represents the foundation of the Divine Wisdom of a Saint (*samyagjñāna*), the rejection of it necessarily leads to the negation of this sublime Transcendental Wisdom (*prajñā*). If Analytic Wisdom is absent, what meditator can come to abide in a state where there is no constructive thought? If one has no thought concerning any of the elements of existence and does not direct the mind upon them, this does not mean that one can cease to remember all that one has experienced and to think of it. If I think: I must not recall in my mind any element of existence, --such a thought will itself be an intense recollection and activity of the mind. If the mere absence of consciousness and recollection is regarded as sufficient, it follows that in a swoon or at the time of intoxication one comes to the state where there is no constructive thought. If we merely cease to reflect and have no discrimination, how can we come to the cognition of the Non-substantiality (*sūnyatā*) of all the elements? And without the cognition of Non-substantiality, it is impossible to remove the Obscurations (*āvaranaprahāṇa*). Therefore, the incorrect presentation can be cast away only by means of the correct Analytic Wisdom.

For this reason it is not proper to say, that one does not reflect, when in reality it is the reverse. Without recollection and correct activity of the mind, how can one come to remember the place of former residence and attain Omniscience (*paramārtha*)? And how will it be possible to extricate the passions? But the Yogin who reflects over an object by means of correct Analytic Wisdom, cognizes all the external elements in the present, past and future as non-substantial, has all thought-construction pacified within him, and reject all the evil doctrines. On this foundation he becomes skilful in expedients (*upāya*) and in the manifestation of Highest Wisdom (*prajñā*). And, having through this cleared all the Obscurations (*āvarana-jñāna*), he can attain the state of a Buddha (*buddhadharma*)⁽¹¹⁾...

Bu-ston then concludes the debate in the following way:

Thus and more spoke he indetail and the *Ton-mun-pa* were incapable of giving an answer. They gave the wreath of flowers to the teacher (Kamalaśīla), and declared themselves vanquished.

Thereafter the king gave the following order: Henceforth, as concerns the theory, one must adopt the system of Nāgārjuna. With regard to the practice, one must become trained in the ten kinds of virtuous conduct and in the ten Transcendental Virtues. As to the *Ton-mun* views, the propagation of these is not to be permitted! Accordingly the Hva śāñ was sent back to China, and his books were collected and kept concealed in a store-house⁽¹²⁾.

Once having read the third *Bhk* it becomes apparent how closely Bu-ston's description of the debate follows Kamalaśīla's text.

(2) Philosophical Basis of Kamalaśīla and the Hva śāñ

According to the Tibetan Shastras, as seen above, the Hva śāñ was defeated. However, his teaching did not completely disappear from Tibet, but rather were inherited in the teaching of the Great Perfection (*Dsogs C'en*), one of the branches of the Nyingma (*rñin ma pa*) tradition. Kamalaśīla's teachings influenced the doctrinal development that began with Atīśa (982-1054 CE), and culminated in Tsoñ kha pa (1357-1419 CE), founder of the Gelugpa (*Dge legs pas*) tradition.

The Hva śāñ is said to be the seventh in the sevenfold lineage of the masters of dhyāna beginning with Bodhidharmatāla⁽¹³⁾. Many ideas from this line of thinking were integrated into the Great Perfection teachings. According to this school, "By a synthetical intelligence of non-duality which transcends any idea concerning something either to be taken or to be abandoned, one masters all dharmas, whether saṃsāric or transcendental, in voidness, but devoid of any notion of voidness itself: thus and so the direct experience of the absolute, as knowledge transcending saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, is realized⁽¹⁴⁾." In fact, contrary to the *History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, and this text of the third *Bhk*, Chinese manuscripts from Tunhuang maintain that the Hva śāñ was victorious, and the teachings of dhyāna (*Ch'an*) were propagated in Tibet.

The influence of Kamalaśīla's *Bhk* in the *Bodhipatha Pradīpa* (*A Torch for Realizing Enlightenment*) by Atīśa, is clearly apparent, while in Tsoñ kha pa's *Lam rim c'en mo* (*The Gradual Way to Perfection*), it is quoted fifty-six times⁽¹⁵⁾. Kamalaśīla established the third way of Mādhyamika called Yogacāra-Mādhyamika based on the idea of *Cittamātra-niḥsvabhāva* (non-substantial awareness), which united the highest ideals of both Mādhyamika

and Yogācāra, in contrast to the two lineages of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti⁽¹⁶⁾. He was in the line of Santarakṣita, the first abbot of Sam-yaṣ monastery (founded in 755 CE by the King K'ri sron lde bstan), and wrote commentaries on Santarakṣita's *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, and others.

Kamalaśīla also followed Sāntideva (650-700 CE), quoting his *Sikṣāsamuccaya* in this text of the third *Bhk*, and emphasized the importance of the repeated practice of the Six Perfections.

It is particular interest also, that the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, so important in the Vajrayāna traditions of China and Japan, is quoted throughout all three *Bhk*, especially in the first and second *Bhk*. According to the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, Mahāyāna consists of three important factors: Compassion (*Mahākaraṇā*), the Seed of Enlightenment (*Bodhicitta*), and Means (*Upāya*). This Great Compassion I the basis of all, the Seed is the cause of Enlightenment, and the Perfect Accomplishment is achieved by the Means (*Upāya-siddhi*). Kamalaśīla insisted on these practices (*Bhāvanā*) in terms of the triple method of learning, reflection, and meditation (*śrutamayī, citamayī, and bhāvanāmayī*). Perfect liberation can be attained by the union of Means and Wisdom (*prajñā*) in the method of practicing both Calmness (*śamatha*) and Discernment (*vipaśyanā*). The Means here indicates the Five Perfections of Bodhisattva, and when united with Wisdom, it leads to the perfect liberation. Practicing the Five Perfections, one attains Calmness of mind, thus allowing the spontaneous light of Discernment to shine forth, just as a candle burns brightest when left in a windless place.

(3) *Sūtrasamuccaya* quoted in the third *Bhk*

Kamalaśīla quoted *Sūtrasamuccaya*⁽¹⁷⁾ in this text, beginning with Section "D", "Confirmation by Buddhavaṇana", and then throughout the remainder of the work. It is widely thought that Sāntideva is the author of the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, yet in the concluding section of the *Bhk*, he clearly mentions Nāgārjuna as the author of the *Sūtrasamuccaya*⁽¹⁸⁾. According to Bu-ston's *History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, Sāntideva wrote the *Sikṣā-samuccaya*, and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*⁽¹⁹⁾. However, no trace of a manuscript of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* by Sāntideva has survived. However, in chapter five of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* "Guarding of Total Awareness", verse 106⁽²⁰⁾, Sāntideva himself states that he has written a *Sūtrasamuccaya*, and that there is yet another *Sūtrasamuccaya* written by Nāgārjuna⁽²¹⁾. Tibetan and Chinese texts of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* are compiled in their respective canons. The Tibetan version is attributed to Nāgārjuna. It seems to me, that the Nāgārjuna of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* must be different from the famous founder of the Mādhyamika school, since the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* is quoted in the text. This sutra is generally assumed to have been composed at least one hundred years after the death of the famed Nāgārjuna, thus making it impossible for the author of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* to have been the same individual.

Ratnākaraśānti (960-1030 CE) who wrote a commentary to this *Sūtrasamuccaya*⁽²²⁾, poses the question in his commentary: why is Mahāyāna superior to other schools? Because, he says, Mahāyāna has the *Laṅkāvatāra* as a sutra, and such great ācāryas as Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. Ratnākaraśānti was one of the six gate keepers of the Vikramaśīlā monastery⁽²³⁾, an outstanding scholar, and the author of many works on Buddhist logic and Vajrayāna texts,

representing the East Gate, while the Pandit Prajñākaramati (960-1030 CE), a commentator of Sāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, was the South Gate scholar in his period.

In conclusion, although the *Sūtrasamuccaya* has not been regarded as an important and influential piece of literature by Buddhist scholars, it does seem that it had a considerable influence on the great pandits Sāntideva and Kamalaśīla. Both emphasized the importance of the Bodhisattva Practices confirmed by Buddhavaçana, quoting many important sutras in the same manner as the *Sūtrasamuccaya* by Nāgārjuna.

Introduction Notes

- (1) David W. Chappell, "Introduction to the *T'ien-t'ai-ssu-chiao-i*," *The Eastern Buddhist*, New Series Vol. IV, No. 1, May 1976, p. 72.
- (2) T 32, pp. 563-572.
- (3) PED No. 5310, 5311, 5312.
- (4) Giuseppe Tucci, *Minor Guddhist Texts Part II*, Rome, 1958. *Minor Guddhist Texts Part III*, Rome, 1971.
- (5) E. E. Obermiller, Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanākrama, Moskva, 1963.
- (6) E. E. Obermiller, "A Sanskrit Ms. from Tibet Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanākrama," *The Journal of the Greater India Society*, Vol. II. 1935, No. 1.
- (7) Shuki Yoshimura, *Indo Daijo Bukkyo Shiso Kenkyu, Kamalaśīla no shiso*, [A Study on the Concepts of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, Kamaraśīla's Thought], Kyoto, 1973, p. 43.
- (8) E. E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (chos-ḥbyung) in India and Tibet by Bu-ston*, Heidelberg, 1932, Reprint Series 5 of Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo, 1963, p. 193.
- (9) Ibid. p. 192.
- (10) Ibid. p. 192.
- (11) Ibid. pp. 193-194.
- (12) Ibid. pp. 195-196, The Sanskrit insertions are included by Masao Ichishima, and do not appear in Dr. Obermiller's Translation.
- (13) G. Tucci, *Minor Guddhist Texts Part II*, Rome, 1958, p. 64.
- (14) Ibid. p. 61.
- (15) Gajin Masato Nagao, *Chibetto Bukkyo Kenkyu*, [A Study of Tibetan Buddhism], Being a translation into Japanese of the exposition of *vipaśyanā* in Tsoñ-khapa's *Lam-rim Chen-mo*, with annotation and prefatory remarks, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1954, p. XII.
- (16) Jithudo Nagasawa, "Kamalaśīla's Theory of the Yogacāra," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. X, No. 1, Jan., 1962, p. 336.
- (17) PED No. 5330, DE No. 3934, NE No. 3321.
- (18) Masao Ichishima, "Sūtrasamuccaya no Bombun Dampen," [Sanskrit Fragment of Sūtrasamuccaya], *Tendai Gakuho*, No. 14, 1971, p. 165. "Sūtrasamuccaya ni tsuite," [About Sūtrasamuccaya], *Tendai Gakuho*, No. 8, 1964, p. 49. "Sūtrasamuccaya no Sakusha ni tsuite," [About the Author of Sūtrasamuccaya], *Indogaku bukkyogaku Kenkyu* [Journal of Indian and

Buddhist Studies], Vol. XVI, No. 2, March 1968, p. 844. "Bhāvanākrama no Daisampen," [A Study on the Bhāvanākrama Part III], *Indogaku bukkyogaku Kenkyu*, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Dec. 1972, p. 136.

- (19) E. E. Obermiller, loc. cit., p. 163.
- (20) Marion L. Matics, *Entering the Path of Enlightenment, The Bodhicaryāvātāra of the Buddhist Poet Sāntideva*, translation with guide, Macmillan, London, 1970. Or else, in the meantime, one should consult the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, as a compendium; and its companion composed by the noble Nāgārjuna should be studied zealously.
- (21) Prajñākaramati, "Bodhicaryāvātra pañjikā," *Bibliotheca Indica: A Collection of Oriental Works*, Asiatic Society of Bengal, New Series, No. 983,1031,1090, 1126, 1305, 1399, Calcutta, 1901, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1912, 1914, p. 164, Verse No. 106.
- (22) PED No. 5331, 255b-256a.
- (23) George N. Roerich, *The Blue Annals (Deb-thel sñon-po) Part one*, Book IV, 1949, p. 206.

THE THIRD PROCESS OF MEDITATIVE ACTUALIZATION by Kamalaśīla

§ 1. śamatha and vipaāyanā (Calmness and Discernment)

Honor to Tārā! The stages of actualization are [here] presented in brief for those who have undertaken the method of the sutra of the great vehicle. Now even though Bhagavān taught [that] the samādhi of bodhisattvas is unlimited [in its variety], consisting of the [four] “measureless” and so on, still inasmuch as all samādhis are included in calmness and discernment, just that way is [here] presented which consists in the unification of calmness and discernment⁽¹⁾. Bhagavān also said, “When a being actualizes discernment and calmness he is freed from the bonds of signs (nimittabandhanā) and the bonds of evil states (dauṣṭhulabandhanā).” So one who seeks to get rid of all obstruction should devote himself to calmness and discernment. By the power of calmness thought becomes unshakeable in relation to its own object, like a lamp in a windless place. By discernment the light of right knowledge arises due to understanding the reality of dharmas as-they-are. All obstruction is thereby gotten rid of, as is darkness owing to the appearance of light.

For this reason Bhagavān taught that [meditative] objects for yogis have four aspects: The reflex without discrimination, the reflex with discrimination, the thing-limit, and the final completion of the work.

The reflex of any dharma—a form of a Buddha for instance upon which one becomes intent and is supported by, is called a reflex without discrimination. It is called a reflex without discrimination because of the absence of defining and discrimination with regard to a real object. And it is called a reflex owing to the fact that one has become intent upon and supported by a reflex of dharmas as learned and acquired. When the yogi considers that same reflex by means of discernment in order to comprehend its reality, then it is called a reflex with discrimination, because of the arising at that point of the characteristics of discernment, defining and discrimination of reality. When the yogi, defining the nature of that same reflex—as though ascertaining the defects on one’s own face by examining the reflection of one’s own face in a mirror—penetrates suchness, characterized by the thing-limit, then because of his understanding of the thing-limit it is called the thing-limit object on the first stage. Then by means of the path of actualization on the remaining stages, there is a revolution of the basis due to the gradual arising of moments of greater and greater purification—as with the use of an elixir of herbs. [And] when the work is finished, marked by the removal of obstruction, there on the Buddha-stage that same knowledge is called the object [arising from] completion of the work.

Such being the case, what does it demonstrate? By means of calmness and discernment there comes to be comprehension of the thing-limit as a whole, and through this one reaches the completion of the work, which is characterized by the removal of obstruction. And just that is Buddhahood. So one who seeks to realize Buddhahood should devote himself to calmness and discernment, but he who does not devote himself to them has neither realization of the thing-limit nor completion of the work. Bhagavān stated the character of calmness and discernment succinctly in the *Ratnamegha* etc.: “Calmness is one-pointedness of thought; discernment is true examination.”⁽²⁾

§ 2. How to practice śamatha and vipaśyanā

The yogi, established in the equipment for calmness and discernment—purification through conduct, etc.—generates great compassion towards all beings, and having produced the thought of enlightenment he should practice the actualization of what he has learned and has thoughts of.

First of all the yogi, who at the time of actualization has fulfilled all his obligations and has urinated and evacuated, remains in a place agreeable to his mind, which is free of noise, thorns, etc. Resolving, “I will cause all beings to be finally brought to the seat of enlightenment,” he manifests great compassion with the intention of rescuing the entire world. He prostrates himself with five members to all the buddhas and bodhisattvas established in the ten directions, places buddhas and bodhisattvas in front of himself or elsewhere in a painting etc., and performs worship with hymns of praise to them appropriately and according to his liking. He declares his own sins, rejoices in the merit of the entire world, sits in a very relaxed and comfortable posture by means of the folded-palanquin of Lord Vairocana or the half-palanquin, neither overly open nor overly closed directs his eyes towards the tip of his nose, extends his body upright, neither too bent nor too stiff, and sits with his mindfulness turned inward. Then he should make his shoulders even. He should keep his head steadily in one direction, neither raised nor lowered, but he should place his nose in line with his navel. His teeth and lips should be kept relaxed, and his tongue should be placed up at the roots of his teeth. On the other hand his inhalations and exhalations should be made without sound, neither coarse nor rapid—rather he should make them just as they would effortlessly enter or leave, softly, unfelt.⁽³⁾ Then, at first, the yogi should fix his mind on such a form of the Tathāgata as he has seen and learned about, and develop calmness.

And he should meditate upon that form of the Tathāgata, dazzling like refined gold, adorned with the major and minor marks, placed in the middle of a mandala together with his retinue, bringing profit to beings by manifold means. With continuous attention he should generate desire for those qualities, calm away depression, excitement, etc., and meditate upon that form to such an extent that it is very clear, as though he were seeing it existing in front of him. Then there should be discernment by investigating the coming and going of that reflex of a Tathāgata-form. So he should reflect in this way: “Just as this reflex of a Tathāgata-form has come from nowhere nor will it go anywhere, though here it is, empty by nature and deprived of self and belonging-to-self—just so are all dharmas empty by nature, deprived of coming and going, like a reflection, deprived of their [own-] form as an entity or the like.” Having so considered, he should remain as long as he wishes actualizing reality with his mind one flavored, free of talk, [whose] considerations have been brought to a halt. This samādhi is taught in the Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhi⁽⁴⁾. And its benefit in detail should be understood in that very sutra. In such a way as this all dharmas are included. Fixing his thought upon that by allaying depression, excitement, etc., he should develop calmness.

The collection of all dharmas is, in brief, divided into those with form and formless ones. Those with form are included [under] the form-bundle, the formless ones are of the nature of feeling and the rest of the bundles.

Now fools wander about in saṃsāra, their thoughts misled, because of their

addiction to being and occur concepts. In order to lead them away from error the yogi, with his calmness complete, manifests great compassion towards them and then actualize discernment in order to realize [the nature of] reality. True examination is called discernment; and [what is] true is the non-selfhood of the person and of dharmas.

Here non-selfhood of the person is the absence of self and belonging to self in the bundles. Non-selfhood of dharmas is the similarity of those very [bundles] to an illusion. In regard to this the yogi should consider as follows: “But still the person doesn’t exist apart from form and the rest, because it appears, and it is just in form and the rest that the idea of “I” has its arising. However the person is not of the nature of form and the other bundles, because they, form and the rest, have an impermanent and manifold nature, and others (non-Buddhists) suppose the person to have a permanent and single form. Nor is it logical [to speak of] the substantiality of a person [which is] not describable in terms of [either] itself [or] of something else, since there is no other kind of substantial existence.” Therefore when he has arrived at certainty that this is just everyone’s false bewilderment—[the notions] “I”, “mine”—then he should also consider dharmas with form in order to realize the non-selfhood of dharmas: “Do these persist existing ultimately apart from mind? Or does mind alone appear as the phenomena form and the rest, like appearance in the dreaming state?” Considering them in terms of atoms and examining the atoms by parts, he does not apprehend them. And thus not apprehending them he abolishes discriminations of existence and non-existence about them. And he comprehends the triple world as mind alone, not otherwise. And further, it is said in the *Lañkāvatāra*: “One should not at all discriminate a substance divided into atoms as a form⁶; because of false view the determination of mind alone does not become clear.” It occurs to him that just mind appears to fools as the appearance of form etc. as though externally separated—like appearances of form etc. being conceived in a dream—owing to addiction during beginning-less time to unreal form etc. Thus the triple world is just mind alone.

He thus determines the totality of designation to be just mind, examines it, [knows] “the nature of all dharmas has been examined,” and also examines the nature of mind. He considers in this way: ultimately mind also, like an illusion, is unarisen. For when just mind appears in variegated aspects through its incorporation of the aspects of form etc. whose nature is false—then where is its own reality, since like the form etc. it does not exist in separation from that [appearance]? Just as form etc. have neither a single nor a multiple nature, since they are the variegated aspect [of mind], so also mind, since it does not exist in separation from that, has neither a single nor a multiple nature. Moreover neither does thought, arising, come from anywhere nor does it, stopping, go anywhere. Nor is it logical [to say that] its arising is ultimately out of itself, another, or both. Therefore mind is just like an illusion. Just as mind so all dharmas, like an illusion, are ultimately unarisen. Further, the yogi, when inspecting the nature of that mind with which he examines, does not apprehend it. So in this way whatever object the yogi’s thought intends, he inspects and does not apprehend, then he considers each and every thing, understands it to be without any pith like the trunk of a plantain tree, and he turns his thought from it. Then when there is cessation of the discriminations of being etc. he reaches the yoga [called] the signless, which is free of all proliferation. And this is said in the *Ratnamegha*: “He,

thus skilled in [the knowledge of] faults, enters into the yoga of actualization of emptiness in order to get way from all proliferation. Possessing the actualization of emptiness he searches out the nature of whatever matters his mind intends, or takes pleasure in, and discovers it to be empty. Whatever that mind is, that too being inspected, he discovers to be empty. Even that mind with which he inspects, that also being searched out, he discovers to be empty. Investigating in this way he practices the signless.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Consequently by this the following is shown: he on the other hand who does not investigate gains no entry to the signless. When, investigating the nature of dharmas in this way he does not apprehend [any], then he does not discriminate “it is,” he does not discriminate “it isn’t.” That which is imagined in his intellect as “it isn’t” is because of not always appearing. For if a being were ever seen then owing to its negation he might imagine “It isn’t.” When a being is never apprehended by the yogi inquiring with insight then owing to the negation of what would he imagine “it isn’t”? In this way other discriminations simply do not [occur] to him then, because all discrimination is included in the discriminations of being and non-being. Thus owing to the nonexistence of the included there is no existence of the included either. When this is the case he has gained access to the absence of proliferation and discrimination—he does not rely on form and the rest. By inquiring with insight he becomes a meditator [who has] insight as his forte, because he does not apprehend the nature of any thing.

Thus having gained access to reality which consists in the non-selfhood of person and dharmas, the yogi, because there exists nothing further to be inspected, abides ascertaining more and more clearly, without just that reality, with a mind acting-out-of-its-own-nature whose consideration has ceased and which is of a single essence free of discrimination.

§ 3. Distractions to be avoided: how to be counteracted

Then established in that [state] he should not disperse his continuity of mind. When now and then he should see his mind distracted externally, then he should calm the distraction by examining the nature of that [distracted thought] and again direct his thought repeatedly towards that [object]. But if he should see his mind discontented with it, then by seeing the virtues of samādhi he should bring about contentment with it. And by seeing the harm of distraction he should allay discontent. And if he should see his mind depressed from his practice, owing to a predominance of lethargy and drowsiness, or [if he has] worries about depression, then he should calm depression by directing his attention to an object of delight—the form of a Buddha⁽⁶⁷⁾ etc. or the idea of light. Then he should hold of that same reality more firmly. But when—like one blind from birth, like a man plunged into darkness, like one with closed eyes—the yogi does not more clearly ascertain reality, then he should know his mind to be depressed and separated from discernment.⁽⁶⁸⁾ And when now and then he should see his mind excited by longing for an object as previously experienced, or [if he has] worries about excitement, then he should calm excitement by focusing his attention on something upsetting such as impermanence. Then he should strive towards keeping his mind free of deliberation towards just that reality. And when his mind’s activity is unstable—like a distraught person or a monkey—he should understand his excitement to be devoid of calmness. But when because of his separation from depression and excitement mind is produced which continues evenly, naturally, and quite clearly upon just that reality, then he should

disregard [what he is doing] by relaxing his effort. And at that point the path consisting of the conjoining of calmness and discerning should be considered achieved. But if he should actualize discerning [and as a result] insight should become more predominant, then owing to his scanty calmness his seeing of reality would not become very clear because of the movement of mind, like a lamp in a windy place. So then calmness should be actualized. When there is predominance of calmness his seeing of reality, like that of a man paralyzed by drowsiness, would not be very clear. Therefore insight should then be actualized. When both of them continue evenly like a pair of oxen which comprise a conjoint [team], then he should remain unpremeditatedly as long as there is no physical or mental pain.

Briefly put, any samādhi [may] have six faults⁽⁹⁾: laziness, loss of object, depression, excitement, lack of effort, and effort. Eight eliminating formative attitudes for these should be actualized: faith, desire, exertion, serenity, mindfulness, full awareness, motivation, and equanimity. The first four of these are the contraries of laziness. This is because by faith, which is characterized by complete confidence in the virtues of samādhi, desire arises in the yogi. Then possessed of desire he develops energy. Then by relying upon his energy he actualizes dexterity of body and mind. Owing to that he turns away laziness, his body and mind serene. Then faith and the others predominate, so for that reason they should be actualized. Mindfulness is the contrary of loss of object. Full awareness is the contrary of depression and excitement, because by being disregarded by it they are avoided. But at the moment of allaying depression and excitement [they may be] the fault of lack of effort; hence, as its contrary, motivation should be actualized. Depression and excitement being laid to rest, when mind becomes quiescent, then [there may be] the fault of effort. Its contrary, equanimity, should then be distracted. And when mind is depressed if effort is not made then mind will be depressed because of its lack of discernment, as if [one were] a blind man. Therefore he should hold back depressed mind and allay excited [thought]. It having once reached evenness, he should remain in equanimity. Then the yogi should remain unpremeditatedly actualizing reality for as long as he wants. But when there is bodily and mental pain he should from time to time repeatedly survey the entire world and comprehend it as a net of illusions, like the moon's reflection, an appearance. And thus the *Avikalpapraveśa* says: "By transcendent knowing he sees all dharmas like the surface of space. By subsequent [knowing] on the other hand he sees them to be like an illusion, a mirage, a dream, the moon's reflection⁽¹⁰⁾." Then, having understood the world to be like an illusion, he should manifest great compassion towards all beings and reflect in this way: "These [beings] of simple intellect, not understanding the depth of Dharma in this way, pile up various actions and afflictions, misled by their attribution of being etc. to dharmas which have been at peace right from the beginning. So I will act in such a way as to cause them to realize the depth of Dharma in this way. Then having rested he should once again in the same way enter into the samādhi of non-appearance of any dharma. If his mind [becomes] weary he should in the same way rest and again enter. With this procedure he should remain in this way as long as he is able to, whether an hour or a watch (3 hours).

§ 4. How to get up from samādhi

Then with the desire to get up from samādhi, he should reflect as follows:

without undoing his posture: If now every one of these dharmas is ultimately unarisen, still because of the totality of various particular causes and conditions they continue in all their great variety, delightful [in being] free from consideration. so there is no implication [here] of nihilism nor of a position of negation. And since they are not apprehended when they are considered by insight, there is no implication of eternalism or of a position of attribution.

Those who, owing to deficiency of the eye of insight, have intellects which are misled [and are] addicted to a self, who perform various actions—they wander about in saṃsāra. On the other hand, those who are completely turned away from saṃsāra yet owing to deficiency in great compassion do not fulfill giving and the rest of the perfections [though they] tame themselves—those beings, owing to a deficiency in means wind up in the enlightenment of disciples and pratyeka buddhas. But those who understand the world of no nature [and] by the power of great compassion endowed with the determination of rescuing the entire world, like a magician [whose] thoughts are not misled, resort to the vast equipment of merit and knowledge—they reach the state of Tathāgata and remain as long as saṃsāra bringing about welfare and happiness in every way for the entire world. Owing to their getting rid of affliction by the power of knowledge they do not wind up in saṃsāra, and owing to their having acquired the vast and immeasurable equipment of merit they do not wind up in nirvāṇa, out of regard for all beings. And they become the patrons of all beings. Therefore I [who] seek to effect the welfare and happiness of every being [and] desire to attain the unfixed nirvāṇa, should persevere in acquiring the vast equipment of merit and knowledge. And thus it says in the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*: “The equipment of knowledge leads to the getting rid of afflictions; the equipment of merit leads to service to all beings. Therefore, Bhagavān, a bodhisattva, a great being, should always persevere in equipping himself with merit and equipping himself with knowledge⁽¹¹⁾.” And the *Tathāgatatotpattisambhavasūtra* says, “Furthermore that origin of Tathāgatas is not due to one cause [only]. For what reason? Because, son of the victors, tathāgatas arise owing to immeasurable tens of hundreds of thousands of causes which have arisen. By what tens? By the cause of arrival at dissatisfaction with [his] equipment of immeasurable merit and knowledge...⁽¹²⁾” And in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* it says: “The bodies of a tathāgata are born of a hundred merits, born of all wholesome dharmas, born of measureless acts [which have] wholesome roots...⁽¹³⁾”

Then when he has done this he should break his palanquin posture and prostrate himself to all the buddhas and bodhisattvas established in the ten directions. He should present them with worship and hymns and should make the vow of Aryabhadracarya and so forth. Thus will he be diligent in acquiring the entire equipment of merit—giving and the rest—which develops into supreme full enlightenment whose womb [consist of] emptiness and compassion.

§ 5. Thesis of the Hva śāñ

[Some say as follows:] “Beings wander in saṃsāra experiencing heaven and other [destinies] as the fruit of action, owing to good and bad acts brought about by discriminations of mind. Those on the other hand who do not think anything nor perform any action are freed from saṃsāra. Therefore nothing should be thought, nor should giving and the other wholesome practices be performed. It is

only with reference to stupid people that giving and the other wholesome practices are taught⁽¹⁴⁾.”

§ 6. Refutation

a) General implication of such a thesis

The entire Great Vehicle is repudiated by one who thinks thus. And because the Great Vehicle is the root of all the vehicles, by repudiating it every one of the vehicles would be repudiated. For that reason by saying that nothing should be thought, the insight which is characterized by true examination would be repudiated because true examination is the root of right knowing. Owing to the latter's repudiation transcendent insight would also be repudiated. Because of its repudiation the knowledge of all modes would be repudiated. And by saying that giving and other practices are not to be performed, quite evidently means, i.e. giving and the rest, is repudiated. To such an extent then is the Great Vehicle repudiated: insight and means. As the *Gayaśīrṣa* says, “Two are these abbreviated paths of bodhisattvas. What two? Insight(*prajñā*) and means(*upāya*)⁽¹⁵⁾.” And the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* says, “And this insight and means leads to the gathering of all perfections of bodhisattvas.⁽¹⁶⁾” And so by repudiating the Great Vehicle a great karmic obstacle would be made. A wise person who cares for himself should shun from a distance, as though they were poisoned food, the words mixed with poison of this one who pays no respect to learned men, who has not understood the guidance of the Tathāgata's expositions, who having ruined himself also brings ruin to others owing to his violation of reason and scripture. Hence by this repudiation of true examination the primary limb of enlightenment, called discern of dharmas, would itself be repudiated. And without true examination, how could the thought of the yogi, whose addiction to form and other things has been habitual since time without beginning, [ever] enter into non-discrimination?

b) Inconsistency of the objection that one can reach nirvikalpa by means of mere *asmṛti* and *amanasikāra*

It is fallacious to say that one enters [into it] by means of no memory(*asmṛti*) of and no attention(*amanasikāra*) to any dharma. For without true examination (*bhūta-pratyavekṣā*) it is impossible to bring about non-memory of or non-attention to even any dharma being [presently] experienced. And if now one should actualize non-memory and non-attention with regard to them [by] actualizing [the thought]: “I should not remember these dharmas nor pay attention to them”—then they would be in fact all the more remembered and attended to by him.

Now if non-memory and non-attention mean merely the non-existence of memory and attention, then this is [to be] considered: by what means does their nonexistence come to be? Nonexistence is not a possible cause by means of which non-discrimination might then come about. The entrance of [someone who has] fainted into non-discrimination would follow, owing to the nonexistence of memory and attention [in him at the time]. There is no other means than true examination by means of which one could bring about non-memory and non-attention.

Even if the possibility of non-memory and non-attention is granted, how would the non-nature of dharmas be understood without true examination? For

without their examination—[through the consideration] that by their very nature dharmas are established as empty—there would be no penetration into their emptiness. And moreover without penetration into emptiness getting rid of obstruction is impossible, for [if it were otherwise] there would be liberation of all [being] everywhere. And further, if in regard to all dharmas the memory and attention of that yogi do not function because he has lost his memory or become stupefied, how could he be a yogi when he is completely stupefied? Without true examination then by practicing non-memory and non-attention just bewilderment(moha) alone would be practiced. For that reason the light of right knowing would be made distant. Now supposing he has no amnesia(muṣitasmr̥ti) nor is he stupefied. Then how would he be able to bring about non-memory and non-attention without true examination? For it is not logical to say that [although] remembering he does not remember [and although] seeing he does not see. And by the practice of non-memory and non-attention how could there be any arising of such Buddha-dharmas as the recollection of previous existence, since [this would lead to] a contradiction, for there would be no sensation of contact with heat for one habituated to cold, the contrary of heat. Moreover if there exists mind-consciousness(manovijñāna) in a yogi who has attained samādhi, then certainly he must have some [meditative] object, for knowing without an object cannot come about all of a sudden in ordinary persons. And [if it] does not exist, then how could the non-nature of dharmas be understood [by him], and by what [means of] opposition can the affective obstruction be gotten rid of? And the cessation of mind(cittanirodha) is not possible for an ordinary person who has not reached the fourth trance(caturtha dhyāna).

c) Necessity of bhūta-pratyavekṣā

Therefore the non-memory and non-attention which are read about in true Dharma are to be seen as presupposing true examination. From this true examination non-memory and non-attention can be effected—not otherwise. Because when the yogi, inquiring by means of right insight does not see in the three times(trikāla) ultimately any dharma, how then would he have memory and attention [with regard to any dharma]? For how could that be remembered or paid attention to which is ultimately experienced in none of the three times, owing to its nonbeing? [For the yogi] then would have entered into knowing which is free of discrimination, the calming of all conceptual proliferation. And because of that entrance he penetrates emptiness. And because of that penetration he becomes one who has gotten rid of the entire net of bad views.

Endowed with means and owing to his practice of insight, [the yogi] becomes proficient, well-versed in right conventional and ultimate truth. Then owing to his acquiring of obstruction-free knowing, he attains every one of the Buddha-dharmas. Hence without true examination there is neither the arising of right knowing nor getting rid of affective obstruction.

d) Construction by Buddhavacana

The *Mañjuśrīvikurvita sūtra* says, “How, girl, does the bodhisattva become one who has won the battle? —He, Mañjuśrī, who investigates and investigates but does not apprehend any dharma...⁽¹⁷⁾” Thus, his eye of knowing wide open, with the sword of insight, he vanquishes the enemy, the afflictions, and abides without fear—and not with his eye closed, like a cowardly person.

Also the *Samādhirāja* says, “If one examines all dharmas, [which are] without selfhood, if he examines them and actualizes them [in meditation], that is the cause for the attainment of the fruit, nirvāṇa. Whatever other cause is not one [leading] to peace.⁽¹⁸⁾”

And it says in the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, “He abides practicing the yoga of discernment by himself; he does not cause others to apply themselves to discernment—such is an act of Māra.⁽¹⁹⁾” And the nature of discernment is true examination in the *Ratnamegha*, the *Sandhinirmocana*, etc. And in the *Ratnamegha* the entrance into the signless is said to be the penetration into absence of own-being by one inquiring with discernment. And it says in the *Laṅkāvatāra*, “Because, Mahāmāti, the particular and general characteristics of existents when considered by intellect are not ascertained, therefore all dharmas are said to be without nature.” Examination of many kinds which is taught everywhere in the sutra by Bhagavān is contradicted if true examination is not to be made. Therefore it is appropriate to say this: “We of little insight and little energy are not able to search around for great learning,” it is not at all appropriate to repudiate it since Bhagavān has expounded great learning in many forms. The same is said in the *Brahmapariṣcchā*: “But those who separated from unthinkable dharmas are of the track.⁽²⁰⁾” It also says there, “They are off the track who imagine the arising of dharmas which have ultimately not arisen, and set in motion thoughts about their impermanence, unhappiness, and the like, as do the Srāvakas, [and who] set up thoughts by means of the extremes of attribution and denial.” What is said [here] in order to deny those [thoughts] is not a denial of true examination, since the latter is accepted in all the sutras. And in the same place in the *Brahmapariṣcchā* it says, “Bodhisattva Cittaśūra said, He who thinks about all dharmas with his mind and at the same time (tatra) is uninjured and unaffected is for that reason called a bodhisattva.” In the same place it says, “How are they possessed of energy? When they are investigating the thought of all-knowledge but do not apprehend it.” Moreover it says in the same place, “They will be intelligent due to their examination of dharmas in a thoroughgoing way.” Again it says in the same place, “They investigate those illusion-like, mirage-like dharmas.” So then whenever “unthinkable” and other such conceptual proliferation is heard, the personally experienced [nature] of dharmas is offered, as a nullifier of pride, to those who believe that the realization of [the nature of] reality is [possible] simply through learning and thinking. Such is to be understood as a negation of thought which is off the track, not as a negation of true examination. Otherwise it would be a very great contradiction with reason and with scripture, as has been said above. Besides, whatever is known through insight consisting of learning and thinking, just that and nothing else should be actualized by insight consisting of actualization—like the running of a horse on an indicated race-course. Therefore true examination is to be made.⁽²¹⁾ Even though it has the nature of discrimination, still, since it has the nature of profound attention, when one considers that from it arises true non-discriminative knowing, one should practice it for the sake of that knowing. And when non-discrimination, the fire of true knowing, arises that [true examination] is itself burned up by it, like the burning up of two pieces of wood by the fire born of the rubbing of the two pieces of wood.⁽²²⁾ This is said in the *Ratnakūṭa*.

e) Mukti is not caused only by destruction of karma but by elimination of kleśas

Now as for the statement, “No wholesome or other act need be performed, anyone who speaks like this on this point would be in agreement with the doctrine of the Ajīvikas that liberation is the ending of karma, for in the teaching of Bhagavān liberation is not held to be due to the ending of karma but rather to the ending of the afflictions. For it is not possible to bring about the ending of karma which has been accumulated during time without beginning, because it has no limit. And the result of it is [rebirth] in evil destinies etc., because of the generation of [both] presently experienced and future karma, and because of the impossibility of stopping karma when all of the afflictions remain, since they are what brings it about—just as when there is no putting out of the lamp there is no putting out of its light.

Nor is the ending of afflictions possible for that denier of discernment, as has been said above. It is held, rather, that discernment should be practiced for the sake of ending the afflictions. Then just by the ending of the afflictions liberation is achieved, so then the exertion to end karma is pointless. It is reasonable to say that an unwholesome action should not be performed, but why is wholesome action rejected? It is not reasonable to say that it is rejected because of its perpetuation of saṃsāra. What perpetuates saṃsāra is simply whatever unwholesome [action] aroused by the mistakes of externality, self, and the rest; but not [the action] of bodhisattvas aroused by great compassion nor [that which] is transformed into supreme enlightenment. So the *Daśabhūmika* teaches: “By means of [their] excellent preparation through transformation, those very ten wholesome paths of action bear with them śrāvakahood, pratyekabuddhahood, bodhisattvahood, and Buddhahood⁽²³⁾.” And the *Ratnakūṭa* points out that “as the mass of water of all the great rivers has entered into the great ocean the wholesome root of bodhisattvas, accumulated from various sources [and] transformed into all-knowledge, becomes the single flavor of all-knowledge⁽²⁴⁾.” Also contradicted would be what is described by Bhagavān here and there in the sutra as the attainment of buddhas and bodhisattvas—a form-body, purification of their field, light, retinue, great enjoyment, etc.—by a being who has the fruition of the equipment of merit, [viz.] giving and the rest. And with the rejection of wholesome conduct the restraint etc. [enjoined] by the Prātimokṣa would be rejected. Hence it would follow that his being shaved on head and face, wearing the yellow robe, etc. are really pointless. And if there is aversion to performance of wholesome actions, aversion to saṃsāra and aversion to action for the benefit of beings would be practiced. Hence enlightenment would be far from him. For it says in the *Sandhinirmocana*, “I say there is no supreme enlightenment for one who has aversion to having the benefit of beings as his sole aim, aversion to having within saṃsāra as his sole aim⁽²⁵⁾.” And in the *Upālipariprocchā* etc. aversion toward saṃsāra is described as the extreme of bad conduct for bodhisattvas, but acceptance of saṃsāra as supreme good conduct⁽²⁶⁾. And the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* says, “Because of means, the going to saṃsāra of bodhisattvas becomes liberation. Apart from means, insight is bondage, and apart from insight, means is bondage. Means along with insight is liberation, insight along with means is liberation⁽²⁷⁾—thus it is described. The *Gaganagañja* says, “Weariness of bodhisattvas towards saṃsāra is the action of Māra⁽²⁸⁾.” And in the *Sūtrasamuccaya*⁽²⁹⁾: “One both examines the uncompounded and is wearied by the

compounded [yet] wholesome—such is the action of Māra⁽³⁰⁾. “One has insight into the path of enlightenment but does not seek out the path of the perfections—such is the action of Māra⁽³¹⁾.”

Where on the other hand it says in the same place that addiction to mind of giving, ...mind of insight is the action of Māra—here is no rejection of the practice of giving etc.⁽³²⁾, but rather what is the mistaken addiction to giving etc. of one who is an apprehender, addicted to thoughts of I and mine, addicted to mind of subject and object: it is rejection of that. For it is in consideration of the fact that giving and the rest aroused through mistaken addiction are not pure that it says “action of Māra.” Otherwise not even meditation would be [something] one should do. And so how would there be liberation? For the same reason it says in the *Gaganagañja* also that the giving etc. of one who has an idea of a multiplicity of beings is the action of Māra. [This is said] in order to set forth the fact that the giving, etc., of one who apprehends by means of an idea of a multiplicity of beings, is not pure⁽³³⁾. The same is said in the *Puṇyaskandhaparināmaṇā*: “I confess that he apprehends everything without knowing the sameness of giving, good conduct, patience, energy, meditation, and insight. He observes good conduct having sought after gifts and having adhered to good conducts; he develops patience having ideas of self and others; and so forth.” In the same place [it says]: “That giving, etc., is not pure which is aroused by the mistaken addiction of one who apprehends having ideas of manifoldness⁽³⁴⁾.” Only to this extent is [such rejection] presented, and not as a universal rejection of the practice of giving and the rest. Otherwise there would [have to] be a confession of all giving, etc., without exception. [But such is] not [the case] for one who has arrived at non-apprehension, etc. The same is also said in the *Brahmapariṣcchā*: “Insofar as there is practice, it is all imaginable, and the unimaginable is enlightenment...⁽³⁵⁾” In this case also, it is owing to the nature of practices [based on] such discriminations as “arising” etc. that their imaginability is spoken of. The prediction [to full enlightenment] is on none other than the bodhisattva established in abiding in the signless, which bears with it no premeditation. In this way only [is the preceding quotation] presented. The non-arising of any giving, etc., ultimately is also made clear [in it]; but it is not declared that practice is not to be done. For otherwise why did not Bhagavān, in the Dīpankarāvadāna(?), [while still] in the condition of a bodhisattva, not reject the practice of those Buddhas revered by Bhagavān, whose names Bhagavān could not declare even if he were to speak them for a kalpa? Moreover Dīpankara at that time certainly did not reject the practice of Bhagavān. Indeed, when he was seen to be established in the eighth stage, in abiding in the pacified and signless, he was predicted [to full enlightenment] by Bhagavān [Dīpankara]. Here his practice was not rejected. And when one considers what it says in the *Daśabhūmika*: “Let the Buddhas not reject that highest quality of bodhisattvas on the eighth stage, abiding in the signless—just this is their parinirvāṇa”; if practice were not to be done at all, all of what has just been said would be contradicted.

This is as it says in the *Brahmapariṣcchā*: “He both gives a gift and is without desire for its consequences; he both maintains good conduct and is not delivered over to it...” “Bodhisattvas endowed with the four brahma-dharmas are irreversible with regard to the buddha-dharmas. What are the four? Unlimited acceptance of saṃsāra, unlimited service and worship of Buddhas...⁽³⁶⁾”—all [of this] would be contradicted.

Nor is it valid to say that practice should be done by one having dull faculties but not by one having sharp faculties, because from the first stage up until [that] of bodhisattvas established in the 10th stage, the practices of giving, etc., arise. And it is not scriptural to say that in the rest [of the stage] one does not continue to practice, for those with dull faculties who enter the stages are not fit [hence the need of training]. In the *Upāhilaripṛcchā* it is pointed out, “That very one who is established in the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas should practice liberality, great liberality, extreme liberality⁽⁸⁷⁾.” And in the *Sūtrasamuccaya* it is pointed out that “the bodhisattva who has the practice of the six perfections has the way of the magical power of a Tathāgata⁽⁸⁸⁾.” And there is no quicker way than the way of the magical power of a Tathāgata. Nor is there another way for bodhisattvas apart from the six perfections and the ten stages which would carry them along more quickly. It is pointed out in the sutra that “the purification of the continuity of mind, like the purification of gold, is only gradual.” “When a bodhisattva is established in suchness he has entered into the first stage. Then only gradually, as he purifies the previous stages, he enters the Tathāgata-stage.” So apart from the stages and the perfections there is no other access to the entrance into the city of buddhahood, nor does Bhagavān teach [any other] anywhere in the sutra etc.

It is not valid to say that owing to the inclusion among the six perfections of meditation itself, just by practicing that all of the perfections are practiced, so giving, etc., need not be practiced separately. For in the same way [one might say] that owing to the inclusion of the six perfections in a Buddhas as well as [symbolically] in a mandala-site made of cowdung, just the mandala-site should be prepared without [any practice of] meditation, etc. There would also be the consequence of fulfillment of the six perfections by a śrāvaka who had reached the samādhi of cessation, owing to his ongoing practice of signlessness alone. Thus no distinction between bodhisattvas and śrāvakas would be available. But in order to show that the six perfections are to be fulfilled by the bodhisattva in every single condition, Bhagavān showed the [mutual] inclusion of all the perfections by each one of the perfections. On the other hand [he did not say] that only one perfection is to be practiced. And the same is said in the *Sarvadharmavaipulya*⁽⁸⁹⁾: “Those servants of delusion, Maitreya, will say of the bodhisattvas’ attainment of the six perfections for the sake of full enlightenment”—“a bodhisattva should be trained only in the perfection of insight. What use are the other perfections?”—in this way they will think the other perfections should be disparaged. ‘Now what do you think, Ajita, was that king of Kāśī foolish who for the sake of the dove gave his own flesh to the hawk?’ Maitreya said, ‘No indeed, Bhagavān.’ Bhagavān said, ‘Was something wrongly done, Maitreya, by means of those wholesome roots, associated with the six perfections, which I accumulated when I was following the career of the bodhisattva?’ Maitreya said, ‘No indeed, Bhagavān.’ Bhagavān said, ‘Now you, Ajita, attained to the perfection of giving [over a period of] 60 kalpas,...attained to the perfection of insight [over a period of] 60 kalpas. While those servants of delusion will say, “Enlightenment [comes about] through only one method, namely the method of emptiness.” They are not purified in their career.’ Merely practicing emptiness they fall into nirvāṇa like śrāvakas.

§ 7. Conclusion

Thus insight should be practiced together with means. Accordingly the

Acārya Nāgārjuna declared in the *Sūtrasamuccaya*⁽⁴⁰⁾, “A bodhisattva lacking in skill-in-mind should not apply himself to the deep dharma-nature.” In this regard he puts forth the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* etc. as his authority(jñāpaka) and [it is] not [merely] the words of Acārya Nāgārjuna. It does not make sense for one who is circumspect to give up what [it said according to] reason and scriptural authority, renounce the words of Bhagavān, and take up the words of some other, foolish person. And in the *Ratnakūṭa*(Tib: *Ratnacūḍa*⁽⁴¹⁾) it says, “Emptiness endowed with all of its excellent aspects should be cultivated by means of one’s endowment with the wholesome, the entirety of giving and the rest”—but not [emptiness] by itself. And the *Ratnakūṭa*⁽⁴²⁾ says, “Just as kings, Kāśyapa, supported by their ministers perform all of their duties, just so does the bodhisattva’s insight, supported by skill-in-means, perform all the duties of a Buddha. For just this reason let there be no entrance into nirvāṇa of one who is cultivating emptiness alone.” And Bhagavān says in the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*⁽⁴³⁾, “Nor should one cultivate exclusively object-free mind alone. One should also cultivate skill-in-means: (upāyakauśalya).” In order to explain this he says, “Just as fire blazes because of its fuel [and] without fuel quiets down, so mind blazes because of its object [and] without an object quiets down. Here the bodhisattva skilled-in-means also knows the tranquility of the object purified by the perfection of insight, yet he does not tranquilize wholesome roots as an object, and he does not arouse the afflictions as an object, but he does arouse the perfections as an object. And he examines emptiness as an object, and he views great compassion towards all beings as an object—for in this way, son of good family, does the bodhisattva who has skill-in-means, who is purified by the perfection of insight, obtain power in the objectless...” And he continues, “For so it is that whatever does not make its appearance for the sake of the realization of all-knowing knowledge is no object for a bodhisattva. The bodhisattva, all of whose objects are transformed into enlightenment, who is skilled in means, sees all dharmas as corresponding to enlightenment. Just as, son of good family, (kulaputra), there is not anything in the 30,000,000-fold world system which would not be for the enjoyment of beings, just so, son of good family, that which a bodhisattva skilled in means does not see as an aid to enlightenment is not a [meditative] object...” In this way in endless sutras the practice of insight and means of bodhisattvas is taught.

Now if he himself is not able to work up the energy [to develop] the equipment of merit(puṇyasambhāra), still if [he thinks that] it is senseless to give such instruction to others, it would be an act of malice towards himself and others. In this way, then, is shown by reasoning(yukti) and scripture(āgama) how the bodhisattva must necessarily carry out true examination and acquire the entire equipment of merit, giving and the rest. Therefore one who is circumspect should discard as though it were poison the words of those little learning and of the proud, and, in harmony with the ambrosial words of Aryanāgārjuna and other wise people, he should generate great compassion towards all beings, and like a conjuror, without making mistakes he should apply himself to the career [in which] the entirety of giving and the other wholesome [dharmas] is transformed into supreme full enlightenment, and to rescuing the rest of the world. As it says in the *Dharmasamgīta*⁽⁴⁴⁾:

Just as some conjuror makes an effort to free an apparition and has no

attachment to the apparition as it is something he has prior knowledge of, so those who have gone beyond to full enlightenment know the triple world to be like an apparition and dress for the sake of the world in the world they have previously known.

Thus he constantly practices insight and means carefully, and owing to the gradual ripening of his continuity from the arising of more and more pure and yet purer moments, in his approach to the supreme goal of the actualization of reality there arises transcendent knowing, unshakable like a flame in a windless place, stainless, the clearest realization of the dharma-element, separated from the whole net of fabrications. And at that point he has attained as his [meditative] object the thing-limit: he has entered the path of seeing and he has entered the first stage. From then on he purifies the stages above that gradually like [the refining of] gold, and when there is passing away without remainder of the obstacles he gains the unattached and unobstructed knowing and reaches the buddha-stage, the receptacle of all good qualities. And [so] he gains as his object the completion of the work. Thus one who seeks the realization of Buddhahood should just apply himself to the middle way.

I have explained the pure unequalled way.

Through whatever merit I have acquired may people acquire the middle way.

Sages whose envy and other impurities are far removed are unsatiated by virtues, [no more than] is the ocean with waters.

With [fine] discrimination they take good counsel [as] delighted geese [can separate out] the milk in the water.

Hence the wise have a mind which has put far away the confusion of [those who] join factions:

One should take whatever good counsel there is even if it is from a fool.

The Stages of Meditative Actualization, composed by the teacher Kamalaśīla, is concluded.

Notes to the Kamalaśīla's Text

- (1) Quoted from the *Samdhinirmocana*, T 16, 701b.
- (2) *Ratnamegha*, T 16, 319b. (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 35, p. 211, 3-1)
- (3) Sgom-paḥi rim-pa, PED No. 5312, 62a-3~62a-7, PED No. 5311, 51a-4~51b-1.
- (4) *Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhī*, T 13, 899a, 904b, 915a, DE No. 133.
- (5) Bunyiu Nanjo, *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Otani Univ. Press, Kyoto, 1956, Sanskrit Text p. 54, Verse No. 127.
- (6) *Ratnamegha*, T 16, 270a, 319a.
- (7) *Bhk III*, T 32, 567a, PED No. 5312, 64b-3.
- (8) Ibid. PED No. 5312, 64b-3~4, also *Bhk III*, PED No. 5311, 52b-3~4.
- (9) G. Tucci, "14. Six defects and eight counteragents," *Minor Buddhist Texts Part II*, Rome, 1958, p. 208.
- (10) *Avikalpapraśeṣa*, T 15, 806b, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 35, p. 231, 4-8, *Bhk III*, PED No. 5312, 65b-3).
- (11) *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, T 11, 43b, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 22, p. 48, 4-3,

- and p. 49, 2-2).
- (12) *Tathāgatotpattisambhavasūtra*, T 10, 263a, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 26, p. 34, 2-7).
- (13) *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, T 14, 561a, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 34, p. 77, 5-7).
- (14) E. E. Obermiller, *The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet by Bu-ston*, Heiderberg, 1932, reprinted in Tokyo, 1974, p. 193.
- (15) *Gayāśīrṣa*, T 32, 564c, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 29, p. 129, 1-2, and *Bhk I*, p. 194).
- (16) *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, T 11, 43b, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 22, p. 49, 2-3).
- (17) *Mañjuśrīvikurvitasūtra*, T 17, 830a, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 27, p. 259, 2-3).
- (18) *Samadhiraḥa*, T 32, 565c, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 27, p. 258, 1-5, Cfr. *Bhk I*, p. 198; SR p. 105, verse No. 31).
- (19) *Sūtrasamuccaya*, T 32, 56b~56c, PED No. 5330, 192a-3~4, Tohoku, DG Sde-dge Edition, No. 3943, 164a-5~6. The original *Sūtrasamuccaya* states twenty kinds of Māra the bodhisattva must overcome. This is the twelfth among them.
- (20) *Brahmapariṣcchā*, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 33, p. 191, 4-2, p. 205, 5-7, p. 192, 5-2, p. 196, 1-8).
- (21) *Bhk I*, T 32, 565b, G. Tucci, "9. Prajñā: śrutamayī, cintamayī, bhāvanāmayī," *Bhk I*, loc. cit., p. 198.
- (22) *Ratnakūṭa*, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 24, p. 194, 5-7, *Bhk II*, PED No. 5311, 54b-4~5).
- (23) *Daśabhūmika*, T 10, 543a, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 25, p. 251, 3-6).
- (24) *Ratnakūṭa*, T 11, 633b, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 24, p. 192, 5-5).
- (25) *Aryasaṃdhanirmocana*, T 16, 695a-b, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 29, p. 10, 5-2, Partially quoted in *Bhk I*, p. 194).
- (26) *Upālipariṣcchā*, T 11, 517b, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 24, p. 50, 3-6).
- (27) *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, in *Sūtrasamuccaya*, T 32, 72a, PED No. 5330, 243b-7, Tohoku, DG No. 3934, 207a-3, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 34, p. 85, 3-5).
- (28) *Gaganagañja*, T 13, 625c, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 33, p. 14, 5-7).
- (29) *Sūtrasamuccaya*, T 32, 56b-c, PED No. 5330, 191b, 192a, Tohoku, DG No. 3934, 164a, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 102, p. 88, 5-6, p. 89, 1-1).
- (30) The third *Māra* of a bodhisattva, *Ibid.*, PED No. 5330, 191b, Tohoku, 164a-2, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 102, p. 88, 5-6).
- (31) The ninth *Māra* of a bodhisattva, *Ibid.*, PED No. 5330, 191b, Tohoku, 164a-4, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 102, p. 89, 1-1).
- (32) *S. S. Ibid.*, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 102, p. 88, 4-1), Tohoku, 163a.
- (33) *Gaganagañja*, T 13, 625c, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 33, p. 14, 5-5).
- (34) *Puṇyaskandhapariṇāmaṇā*, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 37, p. 115, 2-8).
- (35) *Brahmapariṣcchā*, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 33, p. 202, 3-7).
- (36) *Ibid.*, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 33, p. 215, 4-3).
- (37) *Upālipariṣcchā*, T 11, 515c, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 24, p. 48, 4-3).
- (38) *Sūtrasamuccaya*, T 32, 55c, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 102, p. 88, 1-8), Tohoku, DG No. 3934, 162b-2.
- (39) *Sarvadharmavaipulya*, quoted from Cecil Bendall, *sikṣa-samuccaya* by

- sāntideva, St. Petersburg, 1902, p. 97, English translation p. 99. However, the Chinese *Bhk* reads *āryagayāśīrṣa*, instead of *sarvadharmavaipulya*, T 32, 565a.
- (40) Acārya Nāgārjuna, *Sūtrasamuccaya*, T 32, 72a, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 102, p. 109, 4-7), Tohoku, No. 3934, 207a-3. The Chinese version of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* does not include an author's name, but the Tibetan manuscript clearly has the author's name as Acārya Nāgārjuna.
- (41) *Ratnakūṭa*, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 24, p. 193, 1-3). However, the Tibetan *Bhk* reads *Ratnacūḍa*. See C. Bendall, *Sikṣa-samuccaya*, p. 272, Eng. trans. p. 249, *Sikṣa-samuccaya*, T 32, 127c, *Bhk III*, PED No. 5312, 73a-5.
- (42) *Ratnakūṭa*, T 11, 633b, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 27, p. 193, 1-3).
- (43) *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, T 11, 732c-733a, (G. Tucci, *Bhk III*, PED Vol. 22, p. 76, 4-3).
- (44) *Dharmasaṃgīta*, T 17, 627b, DG No. 238.



CLASSICS

The world classic is a significant word which means : 1. Exemplary of a particular style, 2. Exhibiting the timeless fualis and 3. A excellent literary creation. Journal of Darśana in its classics title the publish a master work of philosophy which is excitant example of philosophical writing, and has timeless value. In this volume we are proudly re-publishing a work of Professor J.L. Mehta titled- "Western Metaphysical Tradition" which is trull an example of a classic philosophical writing. This article is basic of deffer's thought on the subject and I believe that without understanding high degger one cannot claim the true understand of western metaphysics.



Jarava Lal Mehta (1912 – 1988) was an Indian philosopher, an expert on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, a retired professor at **Banares Hindu University**, taught at **Harvard Divinity School** from 1968 to 1978 as a visiting professor at Harvard's Center for the Study of World Religions. Schooled in the philosophies of India, Dr. Mehta developed an interest in his early student days in the works of Freud, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. In his writings and lectures, Dr. Mehta showed an unusual facility to move between Eastern and Western thought. His major work was "**The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger**," first published in the United States by Harper & Row in 1971. A collection of Dr. Mehta's essays, "India and the West: The Problem of Understanding," was published by Scholars Press in 1985. At **Harvard**, Dr. Mehta taught courses in Indian philosophy, including a class taught with **Robert Nozick**, the Harvard philosopher. Dr. Mehta also taught courses on philosophical hermeneutics, the science of interpretation.

Heidegger and the Western Metaphysical Tradition

Prof J. L. Mehta

I. HEIDEGGER'S APPROACH TO PAST THOUGHT

All philosophical thinking, according to Heidegger, moves within the intellectual horizon opened up by a tradition. It may seek to enlarge this horizon and may attempt a critical reconstruction of that tradition by bringing into view something that has been ignored and by-passed by it. But no thinker, however original he may be, can lift himself out of the tradition that sustains him and from which the driving power and the manner of his questioning is derived. Man's knowledge of 'what is' and his understanding of what it means to 'be' never sheds its linkage with the 'here' and the 'now', never reaches up into the *topos hyperouranios*, the heavenly region of the pure, the timeless and the Absolute. In the sense in which Heidegger raises the question of 'Being', the question could be raised only within the framework of the Western philosophical tradition as founded by the early Greek thinkers and only at a point in the history of that tradition where it terminates in the philosophy of Nietzsche. The question of Being is thus essentially and intrinsically a historical one, requiring both a critical, regressive analysis or "destruction" of the history of ontology as well as a reconstruction of that history in the light of the deeper and more original understanding of Being and of man in his relationship to Being acquired in the course of the inquiry. The phenomenological destruction promised for the second (unpublished) part of Being and Time- a task of which the nature and necessity is explained by Heidegger in Section 6 of that work- is an integral part of the question of Being, having the positive aim of acquiring a new perspective on the entire history of

European thought and reconstructing it from the point of view of what has remained in it unsaid and unactualized.

This question is historical, further in the sense, as Heidegger insists that the historical destiny of Western man is bound up with the asking or failure to ask, with the manner of asking and answering, this question. Not to be content with gaining knowledge of the essent as such but, going beyond that, to inquire into the Being of essents or into Being as such may seem like verbal idolatry. Being cannot be grasped like a being and is as impalpable as Nothingness. Is it then, Heidegger asks, just an empty word, unreal vapour and an error, as Nietzsche says?¹ In his *Introduction to Metaphysics* he seeks to demonstrate that Being is neither a mere word nor empty abstraction but, with its richness of content and dynamism, holds in itself the spiritual destiny of the West. In the first place, we can meaningfully talk and think about 'Being' because we (i.e. Western thinkers) stand within a tradition which has taken its birth with the question about Being and of which the enfoldment has been determined by this origin. Secondly, a glance at the spiritual impoverishment of present-day Western man and at the bleakness and benightedness of his world- in Heidegger's words, "the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the depredation of the earth, the standardization of man, the supremacy of the mediocre"- it becomes obvious that the word 'Being' has an empty sound for us only because we have for long fallen out of Being and because our relationship to our tradition and to language has been disturbed and disrupted.

¹ For a contemporary eco of Nietzsche's verdict, see the amusing 'Discussion' between Marjorie Grene and Stuart Hampshire in *Encounter*, April, 1958, arising out of a review of Marjorie Grene's book on Heidegger by Hampshire. She 'Heartily' agrees with her critic that Heidegger's ontology "is indeed empty and arrogant nonsense."

What the Western world is today, it has come to be in consequence of its metaphysical foundations in early Greek thought, of the way 'Being' revealed itself in it and of its subsequent withdrawal from the sight of Western man. To ask "What is Being?" or "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" is, therefore, not just a question of merely academic interest, remote from man's basic concerns, a professional luxury confined to the chosen few. As a philosophical question, it has arisen rather from a thinking that breaks the paths and opens the perspectives of the knowledge in which and by which one comprehends and fulfils itself historically and culturally, of that knowledge which kindles and threatens and necessitates all questioning and valuing.¹

Nor is this a question that concerns only the self-realization of single individuals seeking to attain philosophical truth in personal experience. Heidegger is not interested at all either in proving universally valid, eternal and changeless verities or in an experience that is only personal and private or, for that matter, in any sort of experience in the psychological, subjective sense. His is the quest of the *koinon* (Heraclitus), the common, the supra-personal, of the concepts, the language and the presuppositions which provide, determine and mould the intellectual horizon and the historical destiny of whole people; it is the quest for the ultimate metaphysical or spiritual foundations on which the Western man's life is grounded, for the way Being has revealed itself to him and withdrawn itself from him and in so doing has shaped his nature and destiny from Greek times to the present day. The question of 'Being' thus is not a mere intellectual pastime but one in which man's entire, historical existence is involved. Nor does it seek to provide an ontology in the traditional style, much less to assess critically the past mistakes of ontology. "We are

¹ Einführung in die Metaphysik, p. 8.

concerned” Heidegger says,¹ “with something quite different, to restore man’s historical existence- and that always includes our own future existence in the totality of the history allotted to us- to the power of Being which has to be opened up again by man for himself by going back to the origin.”² The question of ‘Being’, far from being merely verbal, amounts to a reflection on the genesis of our hidden history; it is a question that points to the hidden ground of our historical existence and on the answer to which our future historical existence depends.³ As in the case of Nietzsche, Heidegger’s thinking is inspired by a passionate concern for the present, for what is in the world of the present, for what man, fated by Being, has made of himself and his world today, for the way he dwells in it and for the basic attitudes which dominate his way of seeing things and comprehending them. The present technological era, with its emasculation of the spirit and its restless craving for mastery over everything that is one in which man has become utterly blind to the Being of things and to the disclosure of all reality in them other than their calculability and amenability to manipulative control. The desiccation and hollowness of man’s world today, with all weight gone out of things, and the corresponding loss of man’s ability truly to dwell in it as in a home, is a consequence, Heidegger declares, of the whole Western

¹ Ibid, p. 32.

² As Werner Marx says (Cf. “Heidegger’s New Conception of Philosophy”, *Social Research*, 1955; see also Heidegger and die Tradition, passim), Heidegger’s philosophy is the quest of a second, new being. “Today when we say of any particular thing, that ‘it is’ or ‘is not’, that ‘it is’ or is only ‘becoming’, that ‘it is true, genuine’ or only sham’ or when we that man is ‘in truth’ or ‘in error’, we are still thinking under the influence of the first conception of the ‘essence of Being and Man’ as poetically composed by the first thinkers. In this sense the Pre-Socratics set a beginning and a first beginning’. The ultimate aim of Heidegger’s ‘new conception of philosophy during his second phase is to attain a ‘second beginning’—to compose anew the Essence of Being and the Essence of Man”

³ *Einfuehrung*, pp. 70, 71.

past which has worked itself out in the present and is its living foundation. Nietzsche saw the Western spiritual horizon threatened with Nihilism—that “uncanniest of all guests, standing at the door”—and following upon him, Heidegger, with an even deeper insight into the hidden forces behind Western intellectual history and a more thorough familiarity with it, sees but the eclipse of Being today the relentless sway of total Nihilism, the completion of a process that has been at work at least since the time of Plato.

The question of Being is hence directly determined by the history and the present state of the human spirit on earth. “The asking of this question is immediately and fundamentally linked up with the crucial historical question of coming to a decision.... What history here means, however, is not so much the past, for that is just what does not happen any longer; much less is it the merely contemporary, which also does not happen but is only a passing event, comes and goes by. History as happening is the acting and being acted upon in and right through the present, determined from out of the future and taking over what has been. Our asking of the basic metaphysical question is historical because it opens up the happening (*Geschehen*) of human existence in its essential relationships, i.e. to essents as such in their totality, in respect of possibilities and futures never inquired into and because at the same time it binds it back to its beginnings in the living past, thus sharpening it and giving it weight in the present. In this questioning our Dasein is summoned to its history in the full sense of the word, called to it and to make a decision in it... The basic point of view and attitude of the questioning is itself historical, standing and holding itself in what is happening, inquiring out of this and for the sake of this.”¹ The immediate urgency of raising the question of Being comes from the fact that Being has become

¹ Ibid, pp. 33-34.

for us a mere word and floating mist, a fact which is not just a psychological characteristic of present-day man but one in the midst of which we stand, a state of our existence, the mode in which we are ourselves constituted in relation to Being. "The emptiness of the word 'Being', the total vanishing of its appellative force" (as Manheim happily translates) is a manifestation of that perverse and false relationship to language characterizing man today and which is itself rooted in our disrupted relationship to Being as such. Since the destiny of language itself, as Heidegger says, is grounded in the particular relationship of a people to Being in any age, even the basic words of our language no longer speak to us with their full force and with the weight of the tradition which they not only embody but of which they are themselves the wellspring.

The above considerations explain why Heidegger has ceaselessly attempted to come to grips— more strenuously than perhaps any other original philosopher— not only with the central doctrines of the great European philosophers but with the entire course of the history of Western philosophy as a whole, trying to arrive at a complete view of its inner nature and dynamism, much as only Hegel had done before him, from the perspective of the question of Being.¹ But he interprets this history not in terms of the thought that has found explicit utterance in it but from the point of view of the unexpressed presuppositions underlying it, of what

¹ This concern with the historical tradition and with the Greek world whose foundations still sustain the Western world is inspired by Heidegger's passionate concern for the future destiny of man on earth and for the man's regeneration through a new relationship to Being. As he remarks, "Just because we have ventured upon the great and long task of pulling down a world grown old and of rebuilding really and truly anew, i.e. historically, we must know the tradition. We must know more, i.e. in a manner more stringent and binding than all ages and times of upheaval before us. Only the most radical historical knowledge can make us alive to the extra-ordinary character of our tasks and preserve us from a new wave of mere restoration and uncreative imitation." *Ibid.*, p. 96.

has remained unsaid in it. This general principle of interpretation, laying no claim to ‘scientific’ history, is employed by him in the interpretation of individual philosophers, of the larger movement of philosophical history and of the basic philosophical words and concepts coming down from the early Greek origins of Western thought. Already in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Heidegger explicitly adopts the method of interpreting past philosophers, not in terms of what they have actually said but, through a consideration of the latter, to lay bare what is implicitly presupposed in it. Every philosopher, in explicitly formulating his thoughts, leaves unexpressed the driving idea at work implicitly in his formulations and the task of philosophical interpretation, as opposed to that of purely historical scholarship, is to bring this to light by a creative project of thought. “Real exegesis,” in Heidegger’s words, “must show what does not stand in the words and is nevertheless said. To accomplish this, the interpretation must use force. The essential thing is to be sought where scientific interpretation has nothing more to find, branding as everything unscientific that transcends its own preserve.”¹ Explaining the procedure adopted by him in his own much disputed interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger says,² “Now, if an interpretation merely reproduces what Kant has explicitly said, it is, from the very outset, no interpretation in the proper sense. The task before a proper interpretation is to bring expressly into view that which Kant, in his attempt to provide a foundation for metaphysics, has managed to disclose, over and above what he has explicitly formulated, but which, nevertheless, is something that Kant himself could not possibly go on to state. In all philosophical knowledge the decisive thing is not what is said in so many words but what is brought into view, through what is said, as that which

¹ Ibid. p. 124.

² Kant, pp. 182-83.

still remains unsaid... But, of course, in order to wrest from what the words say that which is implicitly intended in them, every interpretation must necessarily use force. Such force, however, cannot be just ramping caprice. The power of an illuminating idea must drive and guide the exposition. Only by virtue of this can an interpretation venture upon the ever audacious undertaking of putting one's trust in the hidden inner passion of a work in order thus to be led into the unsaid in it and be constrained to say that. And that is also the way in which the guiding idea itself emerges into clarity in all its power."¹

Such interpretation aims at re-opening a basic problem at a point where historically a particular formulation and answer has been given to it, at 'repeating' the problem so as to disclose in it possibilities which have not yet been actualized. 'By the repetition of a basic problem we understand the opening up of its original possibilities, hidden so long, by the elaboration of which it is transformed and so alone preserved in its substance as a problem. To preserve a problem means to hold it free and living in respect of those inner forces which render it possible as a problem in its very roots.' The possible, according to Heidegger, is the well-spring of all actualized thinking and a repetition aims at retracing the path taken by the actual back to its source in the possible, in

¹ See also *Einfuehrung*, p. 134, where, referring to the already "proverbial far-fetched and one sided character of the Heideggerian method of exegesis," Heidegger remarks, "Nevertheless, we may and, indeed, must ask here: which interpretation is the true one? Is it the one that simply takes over the perspective into which it happens to find itself already and because it presents itself as familiar and obvious, or is it rather the interpretation which questions the customary perspective in its very roots, because it could be, and in fact is so, that this line of vision does not lead to what needs being seen?" The latter kind of exegesis, Heidegger adds needs a leap that is possible only if we really ask a question and through such questioning first create our perspectives. "But then, this is done neither in a rambling, capricious way nor by clinging to a system taken as a norm, but in and out of historical necessity, out of the exigency of our historical existence."

order to capture it in its moment of birth, as it were, and to see if the possible, the potential and the implicit, offers other ways in which it may be actualized in thought. Only when, starting from the present, we succeed in reaching, step by step, back to the beginnings of the historical unfoldment of the whole of European thought, to the well-spring of the possible, shall we be in a position to see that as one actualized possibility, leaving still others at the disposal of thought. Only thus will it be possible to make another beginning in thought and thus enable a renewal and regeneration of the present. As Heidegger remarks,¹ “To ask the question about Being means nothing less than to recapitulate (*wieder-holen*) the beginning of our historical spiritual existence, in order to transform it into a new beginning. This is possible. It is in fact the authentic pattern of historicity, for all history takes its start in a fundamental happening. But we do not repeat a beginning by reducing it to something past and now known, which we may simply affect and ape. The beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, the darkness, the insecurity that attends a true beginning. Repetition as we understand it is any-thing but an improved continuation of what has been up till now by means of the same old methods.”

Heidegger’s attitude toward history and his interpretation of the historical course of Western philosophy may be brought into sharp focus by contrasting it with the way Hegel has interpreted that history. For Hegel, the history of Western philosophy is not just a succession of diverse views and doctrines, one giving place to another, without any inner connation between them, but represents the process, in itself coherent, uniform and necessary, of

¹ Ibid. pp. 29, 32.

the progress of the spirit towards complete consciousness of itself.¹ Philosophy as the self-development of the spirit towards absolute knowledge is identical with the history of philosophy; the latter is only the externalized form of the inner dialectic of pure thought itself, it's various epochs representing the dialectical enfoldment of one and the same truth at progressively fuller stages of its evolution. "No other philosopher before Hegel," Heidegger remarks,² "has attained to such a fundamental point of view in philosophy which both enables and requires philosophical thinking to move within its history and at the same time makes this movement identical with philosophy itself." The first stage in this process is represented by Greek thought, with which philosophy proper begins and which is the stage of thesis. Thought, at this stage, emerges into pure objectivity, into the universal as such, but because not yet referred to a subject and mediated by it, this is also the stage of abstraction. The beginning, the first emergence of thought, Hegel says, is necessarily the most abstract; it is the simplest and the poorest or emptiest and so the earliest philosophers are the poorest of all. In this stage, Being or the Real

¹ In Heidegger's Being-centred Thought, the place of this is taken by the dispensation or destiny (*Geschick*) of Being. Explaining the role of the individual thinker and the suprapersonal character of the history of thought, Heidegger says in *Der Satz vom Grund* (pp. 144-146), that of all that is difficult to grasp in this world, what is most difficult to grasp, because it lies closest to us inasmuch as we ourselves are that, is the idea that the history of thought rests on the dispensation of Being. This history is not the story of the personal views of individual thinkers thinking original thoughts but of the way thinkers respond to the claim of Being itself. We all stand in the clearing of Being, in the area of openness and light brought about by the way Being dispenses itself, in its own withdrawal, to us. But we do not just stand round unconcerned in this clearing; we stand in it as appropriated by the claim of Being, owned and charged by Being and in its service. The thinker charged and endowed with the gift appropriate to the task of putting into a words the Being of what is, of building and forming in the clearing of Being, of taking care of Being.

² *Hegel und die Griechen*, in *Die Gegenwart der Griechen im Neurea Denken*, *Festschrift fuer Hans-Georg Gadamer*, p. 44.

as the abstract universal and pure objectivity is, as Heidegger puts it,¹ *not yet* determined and *not yet* mediated through the dialectical movement of the spirit's absolute subjectivity and hence, for Hegel, the philosophy of the Greeks is still in the stage of this 'not yet' and satisfying, as he says, only to a limited extent. The next higher stage, that of antithesis, begins with Descartes in whose philosophy the subject is posited and recognized as subject for the first time, thus enabling the objectivity of the previous stage to be grasped explicitly as objectivity. From the point of view of the last stage as represented by his own philosophy, Hegel quite appropriately says of Descartes, "With him we really enter into a philosophy that stands on its own... Here, we may say, we are at home and can, like the sailor at the end of a long voyage on a stormy sea, cry, 'Land!' " The third and highest stage, that of synthesis, in which the two earlier stages are annulled, conserved and taken up (*aufgehoben*, in the three-fold sense of *tollere*, *conservare* and *elevare*) is reached in Hegel's own System of Speculative Idealism, "containing within itself everything that the labour of thousands of years has produced, the consummation and final result of all that has gone before," as he says in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. This is the crowning stage of the concrete universal in which the Spirit, rich with its own self-unfolding process, comes to itself explicitly in the absolute certainty of itself as the absolute, fully self-conscious subject. As Heidegger points out,² that Hegel sees the nature of history in the light of Being conceived as absolute subjectivity and judging the course of philosophy before its culmination in the Spirit's absolute

¹ Ibid, p. 52.

² Ibid, p. 54.

certainty of self-consciousness in his own system, finds in it only a movement from the less developed to the more.¹

For Hegel, as for Heidegger, thought is concerned with something that is in itself historical in the sense of a happening (*Geschehen*). According to Hegel, thoughts Concern is with Being as self-thinking thought, which comes to itself only in the process of its speculative development and the happening is understood as one whose process character is determined by the dialectic of Being.² Heidegger not only does not accept the subjectivist interpretation of Being as thought but rejects the view that particular philosophies are epochs of philosophy emerge from one another in the sense of the necessity of a dialectical process,³ thus differing from Hegel on both these points. Heidegger also differs from Hegel in his estimate of the early thinking of a historical tradition. “The basic error,” he says,⁴ “lies in the belief that history begins with the primitive and backward, the clumsy and weak. The opposite is true. The beginning is the uncanniest and mightiest. What comes after is not development but shallowness and diffusion, the failure to hold on to the beginning, rendering it ineffective and harmless and exaggerating it into a caricature...”

¹ Referring to Hegel’s approach to history, Heidegger says (*Humanismus*, pp. 81-82), “The happening of history occurs as, and arises from, the destiny (dispensation) of the truth of Being, in which Being gives itself and, in giving itself, also withdraws itself. Nevertheless, Hegel’s conception of history as the development of the ‘Spirit’ is not untrue. It is also not partly right and partly wrong. It is as truer as metaphysics, which in Hegel’s system achieves for the first time an expression of its absolutely conceived essence. Along with its inversion by Marx and Nietzsche, absolute metaphysics is part of the history of the truth of Being. What is generated by that is not touched or disposed of by refutations of any sort. It can only be taken in and assimilated by retrieving its truth so that it is conceived more deeply, as embedded in Being itself and is withdrawn from the sphere of merely human views.”

² Cf. *Identitaet und Differenz*, pp. 40.

³ Cf. *Was ist das—die Philosophie ?* pp. 29.

⁴ *Einfuehrung*, pp. 119.

Discussing the Anaximander fragment,¹ he asks, “With what claim does the earliest address itself to us, presumably the latest of the late-corners of philosophy?... Does the chronological and historical remoteness of the utterance conceal in itself a historical nearness of what it leaves unsaid and which speaks, beyond the present, into coming time?... May it not be that what is early outstrips the late, the earliest outstripping the latest most of all?”

Summarizing the main point of divergence between him—self and Hegel, Heidegger says,² “For Hegel, the concern of is thinking with Being in respect of essents as they are appropriated by thought (*Gedachtheit*) in and as absolute thinking. For us, the object of thinking is the same, Being, not Being in respect of its difference from beings. To put it more pointedly, for Hegel the matter of thinking is in thought (*Gedanke*) as the absolute notion. For us, the object of thinking is, provisionally expressed, the difference as difference.” Farther, for Hegel as well as Heidegger, the criterion for a dialogue with the historical heritage is the penetration into the power of the thinking of earlier thinkers. But whereas Hegel finds the specific power of thinkers in what has been thought by them, in so far as it can be taken up (*aufgehoben*, in its three-fold sense) as a specific stage in the dialectic of absolute thinking, Heidegger seeks for this power not in what has already been thought, but rather in what is yet unthought and from which what thought receives its essential character and scope. To the more popular question whether there is any ‘progress’ in philosophy, Heidegger has a characteristic answer: Philosophy, in so far as it is mindful of its nature, does not move forward at all. She steps into her place and marks time so that she may ceaselessly think of one and the same thing. Moving forward, that is, away

¹ Holzwege, pp. 300.

² *Die Onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*, in *Identität und Differenz*, pp. 42-45.

from this place, is an error that follows thinking, like a shadow thrown by thinking itself.¹ Admitting that it is what has already been thought that makes for the not-yet-thought, which comes up ever afresh in its plenitude, Heidegger continues, “The criterion of the unthought does not lead to the incorporation of what has been thought previously into still higher levels of development and systematization surpassing it, but demands that the heritage of thought be liberated in respect of what still lies in reserve in its ‘has been’ (*Geswesenes*). It is this which holds tradition initially in its sway and is prior to it, though without being thought about expressly and as the originative source.” Finally, for Hegel the dialogue with the preceding history of philosophy has the character of annulment (in the three-fold sense of *Aufhebung*), whereas for Heidegger it is of the nature of taking the step back (*der Schritt zurueck*). “The annulment leads into the surmounting, gathering-together sphere of absolutely posited truth in the sense of the completely developed certitude of self-knowing knowledge, while the step back opens the realm, hitherto overlooked, with reference to which the essence of truth first of all becomes something that deserves thought.” The step back, Heidegger explains, does not mean taking an isolated step in thought but a particular manner of thought’s movement and a long way. “In so far as the step back determines the character of our dialogue with the history of Occidental thought, it leads our thinking in a way beyond what has hitherto been thought in philosophy. Thinking steps back before what concerns it, i.e., Being, and thus brings what has been thought into a confrontation (*Gegenueber*) in which we have a view of the whole of this history and that, too, in respect of what constitutes the well-spring of this entire thinking, for it is the well-spring that alone provides the domain in which this thinking abides. This is, in

¹ *Humanismus*, pp. 81.

contrast to Hegel, not a problem Coming down to us already posed, but is rather something that has remained throughout unasked in the entire course of this history of thinking..., the difference between Being and beings.”¹ The difference of essent and Being, itself unnoticed and unnoticeable by metaphysics, is the realm within which metaphysics, i.e., Occidental thinking in the totality of its essence, can be what in fact it is. Hence, Heidegger concludes, the step back is the step that leads out of metaphysics into the essence of metaphysics, into the source and ground of its essential constitution; the step back, taking us out of the charmed circle of metaphysical thinking, alone gives the necessary distance and perspective from which one can contemplate its essential nature and meditate on the ‘ontological difference’ on which, as on its unthought ground, it rests.

The continuous re-appropriation of a living tradition depends upon its re-interpretation from age to age. But every age necessarily interprets the past from its own dominant perspective and in terms of its own conceptual framework and language, thus transforming what it receives from the past in the very process of assimilating it. In seeking to go back—and recapture in its purity (and yet creatively, from the present perspective, in our case the perspective of the question of Being)—to the thinking of an age in which the foundations of this tradition were laid, we have, therefore, in a sense to reverse the process by which the original significance of the central concepts, and the sense of the basic words in which they were embodied, has been obscured by the strata of new meanings imposed upon them by later interpretation. In addition, the utmost care must be exercised to avoid interpreting earlier thinking in terms of later concepts which have evolved from

¹ *Die Ontotheo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik, in Identitaet und Differenz,* p. 46.

them; though these alone have become historically effective, yet they only constitute one possible interpretation that might be given to the central concepts of the earlier thinkers. As Heidegger has said,¹ all later thinking that seeks a dialogue with the earlier must inevitably reach out to it from its own place in history, if it is at all to bring the silence of early thought into an utterance; but this need not necessarily imply projecting later inceptions into them, so long as care is taken to enter, in an expressly inquiring spirit, into the field of vision and hearing of early thinking. No previous thinker, Heidegger asserts, has been able to reach back to the beginning of Western philosophy and to recapture its true character as a beginning. As he remarks, “Neither Nietzsche nor any other thinker before him—not even, and in particular, he who, before Nietzsche, for the first time thought philosophically about the history of philosophy, viz. Hegel—penetrate into the first beginnings; they rather see the beginning as already coloured by, and in the light of, what was already a falling away from the beginning and its stagnation in the light of the Platonic philosophy.”²

Such re-interpretation and mis-interpretation, transformation and falsification have occurred repeatedly not only in the course of the transmission of ideas from one period of history to another but also, continuously, within the same period, as between its different phases. In its most dramatic form, however, the problem can be seen at work in the historically ‘fateful’ translations by which Greek concepts were taken over into Latin and, later, into the vernaculars. In his quest for the unimpaired revelatory power of ancient words, Heidegger has frequently drawn attention to the havoc wrought by this translation

¹ *Vortraege und Aufsaeetze*, pp. 238-239.

² Nietzsche *I*, p. 469.

of the Greek philosophical language into Latin, a language embodying the wholly different Medieval spirit and outlook—an occurrence, Heidegger points out, by no means accidental and harmless but the first stage in the process by which we are cut off and alienated from the original essence of Greek philosophy. The translation into Latin of the Greek *physis* as *natura*, of *ousia* as *substantia*, of *logos* as *ratio*, for example, does indeed convey something of the sense embodied in the Greek terms but, as Heidegger again and again shows in his discussions of these and other terms, the Latin ‘equivalents’ equally stand between ourselves and what the Greek terms say, hiding from our view their original sense and obstructing entry into the genuine Greek vision and way of thinking.¹ Such translations, of course, like all milestones in the history of thought are not just examples of (precious and avoidable mis-interpretation but constitute the very stuff of a continuous historical tradition. As Heidegger has remarked,² in the case of important and effective translations, “the translation is not only interpretation but is tradition, an integral part of our philosophical heritage. As tradition it belongs to the innermost movement of history. ..An important translation corresponds, in a particular epoch of the destiny (*Geschick*) of Being, to the way in which a language, destined by Being, speaks.” That is why every attempt to recapture the unuttered meaning of past thinking requires a creative leap of thought and a new, all-embracing perspective, based on disillusioned, critical awareness of the present, an ear for the message of the past and a passionate concern for our future destiny.³

¹ Cf., e.g., *Einfuehrung*, passim.

² *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 164.

³ On Heidegger’s approach to the history of philosophy, cf. W. Szilasi, *Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie* (in Martin Heidegger’s *Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften*, by Astrada etc.) Helmuth Plessner compares (*Offene*

II THE GREEK THINKERS

Greek thought begins with reflection on Being, not merely in the sense of the totality of what is (*ta onta*) but with an awareness of the Being (*einai*) of all that is, of the essent in its Being. That the Being of essents claimed the thinking of the early Greeks, says Heidegger, actually is the beginning of the Occident as a historical reality and the hidden source from which its destiny springs.¹ Being (*eon, on*) revealed itself to the early Greek thinkers, the founders of the Western philosophical tradition, as *ousia*, which means, according to Heidegger, not substance as the Latin translation of this term interprets it, but constant presence (*Anwesenheit*).² In the light of this way of understanding Being, never explicitly considered by them, they apprehended the totality of essents as *physis*, that which emerges, unfolds itself, enters into and remains in manifestness. The central question of their inquiry,

Problemgeschichte, in Nicolai Hartmann, *der Denker und sein Werk*) Heidegger's approach with that of Hartmann. Werner Marx (*Heidegger und die Tradition*, 1961) discusses critically Heidegger's new determination of Being in relation to the traditional conception as represented by Aristotle and Hegel. For excellent summaries of Heidegger's interpretation of the Western philosophers, cf. P. Fuerstenau, *Heidegger—das Gefuege seines Denkens*, pp. 101-168 and Kanthack, *Das Denken Martin Heidegger (Zweiter Teil-Die Epochen der abendlaendischen Metaphysik)*. See also Richardson: Heidegger, pp. 301-283, for a presentation of Heidegger's views on Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hegel and Nietzsche.

¹ *Vortraege*, p. 227.

² Heidegger has devoted a long essay to Anaximander of Samos in which he gives an elaborate interpretation of the oldest philosophical utterance of Western thought (*Der Spruch des Anaximander in Holzwege*). Discussing the word *chreon* ('necessity' in the usual translation; Heidegger renders it as need or use—*Brauch*), he shows that already with Anaximander, an awareness of the Being of what is and of the distinction between Being and beings had flashed out. 'To *chreon* is the oldest name in which thinking gives utterance to the Being of essents, in which also the nature of the relationship between Being as presence and essents (what is, as present) finds the first expression, a relationship with essents that springs from the nature of Being itself. To *chreon*, anticipating the *Logos* of Heraclitus, expresses the way Being itself is as the relation with essents.

and thenceforward the main theme of Western philosophy, is concerned with the totality of essents conceived as *physis*. It is metaphysics in the sense that it is not about particular essents but about the essent as such, i.e., in respect of its Being, going beyond essents to their Being in order, in the light of that, to understand the nature of 'what is'. In a basic sense, as Heidegger remarks,¹ that meta-physics is physics, *episteme physike*. The Greeks inquired into the Being of essents, into the truth of what is, and in this they were guided by the light of a particular conception of Being, of what it means to be, viz. the sense of Being as presence. They inquired into the Being of beings but they never asked what Being itself meant and therefore could not be aware of the particular sense of Being presupposed in their own thinking about essents as such. The history of Western philosophy, except for its earliest pre-Socratic period, is a history of 'metaphysical' thinking, i.e., thinking about the Being of essents (not about Being itself) and it begins with the oblivion of Being as such and of its truth. The oblivion of Being is the oblivion of the difference of Being from beings which is implied in all inquiry about the Being of essents. The uncovering itself in the essent, Being withdraws itself as such and, along with that, conceals its difference from the essent. The difference breaks out in Anaximander, in Parmenides, in Heraclitus, a lightning-flash in the illumination of which their thinking takes its birth; but the difference does not reveal itself as the difference and so remains unnamed and unthought. The history of Being begins with the oblivion of Being, of Being's own nature and of its difference from the essent.²

All reflection on the Being of 'what is', however, is itself carried on in the light of an implicit conception of Being which

¹ *Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis*, p. 9.

² Cf. *Holzwege*, p. 336.

derives not from man but is something that comes to him as the destiny that hold his thinking in its grip, depending on the way Being illuminates itself in him, on the way Being dispenses and reveals itself to man. As Heidegger explains,¹ in every age Being itself is understood in a determinate sense, disclosing itself in some aspect. But all understanding, as a basic mode of disclosure, must itself move in a determinate line of vision (*Blickbahn*), a perspective which must have opened out in advance. The determinate understanding of Being moves in a pre-determined perspective, not itself made by man but in which man finds himself immersed, a dispensation of Being itself, as Heidegger later calls it. Not even the Greeks did or could, due to reason inherent in the case and, not because of any human deficiency, bring this perspective to light. The history of the way has understood and interpreted the Being of what is in totality is, therefore, rooted in the different ways in which Being itself has, from age to age, revealed itself variously to man, in the history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*) as Heidegger calls it². The history of Being, which is the history of the self-bestowal of Being (*Seinsgeschick*) to man and has thus an intrinsic reference to man as the seat of its illumination, is in the West the history of the way Being reveals and bestows itself in and through its own withdrawal from man. In revealing itself as the light in which essents enter into overtness, it withdraws its own essence into itself; without such revelation man

¹ Cf. *Einfuehrung*, p. 89.

² The history of philosophy is the history of man's attempt to understand -what is. But this understanding is itself the way Being reveals itself in Dasein and is rooted in man's relationship to Being. As Heidegger asserts, the relationship of Being to beings can come only from Being and can have its basis only in the nature of Being" (*Holzwege*, p. 334). The history of man's thinking of Being is thus a manifestation of the history of Being itself. And since the former is in the main a history of the way man has thought about the essent as such and as a whole, disregarding Being itself, the latter is conceived by Heidegger as the history of the self-concealment of Being.

could never have asked what Heidegger calls the ‘leading question’ (*Leitfrage*) of philosophy, the question about the Being of essents, and without this withdrawal man would not have become alienated from Being as such and, forgetting the ‘fundamental question’ (*Grundfrage*) of philosophy, the question about Being as such, abandoned himself to the essent as such. Being only reveals and gives itself to man as its own withdrawal and man’s oblivion of Being is actually the abandonment of man by Being. The history of philosophy, as Heidegger reads it, is thus itself grounded in the invisible, deeper history of Being and though exhibiting on the surface, development and advance in thinking i.e. on the tool of our knowledge of and control over essents as such), it is at best a history of the progressive withdrawal of Being from man vision and so of man’s growing alienation from Being.

Traditionally, Being is contrasted with Becoming, with Seeming, with Thought and with the Ought, fateful distinctions already latent in early Greek thought.¹ As against Becoming, Being is permanence; as against Appearance, it is the enduring prototype, the self-same; as against Thought, it is the object, what lies in front; as against the Ought it is that which is presented to us as something to be realized. All these determinations of Being, through what the Greeks distinguished from it, at bottom mean the same; constancy of presence (*Anwesenheit*), with the notions of “contemporaneity and presence, of constancy and stability, sojourn and occurrence” included in it.² An examination of these contrasting pairs, however, shows that in each case Being and what

¹ The following account of Heidegger’s interpretation of early Greek philosophy is based on *Einfuehrung in die Metaphysik*, Chap. IV. For an elaborate account of Heidegger a treatment of Parmenides and Heraclitus, see the book by G.J. Seidel. Seidel has also an excellent chapter on “The Meaning of Language for Heidegger”.

² See *Was heissi Denken?* 143 ff. for further discussion of the Greek conception of Being as presence.

is opposed to it belong intimately and inseparably together in a deeper sense, that these distinctions have emerged historically from a conception of Being in which they were originally at one with, and implicit within, Being itself. Parmenides conceived Being in sharp contrast with Becoming, thus explicitly bringing out the character of the former as the sheer fullness, gathered in itself, of the permanent, untouched by restlessness and change. Heraclitus says at bottom the same.

Being and appearance are also bound together into an original unity on the basis of which they were then distinguished from one another; the power of coming forth and abiding, *physis*, which for the Greeks constituted the Being of all that is, is at the same time a shining forth, appearing and standing out of hiddenness (*aletheia*). To be an essent is to come to light, to present and display itself; but what appears always has the possibility of appearing as what in truth do not, of being mere appearance and illusion. As Heidegger puts it, where there is unconcealment of essents there is always the possibility of semblance and, conversely, where the essent has stood, unshaken and for long, in a certain semblance, this appearance can shatter and fall away, revealing the essent in its naked truth. Seeming and semblance are for the Greeks not subjective and imaginary but are inherent in the essent and hence, as Heidegger puts it, “they were perpetually compelled to wrest Being from appearance and preserve it against appearance... in the ceaseless struggle between Being and Seeming they wrested Being from the essent, bringing permanence and unconcealment to the essent.”¹ As against the later falling apart of Being and Seeming with Plato, the great age of Greece was a unique creative self-assertion amid the confusion of the complex struggle between the two powers of Being and

¹ Einführung, p. 80.

Seeming. Seeming belongs to Being itself as appearing and because of this the early Greek thinkers, Parmenides in particular, devoted their main effort to the task of rescuing Being from Seeming by distinguishing it from the latter and from non-Being—it is with this distinction that, as Heidegger says, Western man's historical existence begins. The inner unity of Being and appearance has found concise expression in Heraclitus' saying: *physis kryptesthai philei*, i.e., Being, as *physis* (coming forth out of hiddenness) in itself tends to self-concealment, to a relapse into that. Being and Seeming are locked together, intrinsically, in the unity of *polemos*, of perpetual war. Becoming too, like seeming, is not sheer nothing and therefore, though opposed to Being in the sense of what stands out in permanent sameness, is yet comprehended in Being in the larger sense.

The differentiation between Being and Thought also springs from an original, inner belonging together of the two, an initial unity which itself, as Being in the profounder sense, as it were, requires its own differentiation. Logic, the science of 'thought', cannot itself explain the nature and origin of this separation because logic itself arose on the basis of this separation, after Plato's interpretation of Being as idea had already turned Being into an 'object' of knowledge. It can be shown, Heidegger claims, that in early Greek philosophy Being (as *physis*) and thought (as *logos*) were conceived as intrinsically belonging together, provided that we understand *logos* also in a deeper, more original sense, keeping out its later misinterpretation in terms of thinking as a subjective process, of reason, of judgment, of the Christian doctrine. Originally, *logos* meant, according to Heidegger, gathering or collection, having the sense of both collecting and collectedness; it was the primal gathering principle. "Logos signifies here neither meaning nor word, nor doctrine, nor the spirit

of the latter but the permanent, self-abiding, original collection of gathered-togetherness... Logos is the permanent gathering together, the self-contained togetherness of the essent, i.e. Being.”¹ *Physis* and *logos* together constitute a unity and in that sense are the same. What is, is in itself gathered presence, holding together what tends to come apart ; so conceived, Being is at the same time radiance and harmony, the supreme beauty.²

In order to show how this original unity of *physis* and *logos* is eventually broken up, Heidegger offers his own interpretation of the well-known line of Parmenides, *to gar auto noein estin te kai einai* (“thinking and being are the same” in the usual translation, no less un-Greek, Heidegger says, than the misinterpretation of *logos*) as also of his saying, *chre to legein te noein t'eon emmenai* (ordinarily translated as “It is necessary to say and to think that the essent is”).³ To understand the real meaning of *noein*, he insists, we must carefully refrain from projecting into it the modern conception of thinking as the activity of a subject, with Being as its correlate, and from interpreting it in Kantian or Hegelian terms. We should understand *noein* in the sense of *vernehmen* (to

¹ Ibid, p. 98.

² Heidegger has also dealt at length with his interpretation of *logos* and *legein* in an independent essay (in *Vartraege und Aufsätze*). Discarding all later interpretations of *logos* as “ratio, as word, as cosmic order, as the logical and the necessity in thought, as meaning, as reason,” as derivative he goes back to its original meaning : laying down, collecting and gathering, and as such, speech. *Logos*, as Heidegger explains it, is the gathering principle, the *hen panta* (all is one) of Heraclitus. “The *logos* names that which gathers together all that is present (i.e. the essent) in its presence (i.e. Being), laying it out in such gathering. The *Logos* names that within which the presence of the present takes place.... In the thinking of Heraclitus the Being (presence) of essents manifests itself as the *Logos*, the gleaning, gathering laying out (*lesende Lege*).” Ibid. p. 227. Heidegger also shows here how, for the first time, Heraclitus determines the nature of man in terms of his belongingness to Being.

³ For a detailed discussion of this line, see *Was heisst Denken ?*, p. 105 ff.; also see the essay, *Moirai* (in *Vorträge*). For Parmenides also the nature of man and his relationship to Being comes from Being itself,

apprehend), in the double signification of taking up, accepting, letting what appeal's come up and of hearing a witness, questioning him and so determining how matters stand—the sense of taking on and determining.¹ Being, in the sense of *physis* or emergence into unhiddenness, and *noein* are the same in the sense of inherently belonging together ; where unhiddenness occurs and Being prevails, there occurs also, as necessarily implied in it, apprehension. Further, such apprehension, far from being a power exercised by man as subject, is itself possible to man because he himself is part of Being (*physis*) and so shares in the apprehending (*noein*) that is intrinsic to Being. The being of man himself is determined by the inner unity and togetherness of *physis* and *noein*. Apprehension, Heidegger says, is here not a faculty belonging to man with his nature already defined; apprehension is rather a happening, sharing in which alone man enters into history as an essent, appears, that is, in the literal sense, comes into being. Apprehension is not a mode of activity which man possesses as an attribute; on the contrary, man himself is a function of apprehension, what the saying of Parmenides expresses is thus a definition of the essence of man in terms of the truth of Being.

For the early Greeks, man stands in an intimate bond with Being, deriving his own nature from that bond and existing as the locus of the self-disclosure of Being. At the same time, needed and necessitated by Being itself, he seeks to wrest the truth of Being, to make Being itself shine forth and appear by bringing it to a stand in the permanency of well-defined form, through knowledge and art, by embodying, rendering manifest and realizing Being in the essent (*ins-Werk-setzen*, as e.g. when the artist incorporates the truth of Being in a 'work' of art) through the exercise of force

¹ See also *Was heisst Denken?*, p. 125, where *noein* is rendered as 'being mindful of' or 'taking care of'.

against the order of *physis* or *dike*.¹ Knowing as apprehension (*noein*) is not mere passive reception but is an act of violence, a marching out to engage the essent in the battle for Being. Within Being itself, conceived as *physis* and *logos*, here is inherent the possibility amid the necessity of *logos* (i.e. *noein* as a gathering together or *legein*) differentiating itself from *logos* in the sense of the togetherness, the gathered character, of Being itself. *Logos* acquires the sense of a gathering together that makes manifest, occurring in and through man, and, as the gathering and apprehending of the being of essents, it becomes a feature of the constitutive essence of man and no longer an element in Being itself. Further, man's break-through into Being, but for the sake of Being and in its service, in knowledge and art is at the same time a break-through into language. Language, giving form to the essent and opening it up in its being, is a collecting, gathering together and so disclosing, *logos*. It brings the essent into openness, delimitation and permanence; in primordial speech the Being of the essent is opened up in the texture of its gatheredness and maintained and preserved as such. Himself gathered together within the structure of Being, standing and acting in *logos* as gatheredness, man (as a function of *noein* or apprehension) is the gatherer charged with the task of preserving and fulfilling primarily through language (poetic creation and thought), the disclosure of Being, of guarding such disclosure against seeming and closure. *Logos* and *physis* thus split apart, facing each other as it were, but still forming a harmonious whole, the differentiation

¹ For an elaboration of the Greek tragic conception of man, as the *deinotaton*, the uncanny agent of acts of violence, see Heidegger's interpretation of the first chorus song in the *Antigone* of Sophocles in *Einfuehrung*, where he speaks "the creative man, who marches out into the un-said, who breaks into the unthought, enforces what has never happened, makes what has never been seen to appear." See also *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes in Holzwege*, for elucidation of the concept of setting into a work (*ins-Werk-setzen*).

still in the service of Being. As yet this does not mean any breaking away of logos from Being, nor imply that logos stands opposed to Being in such a way as to stand in judgment (as Reason) on Being, determining and regulating what is to count as the Being of essents.

The secession of *logos* occurs, Heidegger points out, when it abandons its original essence, when Being is interpreted differently and its *physis* character is lost from view. The slow and long history of this transformation, in the midst of which Western man has long been standing, culminates in the domination of thinking as ratio over the Being of what is and the determination of man's essence in terms of Reason. The initial differentiation of *logos* and *physis* was followed by the breaking away of logos from the original unity and ultimately to its being elevated to a position of supremacy through the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Plato conceives Being as idea or *eidos*, an interpretation which then dominates the whole course of Western philosophy right up to Hegel, with whom the first phase of Western thought, as Heidegger calls it, comes to its definitive close. Idea or *eidos* means the look, the view presented by anything that confronts us, its visage. In such presentation the thing stands before us, is present, i.e. is in the Greek sense; this is *physis* immobilized and held fast in the aspect presented by it. In the visage that it shows, the essent, that which is present (*Anwesende*), presents itself in its what and how, its *ousia*, which signifies at the same time the presence (*Anwesenheit*) of what is present as well as the latter in respect of its 'what'. The subsequent distinction between *existentia* and *essentia* is based on the Greek understanding of Being as constancy of presence and the Platonic interpretation of the latter as idea. Idea understood as presence, Heidegger points out, includes in itself the sense both of emerging into unhiddenness (simple *estin*) and of the what of the

emergence (*ti estin*) and its correlate the that (*oti estin*). The interpretation of Being as idea follows from the conception of Being as *physis* (emerging and appearing), but with Plato the idea, instead of being recognized as the derivative that it is, usurped the position of *physis* as the sole and proper meaning of Being. What happened was nothing less than a betrayal of the original Greek insight. Being and apprehension, what is seen and seeing, belong together in one whole, but from this it does not follow that being-seen alone can determine and constitute the presence (Being) of the thing seen or that Being should be conceived in terms of apprehension alone and defined as that which is apprehended by the intellect. In the interpretation of Being as idea, Heidegger says, not only is a consequence of the initial conception of the nature of Being twisted and elevated to the status of that nature itself but the falsification is once again misinterpreted. Being is not only understood in the sense of idea (whatness or quiddity), but the latter is exalted as the real essent (*ontos on*) above the whole realm of essents, which is now degraded into the *me on*, the unreal and the imperfect, having only a share in Being (*methexis*), an imperfect copy of the ideal prototype. A chasm (*chorismos*) opens up between the idea as what really is and the essent as what in reality is not. The meaning of appearing, too, is transformed; it has no longer the sense of emerging or showing itself but becomes mere appearance, seeming—on and *phainomenon* fall apart. The meaning of truth, which was at the beginning the *aletheia* or unhiddenness of *physis*, also undergoes a change. Truth is understood now as the adequation (*homoiosis*) of the disclosure of essents to the ideal pattern, the idea, i.e. as, the correctness of seeing, of apprehension in the sense of representation. The transformation of Being from *physis* to idea has been decisive, Heidegger claims, in giving to the history of the Occident its essential character and mould. In his essay on Plato's doctrine of

truth (*Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*), Heidegger brings out the Unthought in Plato's thinking through a detailed discussion of the Allegory of the Cave in the Republic, Book VIII. What remains unthought here, according to him is a transformation in the conception of truth from unhiddenness to correctness of perception or knowing, from *a-letheia* to *orthotes*. The original Greek sense of truth as a wresting away from hiddenness is indeed present in the Allegory, but it is dominated and overshadowed by another conception of truth which comes into prominence. *Aletheia* comes under the domination, the yoke, of the idea, as Heidegger puts it, and truth as unhiddenness recedes into the background. In consequence, not only the character but also the locus of truth has changes. 'As unhiddenness it is still the basic feature of essents themselves. As correctness of 'seeing', it becomes a character of man's attitude toward essents,"¹ i.e. a property of knowing. This change in the nature of truth goes hand in hand with the determination of the Being (presence) of essents as idea, so that presence is no longer regarded as the emergence of the hidden into unhiddenness, as it was in the beginning, but as idea, itself determining truth and rendering it possible. Plato's thought results, Heidegger says, from the change in the nature of truth, a change which manifests itself as the history of metaphysics, of which the final culmination begins in the thinking of Nietzsche.²

With the changed interpretation of *physis* there goes a corresponding transformation in the meaning of *logos*. *Logos* as gathering renders essents manifest; language is that through which the *legein* or gathering and manifesting of this *logos* occurs. But when attention is focussed on the task of guarding authentic discourse against mere repetitive talk emptied of its revelatory

¹ *Platons Lehre*, p. 42.

² Cf. also the illuminating discussion of Plato's theory of art in *Nietzsche I*, Chapter I and comments on Plato scattered throughout the work.

power, the former comes to be identified with *logos* itself and becomes the locus of truth.¹ *Logos* as gathering was initially identical with the occurrence of unhiddenness (truth) and rooted in it, but now, in the sense of statement, it becomes itself the seat of truth in the sense of correctness. Originally, truth as unhiddenness was a feature of the essent and governed by gathering, but now it becomes a property of *logos* (statement) not only thus shifting its locus but also changing its character from primordial unhiddenness of the essent to the correctness of statement. *Logos* thus detaches itself from its initial unity with *physis* and becomes, as statement, the arbiter of what is to count as Being, unfolding, in course, into the discipline of ontology and the doctrine of categories. The Principle of Contradiction, declaring that when two statements contradict each other, what they are about cannot *be*, embodies and illustrates this changed conception of the relationship between *physis* and *logos*. Further, since *logos* as statement is itself an objectively existing entity, it can be employed as an instrument to gain and secure truth as correctness, as an *organon* and with this final transformation of *logos* into a tool, “there arrives the hour of the birth of Logic.” Ever since Aristotle, Logic, born complete in most essentials, has remained the authoritative and standard perspective for the interpretation of Being, right down to Kant and Hegel. The only thing that remains, Heidegger acidly remarks, is now “to lift it off its hinges” and effect radical changes in its very foundations.

The transformation of *physis* and *logos* and consequently of their relation to one another is a falling-off from the first beginning. As Heidegger says, “The philosophy of the Greeks

¹ As Heidegger points out in a discussion of the *homo mensura* doctrine of Protagoras (*Holzwege*, p. 94 ff; also *Nietzsche II*, p. 135 ff.), the change in the interpretation of what is, including man, came about as a result of the Platonic struggle against the Sophists and, in that sense, in dependence upon them.

conquered the Western world not on the strength of what it was in its original beginning but through what it had become towards the end of this beginning,”¹ an end which came to its final culmination with Hegel in the last century. The inner ground of the transformation of *physis* and *logos* into idea and statement lies in the change in the nature of truth from untidiness to correctness. The original essence of truth could not be retained and preserved and there was a “collapse of unhiddenness”, of the area opened out for the appearing of the essent; from the debris ‘idea’ and ‘statement’, *ousia* and *kategoria* were salvaged, as Heidegger puts it, each existing as an objective entity, disjoined from the other and connectable only by a relation having itself the character of an objective entity. Ever since, philosophy has laboured to explain and render the plausible relation between judgment (thought) and Being by all sorts of ingenious theories, in vain, because without reopening the root-question of Being itself. The definitive interpretation of Being itself that emerges, in consequence of all this, is crystallized in the word *ousia*, Being in the sense of constant presence, simple givenness (*Vorhandenheit*). According to this conception of Being, henceforth to dominate European thought, only what always is, the *aei on*, counts as really being. This conception, along with the consequent interpretation of Being as idea also paves the way for the separation between Being and ‘Ought’. Once Being is conceived as idea, itself in a way an essent, it no longer has its potency and its power to render something possible within itself, but becomes subordinate to something above it, to the Idea of the Good (*idea tou agathou*) which, therefore, as Plato says, stands beyond Being (*epekeina tes ousias*).² It is this Idea of Ideas, the Good, that endows Being (as idea) with the

¹ Einführung, p. 144.

² On *agathon*, see *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, pp. 37-38; *Platons Lehre* pp. 36-40; also *Nietzsche II*, pp. 223-233.

power to function as prototype. The Ought thus separates itself from Being, from within Being itself, and sets itself above it. The change in the conception of truth and the consequent interpretation of Being (presence) as idea converts as it were Being itself into an essent and the highest Idea, the Good, appears as the highest essent, the supersensible first cause of the existence and appearance of all sensible essents, called by Plato and, following him, by Aristotle, the divine (*to theion*). Since Plato's interpretation of Being as idea, Heidegger says, all thinking about the Being of essents has been metaphysical and metaphysics itself theological¹ or, as in a later formulation, ontology, theology and logic in one, onto-theo-logic. With Plato, thinking becomes 'philosophy', i.e. representational thinking, which catches only the essent in its net, or thinking in concepts, which is aimed, with its grasping and grabbing, with its calculative character, at attaining mastery over the essent. A new epoch of Being begins, not yet infected with subjectivism and still moving within the basic Greek experience, it is true, but nevertheless destined to cast its nihilistic shadow over the entire course of Western philosophy up to Nietzsche, with whom 'philosophy' rims out its course, opening out the possibility, and the necessity, of a new beginning.

In Aristotle's conception of *energeia* as the Being (*ousia*, presence) of essents, there was indeed a flash of the original spirit of Greek thought. *Energeia* in Aristotle means, according to Heidegger, coming or being brought into unhiddenness and presence and enduring so in an accomplished piece of work, a meaning which was totally lost with the Latin translation of this

¹ Cf. *Platons Lehre*, p. 48.

term into *actualitas* and its eventual transformation into Reality and Objectivity.¹

The ontology of the *Vorhanden* (the simply given), in the language of Being an Time, with its conception of Being as constant presence, itself contains within it the seeds of the differentiation, and eventually of the dissension, of Becoming, Seeming, Thinking and the Ought from Being. The original unity of Being as *physis* in its intimate relation to Truth as unhiddenness and comprehending within itself the relationship to the essence of man, flashing out for a brief historical moment in early Greek thought, could not be sustained, with consequences which have been working themselves out in the shape of the history of Western philosophy.² The ground for this lies, Heidegger says, in the magnitude of the beginning and in the nature of a beginning as such. "As a beginning, the beginning must in a sense leave itself behind, thus necessarily hiding itself (though this self-concealment is not nothing). A beginning can never directly preserve its power as a beginning and the only way to preserve its force and safeguard its continuation is to repeat the beginning, draw it out once again (*wieder-holen*), in its originative character, in a still deeper sense,"³ i.e. by explicitly bringing out what has remained unthought in it. That is why, in his quest for a new conception of Being, Heidegger goes back to the earliest Greek thinkers who had a glimpse of the Being of essents (*physis*) as the unity of the various elements that

¹ As already remarked, in Heidegger's writings scattered discussions of Aristotle are to be found all over. Except for a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* B 1 (*Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis*) dealing with the Aristotelian concepts of *physis*, *ousia* and *kinesis*, nothing by way of a systematic treatment has, however, been published, hence the meagre treatment of Aristotle here.

² Already by the time of Aristotle, *physis* had come to denote a particular region of essents, distinguished from the sphere of *ethos* and *logos* and no longer having the broad meaning of the totality of essents. Cf. *Holzwege*, p. 298.

³ *Einfuehrung*, p. 146.

later fell apart and renders explicit their unuttered but presupposed conception of Being itself—Being as constant presence (*Anwesenheit, ousia*). It is this way of understanding Being, i.e. the determination of the meaning and content of the infinitive ‘to be’ (*Sein* or Being) in terms of the present ‘is’ and not the other way round, that led to the separation of Becoming, Seeming, Thinking and the Ought from Being, though they are themselves not sheer nothing. “But if, in these distinctions, all that is opposed to Being is not nothing, then it is itself essent, ultimately even more so (since Being itself gets its determination in opposition to them) than what the narrow conception of Being regards as essent. But then, in which sense of Being are Becoming, Seeming, Thought and the Ought essent? In no case in the sense of Being from which they are distinguished.”¹ The Greek understanding of Being, dominating the whole course of Western philosophy, Heidegger concludes is too narrow and “does not suffice to name everything that ‘is’. It is oblivious of the one and only distinction that counts, the distinction between Being and beings, and so generates, through this oblivion, the entire enfoldment of the subsequent tradition of ‘metaphysical’ thinking. For this reason, Being must once again be experienced anew in its very fundamental and in all the breadth of its possible nature... The Being which they (these distinctions) encircle must itself be transformed into the encompassing circle and ground of all essents,” not excluding the ‘terrible power of negativity’ (Hegel), the Nothing. And such rethinking of Being must take cognizance of the fact, itself hidden from the Greeks and from subsequent philosophy, that from the very beginning the perspective governing the disclosure of Being was Time (Being= presence, the ‘is’), though time as understood,

¹ Ibid, p. 155.

in its turn, in the light of that narrow interpretation of Being as simple givenness (*Vorhandenheit*), as a succession of given nows.

With the arrival of Christianity, the highest essent, the Divine (*to theion*), became God the Creator and the Being of essents as a whole was understood to lie in its createdness by God. The leading question of philosophy, viz. the question of what the essent is in its totality, appears as having been conclusively answered, the question itself being thus done away with and that, too, on an authority far superior to the chance opinions and delusions of men, as Heidegger puts it.¹ “Biblical revelation which, according to its own assertion, rests on divine inspiration, teaches that all that is, is created by a personal creator God and is sustained and ruled by Him. Through revealed truth, proclaimed by the Church doctrine as absolutely binding, the question as to what the essent is has become superfluous. The Being of the essent consists in its being created by God (*omne ens est ens creatum*).”² To be an essent means to belong in its particular specific position in the hierarchy of the created and, as so brought about, to correspond to the cause of creation (*analogia entis*).³ Truth itself is understood as *homoiosis* and *convenientia*, the correspondence or adequation of things with their pre-conceived idea in the divine mind. To know the truth about what is, the only reliable way left for man is to devote himself to the revealed teaching, the *doctrina* of the Church doctors. In its essence truth now appears in the character of ‘doctrine’ and its knowledge consists in the ‘*Summa*’, the systematic collection of the whole heritage of the various doctrinal views in so far as they are consonant with the teaching of the Church.

¹ *Nietzsche I*, p. 131.

² *Ibid*, p. 132.

³ *Holzwege*, p. 83.

Scholars adopting this approach to the essent as a whole are called ‘theologians’ but, Heidegger remarks in an interesting passage,¹ their ‘philosophy’ is philosophy in name only. “A ‘Christian philosophy’ is even more of an absurdity than the idea of a square circle. Square and circle have at least this in common that they are both spatial constructs, whereas Christian faith and philosophy are divided by an abyss. Both, it might be said, teach the truth, to which the answer is that truth here is conceived by each in wholly disparate ways. That the Medieval theologians studied Plato and Aristotle, re-interpreting them in their own way, is much the same as Karl Marx using the metaphysics of Hegel for his political doctrine. Properly and strictly speaking, the *doctrina Cristiana* does not mean to impart knowledge about the essent, about what is; its truth is entirely concerned with salvation, with insuring the salvation of the individual immortal soul.”

III. THE MODERN AGE

The modern age begins with the liberation of man from the authority of the revealed truth of Christianity and Church doctrine such that, standing on his own, man himself becomes his own law-giver.² This liberation, however, is itself conditioned by its bond with revealed truth, through which man was assured of the salvation of his soul and made secure in that certainty. As Heidegger points out, “The liberation from the revelation-based certainty of salvation had, therefore, to be a liberation into a certainty in which man secures truth as what is known to him through his own activity of knowing. This was possible only when man himself, seeking to liberate himself, guaranteed the certainty of what is knowable, which in turn he could do only by

¹ Ibid, p. 132.

² For this account of Descartes and the rise of modern philosophy cf. *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* in *Holzwege*; also *Nietzsche II*, pp. 132-192.

determining, from within himself and for himself, what is to count as knowable to him and what is to be understood by knowledge and by the assurance of the known, i.e. by certainty.” What is of decisive importance here, Heidegger says, is not that man throws off his shackles but that with this freedom, his own essence is transmuted and he becomes a subject. For Aristotle and the Greeks, the subject (*subjectum, hypokeimenon*) was what a statement was about, that which lies before, that which underlies as its basis, the permanently present. But for Descartes, the permanently present, the given, is found in the *ego cogito*, which thus becomes the ultimate subject, the subjectness of the ego as subject lying in the certainty of self-consciousness. Man becomes an essent in whom all that is grounded as to the mode of its Being and its truth. Correspondingly, the nature of the essent in its totality also undergoes a change. The world turns into an image, a picture in man’s grasp and at his disposal, and “the essent as a whole is set out as something which man may prepare himself to meet and which he accordingly seeks to bring in front of himself, to have and keep it, in a positive sense, before himself (*vorstellen*, taken literally).” The world is conceived as a picture and the essent as something which is only in so far as it is set up by the representing, producing activity of man. The Being of essents is sought and found in the representedness (*Vorgestelltheit*) of essents; the presence of the present appears, since Descartes, in the mode of objectivity. This is indeed a far cry from the early Greek conception of Being as the presence of the present, of what lies in front (the *hypokeimenon* or subject in the Greek sense), in the unhiddenness or truth of which man shares through apprehension and so is man. “Representation (*Vorstellen*) has no longer the character of an apprehension of what is present, in the unhiddenness of which this apprehension itself belongs, with its own mode of presence. In representation there is nothing more of the opening oneself for....,

but only a grabbing and grasping of.... Here it is not what is presented that has its sway; it is the attitude of attacking that prevails.” The nature of truth itself undergoes transformation, so that truth is conceived from now on, not as unhiddenness, but as the certainty of adequation and correctness.

Liberated from the authority of revealed truth, man has to find certitude within himself and to find a metaphysical foundation for this certitude. Such a *fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis*, absolutely unshakable in its character as a foundation, Descartes provides in the *ego cogito*, in the ‘I’ conceived as the thinking, representing principle determining what ‘being’ is to mean. The *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes formulates, Heidegger points out,¹ an intrinsic connection between *cogito*, representing, and *sum* or being, such that it is not merely ‘I’ who am as representing but that the being of every essent consists in its being represented. Further, *cogito* is always *cogito me cogitare*; every ‘I think (represent)’ is at the same time a representing of oneself as representing. It is of the nature of representation as such to incorporate within it the reference to the representing ‘I’ for which it is a representation and which itself is as represented in what it represents. The ego is as representing (*sum cogitans*) and as itself a representation of such representing. As Heidegger remarks,² “*sum res cogitans* does not mean that I am a thing endowed with the property of thinking ; it means that I am an essent whose mode of being consists in representing, such that this re-presenting (*Vorstellen*, putting in front of oneself) puts, at the same time, the representing ‘I’ itself in the position of being represented.” Man, in quest of the certitude of what he knows and of himself as knowing, thus becomes the subject, the underlying basis and ground of

¹ *Nietzsche II*, p. 162.

² *Ibid*, p. 164.

everything that is, in terms of whose representing activity the Being of everything is determined and for whom everything is an object, including himself. This thorough subjectivity is at the same time extreme objectivity. The essent is objectivized by virtue of a re-presenting which aims at holding any- thing that is before oneself so that calculating man can, in his concern for certitude, secure and be certain of the essent. This conception of the Being of essents as objectivity of representation and of truth as certitude was for the first time developed in the metaphysics of Descartes, Heidegger says, and modern metaphysics in its entirety, not excluding Nietzsche, moves and keeps within the perspective opened up by Descartes in his interpretation of the essent and of truth. Descartes marks “the beginning of the consummation of Western metaphysics”, a beginning of which the far-reaching metaphysical significance emerges with growing clarity and force in the views of succeeding philosophers.

The subjectivist trend in modern metaphysics is deepened still further in Leibniz’s conception of the subject as *ens percipiens et appetens*. The Being of what is (i.e. the presence of the present) manifests itself not only as representation but as will, which henceforth is an essential aspect of the way Being is understood in modern times right up to Nietzsche, by whom it is explicitly recognized as the only reality. Leibniz’s conception of representation, the true *subiectum*, which is at the same time force (*vis primitiva activa*) and is characterized by the synthetic function of bringing into a unity all that is (Being as unifying ground, Logos), prepares the way not only for Kant but is destined to constitute “the historical foundation of the modern period.”¹ The Principle of Sufficient Reason, after its long period of incubation, at last emerges into clear and explicit formulation by Leibniz and

¹ Ibid, p. 442.

philosophy, conceiving truth as certainty, forthwith becomes a quest for the “conditions of the possibility of”; thinking comes into its own in the shape of Reason.¹ The name of Leibniz stands, Heidegger says, not for a past system of philosophy but “designates the contemporaneity of a thinking of which the full impact has yet to be endured Only when we glance back at what Leibniz thinks, we can realize how very much the present era, called the Atomic age, is under the domination of the *principium reddendae rationis sufficientis*.”² In Leibniz, Being reveals itself as Ground and as Reason, as the very principle of the calculability of essents and their subjugation by man.

Plato interpreted Being (presence) as idea, consisting of the ‘what’ of anything, and the Idea as *agathon*, enabling it to be what it is ; with Descartes, the idea becomes the *perceptum* of a *perceptio*, a representation. The *agathon* character of the idea, i.e. Being as enabling and rendering possible, as ground, having been brought once again to light by Leibniz, manifests itself in all its power in the Kantian metaphysics. The innermost core of the history of modern philosophy, Heidegger says,³ consists of the process by which Being acquires its indisputable character of being essentially the condition of the possibility of essents, i.e., in the modern sense, of what is represented, i.e. of what stands opposite, i.e. of objects. The decisive step in this process is taken by the metaphysics of Kant, the peak or centre to which the subjectivism of the modern period, initiated by Descartes, leads up and which points beyond to the speculative-dialectical interpretation of Being

¹ Cf. *Der Satz Vom Grund*, passim; the whole of this book is devoted, by way of a continuous discussion of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, to the philosophy of Leibniz and is important also for the elucidation of Heidegger’s conception of the destiny of Being (*Seinsgeschick*) and of the history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*) in relation to the history of thought.

² Ibid, p. 65.

³ *Nietzsche II*, pp. 230-33.

as the absolute concept by Hegel.’¹ The basic metaphysical position of Kant finds expression in the fundamental principle, the “supreme principle” upon which the whole of the Transcendental Philosophy rests (as H. J. Paton describes it and as Kant himself explicitly recognizes). In its final formulation the principle runs: “The conditions of the **possibility of experience** in general are likewise conditions of the **possibility of the objects of experience.**”² In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s aim is to

¹ Cf. *Nietzsche II*, p. 231 also Kants *These ueber das Sein*, p. 36. The central place (die Mitte) that Heidegger assigns to Kant in the history of modern thought is reflected in the formers unceasing pre-occupation with Kant in his own thinking. Apart from the major work Kant and *das Problem der Metaphysik*, written during the Being and Time phase, scattered discussions of Kant’s views can be found in most of his later writings. Heidegger’s latest published work (1962), *Kants These ueber das Sein*, an essay, and *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, a full-sized book, is devoted entirely to Kant. See also the report of the discussion with Ernst Cassirer at the Davos Conference in: *Ergaenzungen zu einer Heidegger-Bibliographie* by Guido Schneeberger. H. J. Pos gives an interesting account of the encounter between the two philosophers at Davos in his “Recollections of Ernst Cassirer” (*The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, ed. by Schilpp). A less biased and more detailed account has been recently provided by Carl Hamburg (“A Cassirer-Heidegger Seminar” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXV, 2.) who also gives a full translation of the discussion-report in *Schneeberger. Die Frage nach dem Ding* is subtitled, *Zu Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalen Grund-saetzen* (on Kant’s doctrine of Transcendental Principles) and is in the main a study of Chap. II (System of all Principles of Pure Understanding) of Book II (Analytic of Principles) of the ‘Transcendental Analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason, thus making good what was lacking in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, as Heidegger says. In the perspective of the inquiry into the thingness of a thing, i.e. of the *a priori* determination of the most general characteristics of the Being of an essent, Heidegger considers this as the very heart and core of the whole work, in accordance with Kant’s own innermost intentions. Heidegger’s procedure in this book is one of straightforward exegesis; the implicit and the unsaid in Kant’s view of Being is brought out in the recent essay mentioned above. The exegesis is, nevertheless, one which seeks to go beyond the one-sidedness and bias of the Idealistic and the Neo Kantian interpretations.

² Critique of Pure Reason, A 158, B 197. About this sentence, Heidegger writes (*Die Frage nach dem Ding*, p. 143), “He who grasps this sentence, grasps Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Who grasps the latter, knows not just a book in the literature of philosophy but has a grasp of the basic attitude characterizing

discover how ontological or transcendental knowledge (the *a priori* synthesis) is possible. Such knowledge is concerned, not with the essent as such but, transcending that, with the possibility of a prior comprehension of its Being, with the ontological constitution of the essent, i.e. with the structure of transcendence. “The supreme principle of all synthetic judgments”, quoted above, sums up this structure as the unity of the two elements it mentions, experience and the objects of experience. In order that an object should be given, there must occur a prior “turning oneself toward” it, in the form of the ontological synthesis, of which the core, according to Heidegger, is constituted by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. This turning-oneself-toward is the condition of the possibility of experiencing an object. In the second place, the object itself must be rendered possible by a pre-given horizon in which it may appear; this horizon is the condition of the possibility of the object in respect of its objectivity (that it can stand opposite us, confront its). As Heidegger puts it,¹ “The turning oneself-toward and letting (the object) stand-opposite as such fashions the horizon of objectivity in general....The transcendence is in itself *ekstatic-horizonal*.” The transcendental object, with which ontological knowledge is concerned, is not an essent hidden behind the phenomenon but is the correlate of the unity of apperception, the X as Kant calls it; it is nothing at all but sheer horizon. The X is “object in general”, i.e. the horizon of objectivity, the transcendence in and through which the Being of essents manifests itself *a priori*.

It is, Heidegger holds, the transcendental imagination which primarily renders possible such ontological knowledge by

our historical existence, which we can neither circumvent, nor leap over nor disavow in any other way. We must, on the contrary, by appropriating and transforming it, bring it to a decision in the future.”

¹ Kant, p. 111.

building, prior to all experience of objects, the pure schema or view of a horizon of objectivity as such, the horizon of ‘constant presence’ in which an object may manifest itself as present. Heidegger further suggests that it is the faculty of the imagination that constitutes the ‘hidden’ common root of the Sensibility and Understanding; he identifies the transcendental imagination, as Kant himself failed explicitly to do, with primordial Time, which constitutes and generates time in the modalities of past, present and future through the operation of the three-fold synthesis. Without being himself explicitly aware of it, Kant has brought together Time and the ‘I think’ and identified them; the pure self, i.e. the finite human subjectivity, is essentially of the nature of time. Kant was bound to light upon time as the root determination of finite transcendence because the understanding of Being in *Dasein*, by itself as it were, projects Being in terms of time. And he was bound at the same time, Heidegger adds, to be carried back from the vulgar concept of time to the transcendental understanding of time as pure self-affection, which in its essence is one with pure apperception and in this unity renders possible the pure sensuous Reason in its wholeness. Unknown; explicitly to the author, “time in its essential unity with the transcendental imagination acquires a central metaphysical function in the **Critique of Pure Reason**.”¹ Had Kant realized the implications of this, the dominating position of reason and understanding, the age-old pre-eminence of ‘Logic’ in metaphysics including his own concept of a ‘transcendental logic’ taken as something absolute, would have been thoroughly shaken and become questionable. But in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant gives back to the Understanding its dominating place, with the consequence that metaphysics becomes

¹ Ibid., p. 219.

with Hegel, more radically ‘Logic’ than ever before.¹ If only Kant had seen that the horizon of transcendence is constituted by the pure schemata regarded as transcendental time determinations, he would have concluded, as Heidegger does in *Being and Time*, that the ontological structure of essents, i.e. their Being, is essentially rooted in Time. The possibility of ontological knowledge is shown, in Kant, to be grounded in the structure of transcendence, i.e. of the finite subjectivity of the human subject. Kant, “who was alive, in his philosophizing, to the problem of the possibility of metaphysics as no one before him or since,” shrank back, Heidegger says, from explicitly recognizing the transcendental imagination (Time) as the ground of ontological knowledge because to have done so would have meant abandoning the firm ground of pure reason on which he himself stood and because it would have forced him to go beyond metaphysics itself to its true ground in the truth of Being as such.²

¹ From another direction this is also the conclusion of Heidegger’s second book on Kant. Kant determines the nature of human knowledge so that thought becomes subservient to intuition, thus losing its old supremacy. This radically transforms the nature of thinking and hence of logic. But as Heidegger remarks it was not within the power of Kant to realize fully and work this out, for that would have meant nothing short of jumping over his own shadow, “This no one can do, but the uttermost exertion in snaking this forbidden attempt—this is the decisive and basic movement of the act of thinking. In Plato, in Leibniz, above all in Kant, finally in Schelling and Nietzsche we can observe in different ways this basic movement. Hegel alone has apparently succeeded in jumping over this shadow—but only by eliminating the shadow, i.e. the finitude of man, and leaping into the Sun itself. Hegel has passed over the shadow which does not mean that he has leapt over it. And yet every philosopher must want to this. In this ‘must’ lies his vocation. The longer the shadow, the more far-reaching is the spring.” (*Die Frage nach dem Ding*, p. 118)

² The above is an extremely condensed account of the substance of Heidegger’s lucidly articulated interpretation of Kant in his *Kant und das problem der Metaphysik*.

“Kant is the first,” says Heidegger,¹ “to raise once again, since the philosophy of the Greeks, the question of the Being of essents as a question to be unfolded.” In accordance with the dominant tendency of the age, his thinking moves in the dimension of Reason, the faculty of representing something as something. It is the dimension of subjectivity, in which what is *is* only as an object for a subject. The certifying ground, the ultimate *a priori* condition of the possibility of objects is the objectivity, the object-ness, of objects. The conception of objectivity as constituting the Being of all essents which can be experienced, of objectivity for rational subjectivity, is the view of Being implicit in Kant’s thinking, for, according to him, it is only in the light of a prior glimpse of Being as objectivity that anything can appear at all as an object. Being, i.e. the presence of the present reveals itself in the Kantian philosophy in the character of objectivity (standing opposite) as against the way the Greeks encountered the essent as facing them in its own character as constant presence. The original and basic conception of Being as presence is presupposed and implied in the Kantian determination of the essent as an object of experience ; objectivity is the form in which the presence of the present appears in the age of subjectivity. The supreme principle of Kant’s metaphysics, quoted earlier, says, according to Heidegger, “that the conditions of the possibility of representing (*vor-stellen*) what is represented are at the same time, i.e. none other than, the conditions of the possibility of what is represented. They constitute the representedness which is the essence of objectivity, i.e. of the Being of essents. The supreme principle says: Being is representedness. Representedness, farther, is a kind of being handed over or delivered, such that the representing self can be secure of what is thus presented and brought to stand. Security is

¹ *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 131.

found in certitude, which is how the nature of truth is determined.”¹ The connection between Being (*eon*, understood as presence) and Unity (*hen*) or the logos as gathering together and disclosing, left unexplained by the Greeks, appears in Kant in the form of the supreme principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception, which renders possible both the objectivity of the object as well as the object as such. The unity is conceived, however, as one of synthesis (*syn*=together ; *thesis*=positing). The logos is here shifted and transferred to the ‘I’ as subject and yet, as apperception, it remains in contact with affection through the senses. The subjectivity of man is, with Kant, not yet absolute but still remains a subjectivity of finitude.²

The transcendental method is the inquiry not into objects but into the nature of their objectivity (i.e. their Being) and hence into the subjectivity of Reason, for which it is objectivity and in which it is rooted. And it is further an inquiry which is itself, as Heidegger notices in his later phase, part of objectivity, a manifestation of the way Being reveals itself as the objectivity of the object of experience. The transcendental method is itself a mode of representation springing from the subjectivity of Reason in which Being itself, in revealing itself as objectivity, conceals itself as Being to the utmost degree.³ The self-certitude of knowledge through representing the essent in its Being as objectivity, characteristic of modern subjectivism, finds expression in Kant’s doctrine of Reason as assuring itself both of itself in its self-legislative supremacy as well as of its object by prescribing its nature to it. But in his doctrine of the transcendental imagination Kant has also for the first time seen and realized in his thinking the

¹ *Nietzsche II*, p. 231.

² Cf. *Kants These ueber das Sein*, p. 18.

³ Cf. *Der ‚Satz vom Grund*, p. 137.

inventive or creative nature of Reason, as Heidegger points out,¹ thus preparing the way for the conception of Absolute Reason in the metaphysics of the German Idealists. “The categories of reason are horizons of imaginative creation (*Ausdichtung*) through which what is encountered is provided with a free and open area, placed within which, and from out of which, it becomes capable of appearing as something stable, as that winch stands opposite (*Gegenstand*).” Schematization is the essential creative core of Reason, of thinking as it appears in the form of reckoning and calculation to guarantee certitude in the realm of what is by positing it as object. Kant himself speaks of Being as what is posited in transcendental reflexion, in the representation of representation, thus conceiving Being in terms of an act of the human subjectivity. In this respect, Kant only follows to its logical end the Central tendency of the whole history of philosophy, i.e. the determination of Being regarded as presence in terms of thinking as a representation of what is.² But the Being of what is, not being itself an essent, cannot be grasped by representational thinking, nor itself be adequately characterized in terms of constant presence, of simple givenness, of the ‘is’. Hence the need to reopen the question of Being again and to explore the possibility of giving utterance to it, not in terms of thinking, nor of an essent of any kind but in terms of its own self, i.e. of the temporality that has been lying concealed with in the view of Being as constant presence.

With all his subjectivism, Kant never lost sight of the finitude of Reason and of man's knowledge, a finitude which is not due merely, or primarily, to the fact that human knowledge is

¹ *Nietzsche I*, p. 584.

² Cf. *Kants These ueber des Sein*, in which Heidegger discusses Kant's statement that Being is not a real predicate but the pure positing of a thing (Critique of Pure Reason, A 598, B 626).

subject to fickleness, inaccuracy and error. Finitude Heidegger points out,¹ is inherent in the very essence of knowledge, for man's knowledge is not, like divine knowledge, intuitively *originarius* (creative knowledge) but is necessarily receptive and dependent upon something given to it and, therefore, also in need of the activity of thinking. "Thinking as such is hence the seal of finitude." The attack against the thing-in-itself, which Reason cannot assimilate into itself and upon which it is dependent, launched by the German Idealists, is based on a growing forgetfulness of Kant's basic insight into the finitude of man's knowledge. The latter, in turn, results in the transformation of metaphysics, expressive of man's need for ontological knowledge, i.e., of his finitude, into Logic as Hegel conceives it in the form of Absolute Knowledge: "Logic is hence to be conceived as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This is the realm of Truth as it is in and for itself, without any veil. Its content, one may therefore say, is the representation of God as He is in His eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit."² The quest for the real as the other to thought culminates here in the undisputed sovereignty of thought as the only reality, with nothing to limit it and completely transparent to itself and so in full possession of truth, indeed as Truth itself.

Philosophy, Hegel said, comes to port, the secure haven of self-consciousness, with Descartes.³ But, as Heidegger remarks⁴, it comes into full possession of the land, where it has since made itself at home, only with Hegel, who conceives the unshakable certitude of thought as the Absolute itself. Philosophy, according

¹ *Kant*, p. 31.

² *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, p. 31.

³ The following account is based on Heidegger's essay, *Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung* in *Holzwege*, a commentary on the sixteen paragraphs of Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Phenomenology of Mind*.

⁴ *Holzwege*, p. 118.

to Hegel, is the actual knowledge of what truly is, actual being understood in the sense of the Aristotelian interpretation of presence as *energeia*, subsequently transformed into *aetualitas* and objectivity and the latter understood as spirit and self-consciousness. Real or actual knowledge is absolute knowledge of the Absolute in its absoluteness, i.e. the certitude of the spirit in its unconditioned self-awareness. The Absolute is not something external to knowledge, regarded as a means—instrument or medium—for grasping it. The Absolute is already present with us and our attempt to know it is already illuminated by its *parousia*. For Hegel, philosophy is science or ascertained knowledge (*Wissenschaft*), the unconditioned certitude of knowledge in self-consciousness. The subjectivity of the subject lies in its representational relation to the object and so to itself. Representation presents the object by representing it to the subject, a representation in which the subject as such presents itself. The absolute self-certitude of such presence (in presentation) is the absoluteness of the Absolute, the absolute certainty of Spirit as self-consciousness, which is realized in philosophy as absolute knowledge or science. Truth, understood previously as correspondence and so as an attribute of representation, becomes with Hegel certitude and identical with representing itself. Knowledge, with its certitude immanent in itself, severs itself from its relation to objects; representation liberates and absolves itself completely, as Heidegger puts it, from its objective reference and in this independence of self-representation attains to total absoluteness.

The Phenomenology of Mind, which give an exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon (appearing in the original sense of *phainesthai*), does not describe so much the passage of the mind from the natural consciousness to absolute knowledge and is not so

much, Heidegger says, an *itinerarium mentis in Deum* as itself a manifestation of ascertained knowledge, as the emergence of Science itself. Hegel's distinction between the natural consciousness and real knowledge does not imply, according to Heidegger, that the former is 'mere' appearance ; it is the consciousness which is untrue, not in the sense of being false or illusory, but as the not yet perfectly true, being driven forward towards its own truth by the power of the will of the Absolute. The natural consciousness is itself a mode of knowledge (*Bewusstsein* = being in the state of having known) and as consciousness, it is presence (Being) in the mode of a gathering together of representations, i.e. as subjectivity. It is not real knowledge in the sense that it represents only the essent, paying no heed to the essent in its Being. But the natural consciousness is able to represent the essent only because, without explicitly knowing it, it has already represented to itself the Being of essents in a general and indeterminate way. As opposed to actual knowledge, which has the Being of essents as its object, it is only, as Hegel says, a notion of knowledge, not real knowledge assured of the actuality of the actual. The natural consciousness, Heidegger asserts, is not necessarily coincident with the sensuous consciousness; it is a confinement, not to the perceptual, but to any kind of immediate object it may represent, be it the non-sensible entities of logic and reason, be it the supersensible entities of the spirit. Representation as such is the hall-mark of the natural consciousness. Consciousness itself is neither the natural consciousness taken by itself nor real knowledge taken by itself but the original unity of both, in and for itself. Consciousness itself is the unrest of its own self-differentiation into natural and real knowing and thus contains *in itself, itself* is, the principle of its movement beyond the natural.

The object of consciousness, as immediately present in representation and without any reference to the act or agent of the representation is called by Hegel Being, which for him means the essent.

Being in this sense is for him what is not yet, really and in truth. Being has for him always this narrow sense of 'mere Being' because what truly is, is the *ens actu*, the actual, of which the actuality consists in the knowledge of the certitude fully aware of itself; the latter alone 'is' the true and the whole Reality. Being, supposed to have been left behind in absolute knowledge thus comes back again, though, as Heidegger comments, Hegelian 'Science' takes no notice of this fact. In contra- distinction to Hegel's usage, Heidegger uses the word 'Being' for what Hegel calls objectivity, with Kant, as well as for what he conceives to be the truly actual and what he calls the actuality of time spirit. As he remarks,¹ "We interpret the *einai*, Being, of the Greeks not like Hegel in terms of its view as the objectivity of the immediate representation of a subjectivity that has not yet found itself, i.e. not in terms of subjectivity, but in terms of the Greek *aletheia*, as presence in and through unhiddenness," a presence (*ousia*, *Anwesen*) which has its basis in an as yet unthought character of time of which the true nature has yet to reveal itself. As Heidegger remarks, according to his own usage Hegel should not, strictly speaking, apply the word Being, as he is inevitably led to do, to time reality of the real, to the spirit which, for him, is self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusst-sein*, *being-self-conscious*). Being, in Heidegger's sense, discloses itself in Hegel, at the same time concealing its own truth, as the absoluteness of the Absolute.

¹ Ibid, p. 142

Hegel realizes that the distinctions between knowing and its object, between the object and its objectivity, between knowing and the knowledge of this knowing, all fall within consciousness itself. But, Heidegger points out, because Hegel's thinking moves within the sphere of metaphysical representation, he is unable to grasp the real significance of these distinctions, ultimately traceable to the unnoticed ambiguity of the *on* (which means both the essent and its Being) on which metaphysics itself is based. In terms of his own distinction between the ontic and the ontological, Heidegger designates the natural consciousness as the ontic consciousness, primarily concerned with representing the essent, its immediate object. "But," he says,¹ "representing the object is at the same time representing it, though without explicit awareness, as object. This consciousness lies gathered together the object in its objectivity and is therefore ontological. But, while representing the object it does not direct itself to objectivity as such; the natural consciousness is ontological and yet not quite such. We may, therefore describe the ontic consciousness as pre-ontological. As such, the natural consciousness is the implicit distinction between the ontically true and ontological truth." Consciousness is itself as this distinction and hence, as natural, not cut off from the ontological but resting on it, and yet confined mostly to the ontic, not going behind to the truth of its true object, the essent. This truth, underlying its true immediate object, is indeed not something hidden behind or under the object, as Heidegger puts it, but is rather the prior, fore-given horizon of light within which objects can at all show themselves and be known as such. What Hegel calls the self-examination of consciousness is the process of continuous comparison between the ontic and the pre-ontological by which consciousness comes to its own real Being as fully

¹ Ibid, p. 163.

manifest ontological consciousness This is the dialectical movement which consciousness executes on itself-on its knowledge as well as on its object in the sense that out of it the new and true object arises, which Hegel calls experience.¹ This is Hegel's term for the Being of 'what is', the full presence, appearance or epiphany of consciousness, of the subjectivity of the subject. The basic feature of consciousness is to be already what, at the same time, it is not yet, to hold itself in the not- yet of the already, to be on its way to that. As Heidegger puts it, "The Being (presence) of consciousness consists in its self moving character. The Being which Hegel conceives as experience is fundamentally characterized by movement."² This movement is dialectical in the sense of a continuing dialogue between the natural and the real, between the ontic and the ontological knowledge, through end as which consciousness gathers itself together and realizes itself in its complete truth, the absolute notion. The movement culminates in experience, the self-manifestation of consciousness as self-representation, "the presentation of the absolute subject as representation, and thus as absolving itself fully." Experience, Heidegger continues, "is the subjectivity of the absolute subject. Experience is the presentation of absolute representation and as such the *parousia* (complete presence) of the Absolute. Experience is the absoluteness of the Absolute," the way consciousness is as presence and appearance. Experiencing is the mode in which consciousness sets forth on its ascent to its own notion—as what it truly is, reaching out for and attaining to its truth, in which consummation its own nature as appearance shines forth. "Experiencing is a mode of presence, i.e., of Thing. Through experience, emergent consciousness comes into its own presence, abiding in itself as thus emerging forth. Experience gathers

¹ Cf. *The phenomenology of Mind*, trans. by Baillie, p. 142.

² *Holzirege*, p. 167.

consciousness together into the collectedness of its own essence... the truth of what is true, the Being of what is, the shining forth of what emerges."¹ In experience thus conceived, there is reversal (*Umkehrung*, turning round) of consciousness from the habitual representation of what appears to its appearance, from the essent to its Being, a reversal or conversion which is due to our own agency (*unsere Zutat*) in the sense that, setting aside our private opinions and predilections, we let that which appears (consciousness) shine forth by itself and appear as it is in its own Being, impelled by the Absolute which, as Will, realizes itself in experience. The exposition of the experience of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Mind* is itself the fulfillment of the Absolute's will a manifestation of the way man is related in his essence to the Absolute, as fulfilling its will, part of the Absolute's *parousia*.

According to Heidegger, the exposition of the emergence of absolute knowledge in the *Phenomenology* represents Hegel's ontology of the actual consciousness in its actuality, of the subject as subject, i.e., of the true essent as Hegel conceives it in its wholeness. The Science or absolute knowledge of which this is only a part leads on to its proper completion in his *Science of Logic*, which exhibits, Heidegger says, not the self-manifestation of the Absolute, but how the Absolute is present to itself in its absoluteness, the self-comprehension of the Absolute in absolute notion. This is the theology (or theiology, as Heidegger prefers to call it) of the Absolute. The Science of the Absolute, Heidegger says,² is for Hegel, about the time when the *Phenomenology of Mind* was first published, "the onto-theological knowledge of the true essent as essent. In its entirety, it unfolds itself in its two aspects in the *Science of the Phenomenology of Mind* and in the

¹ Ibid, p. 170.

² Ibid, p. 184.

Science of Logic. Hegel's *Science of Logic* is at this time conceived as the Theology of the Absolute and not as Ontology. The form taken by the latter is the *Science of the Experience of Consciousness* (the title under which the *Phenomenology* was first published in 1807). The *Phenomenology* is the 'first Science', the *Logic* the Science proper, within the first philosophy, constituting the truth of essents as such. This Truth is of the essence of metaphysics. "Hegel dropped the first title of the *Phenomenology*, Heidegger suggests, perhaps because he shrank back from acknowledging the original force of the word 'experience', with its suggestion of reaching out and arriving, a mode of presence, of *einai*, of Being." The term 'phenomenology', which was substituted for it, carries, nevertheless, the same meaning: the *phainesthai*, the self-emergence or appearance of the absolute subject, the spirit. The *Phenomenology of the Mind* is the appearance of the Spirit, as gathered together in the dialogue between the ontic and the ontological consciousness, in its *parousia*.

Both the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* are, Heidegger points out, theologies of the Absolute, the first, of the Absolute in its *parousia* (i.e. its presence with us) and the second, of the Absolute in its absoluteness. And both are ontologies, worldly, inasmuch as they represent the worldliness of the world, the essent (conceived as subjectivity) in its totality. But, as Heidegger remarks, "the science of absolute knowledge is not the worldly theology of the world because it secularizes the Christian Church theology but because it is itself implied in the very essence of ontology." Hegel's metaphysics demonstrates the metaphysical character of theology itself and provides confirmation of the essentially onto-theological character of metaphysics, as it has developed since the age of the Greeks. True to the metaphysical

tradition, Hegel's thinking is concerned, as Heidegger points out,¹ with the essent as such and as a whole, with the movement of Being from its emptiness and abstraction to its concrete fullness. Like all metaphysic, it thinks the essent as such, i.e. in general, conceived as the most universal basic to which one can penetrate; and it thinks the essent in its totality and its Being as the unity of this whole, conceived as the foundation on which all that is can be grounded, i.e. as the highest Being. It is ontology and theology in one- the logos of the most universal Being and of the highest (*theion*). For Hegel, the true Science or metaphysics is 'Logic', not because it has thought for its theme, but because for him, too, the main concern of thinking is with Being, as presence, in the form of the ancient *Logos*, the ground which provides the foundation, with Being conceived as ground.

Hegel declares that the goal of philosophy, in its dialectical progress from the abstract universal, Being, to the full concreteness of Absolute spirit, is truth, finally reached in his own Science.² Taking truth in the sense of the absolute certitude of the self-knowledge of the absolute subject, Hegel does not realize that just this certitude itself is dependent upon truth in a more fundamental sense, upon truth understood as disclosure or unhiddenness, *aletheia*. Whether in the initial emergence and manifestation of Spirit as pure Being or in the final self-manifestation of Spirit as Absolute Idea, truth as prior disclosure or unhiddenness must already be presupposed. And this leads, Heidegger says, to "the further question whether the unhiddenness has its seat in spirit, conceived as absolute subject, or whether, on the contrary, unhiddenness is itself the locus and a pointer to the location in winch alone such a thing as a representing subject can 'be' what it

¹ See, *Identitaet und Differenz*, pp. 54-55.

² See for this paragraph, *Hegel und die Griechen* in the *Gadamer-Festschrift*.

is”¹ Thinking of historical reality in terms of Being conceived as absolute subjectivity and approaching it in the speculative, dialectical manner, Hegel, despite his taking ‘the kingdom of pure truth’ as the goal of philosophy, is debarred from the awareness that truth in the primordial sense of unhiddenness (*aletheia*) still remains the Unthought of philosophy, the mystery that it has always been. “Hegel takes Being, when he conceives it as indeterminate immediacy, as what is posited by the determining, conceiving subject. Accordingly, he cannot allow Being, in the Greek sense of *einai*, to be detached from its connection with the subject and bet it free in its own essence. The latter, however, is presence i.e. a coming out of concealment into unhiddenness, into presence.”² *Aletheia*, which has its sway even before philosophy proper begins, still remains a mystery. Being can reveal itself as presence only with the prior occurrence of unhiddenness. But the latter, *aletheia*, still remains unthought in its essence.³

Hegel’s metaphysics of absolute knowledge as Spirit, according to Heidegger, marks the beginning of the last stage in the development of metaphysical thought but not yet its final consummation. Although unconditioned certitude has come into its own in Hegel as absolute actuality, the will, implicit in the conception of Reality since Leibniz and implied in Kant’s as well as Hegel’s concept of Reason, is yet to emerge explicitly and be acknowledged expressly as the Being of what is.⁴ The

¹ Ibid, p. 53.

² Ibid, p. 54.

³ As with all the other philosophers considered in this chapter, only an outline of the way Heidegger interprets Hegel is given here. The wider question of his relation to Hegel, to Plato and Aristotle, to Medieval thought and Christianity, to Kant and Nietzsche cannot be dealt with here. How much of the thought of the past, and in what form, is alive in Heidegger’s own philosophy is also a question for the future. For Heidegger’s relation to Hegel in particular, cf. Jan van der Meulen, *Heidegger und Hegel* (2nd ed., 1954).

⁴ Cf. *Vortraege und Aufsaeetze*, pp. 76, 114.

consummation of metaphysics, the ultimate stage of its development, occurs in the thinking of Nietzsche, with whom the possibilities latent in metaphysics since its Platonic inception are fully explored and exhausted. The full implications of the awareness, present in Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, that the Will constitutes the Being of all that is drawn out and carried to their logical conclusion by Nietzsche, who saw, and thought through, as no thinker before him, the dark shadow cast over the present and the coming world-history by the Nihilism inherent in the metaphysical (i.e. the Platonic-Christian) tradition of the West. He conceived his own work as a reaction against and an overcoming of metaphysics, a fight against Platonism. But, like all counter movement, like everything 'anti-', as Heidegger puts it, it remains itself necessarily stuck up in what it attacks. "Nietzsche's counter-move against metaphysics is, as its mere inversion, itself ensnared in metaphysics, inextricably and without a way out left; it has cut itself off from its own essence and, as itself metaphysical, become incapable of recognizing its own essential nature."¹ Nietzsche's philosophy is itself a manifestation of the last epoch of metaphysics, the entire history of which is itself one long drawn out epoch in the history of Being and of the way Being has revealed and dispensed itself to man through its own withdrawal.

Seeking to take Nietzsche seriously as a thinker, not just as one who philosophized existentially (which, Heidegger says, he never did), Heidegger finds that his thinking is no less pointed, detached and stringent than the thinking of Aristotle. "The

¹ *Holzwege*, p. 200; cf. *Platons Lehre*, p. 37: "The concept of value, emerging in the 19th century as the inner consequence of the modern conception of truth, is the latest as well the weakest off-spring of the agathon... In so far as Nietzsche's thought is dominated by the idea of value without awareness of its metaphysical origin, Nietzsche is also the most unbridled Platonist in the history of Western metaphysics."

customary, but none the less questionable, juxtaposition of Nietzsche with Kierkegaard,” Heidegger remarks,¹ “fails to recognize, due to a failure to appreciate the true nature of thinking, that as a metaphysical thinker Nietzsche has his place secure near Aristotle,” which cannot he said about Kierkegaard, although the latter refers to Aristotle more frequently. It is widely held that Nietzsche is not a strict thinker but a poet-philosopher; that he cannot be counted among the philosophers, who excogitate only abstractions, shadowy and remote from life; that if he is at all to be called a philosopher he must be regarded as a ‘philosopher of life’ (*Lebensphilosoph*), who has at last done away with abstract thinking. This estimate of Nietzsche, Heidegger holds, is utterly mistaken. It was Nietzsche who said, “Abstract thinking is for many hard and a torture, for me, on favourable days, a feast and an intoxication.” Nietzsche's philosophy, despite its aphoristic style and unsystematic form, is metaphysics and has its place on “the long course of the age-old leading question of philosophy: What is the essent?”² The diverse themes which recur in his thought are linked together by an inner unity and, Heidegger believes, constitute a meaningful pattern which in essence is metaphysical. This, of course, can be seen only if we look at Nietzsche's thought from the perspective of the history of Being, a perspective which was not available to Nietzsche and which, in fact, is accessible only to a thinking that has taken the leap out of metaphysical thinking and so can see in Nietzsche the final culmination of such thinking.

Heidegger sums up the central concepts of Nietzsche's philosophy in five basic key-terms in his thinking.³ These are **The Will to Power; Nihilism; the Eternal Recurrence of the Same;**

¹ *Holzwege*, p. 230.

² *Nietzsche I*, pp. 12 and 14.

³ See, for the following, the essay entitled *Nietzsches Metaphysik* in *Nietzsche II*.

the Superman and Justice. Metaphysics is the truth of essents as such in their totality. This truth is the unhiddenness of the ‘what’ of the essent (the *essentia* or *Seiendheit*, being-ness) as well as of its ‘that’ (the *existentia*, that and how the essent as a whole is). Further, the truth of essents appears in varying forms, depending on the way the essent is conceived from time to time, being thus historical in its very nature. Finally, according to the way truth appears in any period of its history, it requires a type of humanity which corresponds to it, establishes it, makes it known and preserves. In Nietzsche’s metaphysics, Heidegger says, “The Will to Power names the Being of essents as such, the *essentia* of essents. ‘Nihilism’ is the name for the history of the truth of essents as thus determined. The ‘Eternal Recurrence of the Same is the way the essent as a whole is, the *existentia* of essents. The ‘Superman’ refers to the type of men demanded by this whole (as conformable and adequate to it). ‘Justice’ is the essential character of the truth of essents as Will to Power.”¹ Each of these concepts involves the others and must be understood with reference to them. They constitute, in their unity, Nietzsche’s metaphysics, his vision of the truth of essents as such in their totality.

The Will to Power, Nietzsche says, is “the innermost essence of Being.”² Will here must be understood, hence, not in the psychological sense of a mental faculty, but metaphysically, as the basic character, the Being, of the essent, as such, in terms of which Nietzsche comprehends all essents, physical or mental. The will is not any sort of wishing or striving but, fundamentally and in essence, commanding. It is again not something separate and external to power, and the latter is not a goal which the will seeks to attain as something outside it. Both together constitute an

¹ *Nietzsche II*, p. 260.

² Cf. Chapters I (*Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst*) and III (*Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis*) of *Nietzsche I* for detailed treatment of the Will to power.

indivisible unity, the will to power being the essential character of power itself, which is never a final possession but ceaselessly tends to exceed itself, which is as such constant self-enhancement. Power is always, therefore, for more power, power over power, and the will essentially the Will to will. Concerned with its own preservation and increase, the will to power prescribes for itself the conditions which render this possible. The process of Becoming, the movement towards more power inherent in the will to power, secures itself by setting up 'points of view', outlooks, which can be counted upon, and must be reckoned with-the will to power is, as Nietzsche calls it, intrinsically 'perspectivistic. These points of view are measures and quantities, i.e. values; the 'seeing' characteristic of the will to power is by its very nature a reckoning with values. Value is essentially the point of view employed by "the commanding-calculating seeing of the will to power." Such points of view condition the complex fabric of science (knowledge), art, politics and religion, shapes taken by the will to power, which may, in turn, be themselves called value-structures. "The Will to Power is, in accordance with its innermost nature, a perspectivistic reckoning with the conditions of its possibility, which are as such set up by itself. The Will to Power is in itself value-positing."¹ It is a will that wills values and is itself the valuation principle, and hence the thinking which takes the truth of things as will to power is necessarily a thinking in terms of values. "The metaphysics of the Will to Power- and only that- is properly and necessarily a thinking in terms of values... In such value-thinking consists the self-consciousness of the Will to Power... Value-thinking is implied in the way the Will to Power is itself, the

¹ *Nietzsche II*, p. 272.

subiectum.... The Will to Power reveals itself as the subjectivity of which the distinctive mark is evaluative thinking.”¹

Plato, with whom metaphysics begins, conceived the Being of the essent as idea, the principle of the unity what is diverse, and at the same time the good, the enabling or the condition of the possibility of What is.² The ideas, which alone truly are, belong to the super-sensible realm and viewed from Nietzsche’s metaphysical position they are values. The essent as such in its totality is comprehended in terms of the supersensible- whether understood as the God of Christianity, as the moral law, as Reason, as progress or as the happiness of the Many, the Ideal or, from Nietzsche’s point of view, the highest values. All metaphysics is Platonism and Christianity, including its modern secularized forms, is ‘Platonism for the people’. Taking the concept of value as the clue to his historical reflection on metaphysics, the basis of Western history, Nietzsche interprets and examines metaphysics in terms of the Will to Power as the sole principle of valuation. He regards all metaphysics as a system of values, but without explicit recognition of the Will to Power as the supreme principle. Hence he conceives his own metaphysics of the Will to Power as providing the “principle of a new scheme of values,” involving a “revaluation of past values.” Such revaluation constitutes the ultimate character of Nihilism. According to Nietzsche, Nihilism means the devaluing of the highest values. In Heidegger’s words, “Nihilism is the process of the devaluation of the highest values prevailing hitherto. The annulment of these values is the collapse of what has hitherto been taken as the truth about the essent as such in its totality the fundamental happening in the Western

¹ Ibid, p. 272.

² On Nihilism, cf. *Nietzsche II*, Chapters V (*Der Europäische Nihilismus*), and VII (*Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus*); also the essay, *Nietzsches Wort "Gott ist Tot"* (in *Holzwege*) and *Zur Seinsfrage*.

history, a history of which metaphysics has been the foundation and guiding principle. In so far as metaphysics has received its peculiar theological mould through Christianity, this devaluation must also be expressed theologically, in the words, "God is dead,"¹ where 'God' means the supersensible realm in general, the true, eternal world, beyond this earthly one, as the real and only goal, both as conceived by Christian faith and in its secularized form (Conscience, Reason, Progress, the Social Instinct). But though the devaluation of the highest values, the vanishing of all value from the world, is part of the Nihilistic process and the fundamental happening in the history of the West, it does not yet exhaust the full essence of Nihilism. The collapse of the highest values prevailing hitherto demands the setting up of new ones, a revaluation of all values. Hence, Nihilism does not stop short at mere nullity but has a liberating, affirmative character. As a historical process, "Nihilism is a devaluation of the hitherto highest values, aiming at the thorough revaluation of all values"; it implies the total rejection of past values and a grounding of the essent as a whole on entirely different conditions. But, Heidegger points out, "even with this recognition of the affirmative character of European Nihilism we do not come to its innermost core; for Nihilism is neither just one historical occurrence nor even the central feature of Western history, but is itself the law of this history, its 'logic'."² As such, Nihilism manifests itself in a series of stages, beginning with Pessimism, the preliminary form of Nihilism, with its two sub-forms, the pessimism of the weak and the pessimism of the strong. 'Incomplete Nihilism' denies indeed the values hitherto taken as the highest, but only puts new ideals in the place of the old (Communism in place of primitive

¹ *Nietzsche II*, p. 275; cf. also, *Karl-Heinz Volkman-Schuck: Zur Gottesfrage bei Nietzsche in Anteile-Martin Heidegger zum 60. Geburtstag.*

² *Ibid*, PP. 277, 278.

Christianity, ; Wagner's music in place of dogmatic Christianity), without abandoning that 'place', the self-subsisting super-sensible dimension, itself. For 'extreme' or complete Nihilism then' are no self-subsistent eternal truths whatever. Extreme Nihilism, in so far as it remains content with such negation, remains 'passive', whereas 'active' Nihilism, rejecting both this world as well as the ideal, super-sensible world, goes on to affirm a new principle of valuation and as truly liberating man from the bondage of the old, is characterized by Nietzsche as 'ecstatic Nihilism.' "Despite the appearance of being merely negative, it affirms, neither anything given nor an ideal, but rather the 'principle of valuation' itself, the Will to Power," thus becoming full-fledged and complete, 'classical' Nihilism, as which Nietzsche understands his own metaphysics. Revaluation for Nietzsche does not mean, Heidegger remarks, "that in the old and the same place of the hitherto prevailing values new ones are set up; the term means, in the first place and always, that the place itself is determined anew." It is through the "revaluation" that, for the first time, values are conceived as values, i.e. as the conditions of the Will to Power. The revaluation is, strictly speaking, a re-thinking of the essent as such in its totality in terms of 'values'.

According to Nietzsche's doctrine, the total worth of the world cannot be evaluated, for it makes no sense to speak of the total value of the essent as a whole which, as Will to Power, sets up values as the condition of its own maintenance and increase.¹ In itself it is worth-less, having no intrinsic meaning, aim or purpose. This, however, must be understood not in a merely negative sense but as asserting something positive about how the essent as a whole is: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same. This "most difficult

¹ On the Eternal Recurrence, cf. the detailed treatment in Chapter II (*Die Ewig Wiederkehr des Gleichen*) and in Chapter IV (*Die Wiederkunft des Gleichen und der Wille zur Macht*) of Nietzsche (in Vols. 1 and 2 respectively).

of all thoughts”, as Nietzsche calls it, must be grasped in its inseparable connection with the Will to Power, as characterizing, together with the latter, the essent as a whole. As Heidegger expresses it, “The essent, which as such has the fundamental nature of the Will to Power, can be, as a whole, only the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. And conversely, the essent, which as a whole is the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, must as essent have the fundamental character of the Will to Power.”¹ The values or ends set up by the Will to Power are not something “in themselves”, outside this Will, with the attainment of which it can come to rest these ends, points of resistance or hindrance essential for the operation of power, are set up by the will and are immanent in it. The Will to power as power beyond power is intrinsically a perpetual return into itself, giving thus to the essent as a whole, i.e. to the process of Becoming, its unique state of movement, not directed towards any ultimate goal extraneous to itself, and yet ceaselessly moving towards self-imposed ends and so ever returning to itself. Further, the essent as a whole, conceived in its Being as Will to Power, must be a fixed quantity because power, with ceaseless increment inherent in it, cannot increase infinitely in the absence of any surplus, as Heidegger puts it, beyond itself, from which it can feed itself. The world, as power, must not be conceived, Nietzsche says, as unlimited, for it cannot be so conceived, the concept of infinite power being self-contradictory. The world is incapable of eternal novelty. Since the essent as such is conceived as Will to Power and hence as eternal becoming which advances towards no pre-determined goal beyond it, and since this eternal becoming is limited as to the possible forms and power-structures in which, as Will, it can manifest itself, therefore, the essent regarded as the Will to Power must be, as a whole, a

¹ *Nietzsche II*, p. 284.

perpetual return of the same. This circular movement, “the primordial law of the essents as a whole”, is the mode of presence (Being) of what is as such ever varying or becoming, but in a way that guarantees the utmost constancy and invariability as a whole. As Heidegger remarks, the Eternal Return is the most unvarying perpetuation of what is ceaselessly varying. In Nietzsche's doctrine, the conception of Being as constant presence, as old as metaphysics, appears in the guise of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. “To set the stamp of Being on Becoming- in this lies the highest Will to Power,” as Nietzsche says, adding, “that everything returns is the utmost approximation of a world of Becoming to one of Being.” The conception of the Eternal Recurrence of the same, the summit of Nietzsche's metaphysical vision, is, as the truth about the essent in its totality, neither a merely personal experience of this thinker, with its validity confined within the limits of a personal view, nor is it amenable to scientific, empirical demonstration. The Will to Power itself, the basic character of the essent as such, and not a ‘Mr. Nietzsche’, as Heidegger puts it, sets up and determines the thought of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same.¹

Nietzsche's conception of the Superman or Overman (as Walter Kaufmann translates *Uebersensch* in his *Nietzsche*, finding the English ‘superman’ misleading) has nothing to do with a supersensible ideal of humanity, nor does it announce the

¹ For a more detailed account of this central concept of Nietzsche's philosophy, see the brilliant Chapter II of *Nietzsche I*. As Heidegger remarks there (pp. 257-258), “Nietzsche's doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same is not just one theory about what is among others, it has developed as a result of the most bitter argument with the Platonic-Christian mode of thinking and with the way the latter has worked itself out and developed in the modern age. This mode of thinking is at the same time judged by Nietzsche as the distinctive feature of Western thought and of its history in general.” For a criticism of Heidegger's views on this doctrine, cf. Karl Loewith: *Nietzsches Philosophic der Ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen*, pp. 222-225.

impending emergence somewhere of a 'supra-human' personality.¹ It is not, Heidegger says, the product of the arrogance of a 'Mr. Nietzsche' and it does not mean the crudely magnified capriciousness of the deeds of violence in the manner common to humanity so far. As against a mere inflating and carrying beyond all bounds of man in his existing character, the Overman marks a reversal of the hitherto prevailing nature of man. The Overman, in Heidegger's words, is man nihilistically reversed. He is the type of man who corresponds metaphysically to Nietzsche's vision of the essent, which is as such the Will to Power and in its totality the Eternal Return of the Same. The Overman is the complete negation of the man of the past, of man as shaped by the Platonic worldview and Christian morality, but it is a negation that springs from the affirmation of the Will to Power. In the epoch of 'metaphysics', man is conceived as, and is, in consequence of the way he is related to Being, the rational animal. The Overman represents a denial of this nature of man, but it is a nihilistic denial of this nature in the sense that it merely reverses the relative positions of rationality and animality, making Reason a mere tool in the service of the latter. The metaphysical emergence, in Hegel, of Reason as absolute subjectivity, i.e. as the Being of what is, prepares the ground for the total, nihilistic inversion of the role of Reason in Nietzsche. "The nihilistic denial of the metaphysical primacy, determining what is to count as being, of unconditioned Reason—not its complete rejection—is the affirmation of the unconditioned role of the body as the warrant and point of reference for all interpretation of the world."² The will, inherent previously in Reason as representing and in its service, now emerges as dominant, with Reason subservient to it as calculative

¹ On the Superman, see also *Wer ist Nietzsches Zerathustra?* in *Vortraege and Aufsätze*.

² *Nietzsche II*, p. 300.

thought and evaluation. It is transformed into the Will to Power, its own sole law-giver and the Being of all that is. The subjectivity of the Absolute spirit, though unconditioned, was yet incomplete, but the inversion of rational subjectivity into the subjectivity of the Will is its final consummation. The reversal of rational subjectivity of unconditioned representation into the subjectivity of the Will to Power is the overthrow of the primacy of Reason as the guiding principle and arbiter for the conception of what is, a phenomenon described by Nietzsche as the death of the God, of Christian morality. The Overman is the necessary consequence of this ultimate, completed subjectivity. With the collapse of the supersensible realm in general, there remains, in the midst of essents as such and as a whole, only man who, as the ultimate subject and sole embodiment of representing, value-positing Will, must offer himself to the Will to Power as the abode of its pure presence. The Overman, going beyond the man of the past, is the subject in whom the pure essence of the Will to Power finds its dwelling ; in willing itself, the Will to Power must will its own highest condition, the Overman. Man as he was up till now was characterized by Reason as his distinctive mark and was therefore 'the animal not yet fixed in his nature', but as the Overman, with his animality as itself the very essence of the Will to Power, he is at last defined and established in his true nature, the prototype of a humanity in accord with the essent conceived as the unconditioned, completed subjectivity of the Will to Power, fitted for absolute mastery over the earth. The Overman is the guardian and the repository of the truth of the essent as such and in its totality, as this truth is determined by the Will to Power and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same.

In Nietzsche's subjectivistic thinking, Truth retains its character of certitude and permanence but in conformity with his

nihilistic revaluation, it ceases to be a super-sensible light and becomes, as a condition of the Will to Power, a value.¹ Truth, for him, is a value necessary for the Will to Power and, as producing the illusion of permanence in what is ever a becoming, it is a kind of error. As the condition of the maintenance of the Will to Power, truth is necessary but not sufficient, for the Will to Power is primarily the will, not merely to the retention of power but to its incessant enhancement. For the latter, art alone suffices and hence, for Nietzsche, “art is of greater value than Truth.” As ‘error’, truth also continues to be understood in his thinking as a kind of correspondence. But the original character of truth as *aletheia*, unrecognized but still implicitly present in all modern thought in a changed, perverted and disguised form, also shines through in Nietzsche’s conception of art. The modern liberation of man from truth as certitude of salvation, leading man to seek assurance in himself, shows its real, full nature in the metaphysics of the Will to Power, with the final overthrow of creative Reason bearing the stamp of the logos- the divine creative power- of Christian theology. Man’s new freedom now finds assurance and justification in a new kind of righteousness or justness, a manifestation of the Will to Power itself as setting up conditions of its own preservation and enhancement. In Nietzsche, as Heidegger puts it, Righteousness (*Gerechtigkeit*), “because it is the highest mode of the Will to Power, is the real basis for the determination of the nature of truth. In the metaphysics of the unconditioned and complete subjectivity of the Will to Power, truth exhibits itself as ‘righteousness’.” In Nietzsche’s sense of this term, however, all its associations deriving from Christian, humanistic morality must be excluded. Keeping in view the fact that in the metaphysics of the

¹ Cf. *Nietzsche I*, pp. 612-616, for Nietzsche’s conception of Truth, where righteousness is also discussed in the section entitled, *Die Wahrheit als Gerechtigkeit*.

Will to Power the right can only be what the Will sets up for its Own perpetuation, we must understand righteousness as a pure function of Power. "Looking out beyond the petty arid narrow perspectives of good and bad", prevailing thus far, righteousness opens out the wholly new point of view from which man is seen as pushing on to absolute mastery over the earth. Nietzsche himself, Heidegger points out, never explicitly realized that and how righteousness is the aspect in which he conceives truth, i.e. the unhiddenness by virtue of which the essent manifests itself as such and in its totality as the Will to Power and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. "The metaphysics of Unconditioned and complete subjectivity, without explicitly it saying it, thinks its own nature, i.e. the nature of truth, as righteousness. The truth of essents as such as a whole is accordingly truth about the essent but such that its own nature is determined by the basic character of the essent, i.e., by the Will to Power as its highest form."¹ Nietzsche's metaphysics is, as all metaphysics necessarily is, the truth of essents as such and as a whole in a double sense: truth about the essent because truth which itself derives from the Being of essents. Such truth is essentially historical in character, each of its historical manifestations depending upon the way Being reveals itself to thinkers in different ages.

With Nietzsche's philosophy, in which the tradition of Western thinking comes, an important sense, to a focus and fulfills itself, we come to the end of the metaphysical epoch in the history of that tradition. "The decisive question", Heidegger says, "for him who still can, indeed must, raise a philosophical question at all at the end of Western philosophy, is not the question about the basic character of the essent, how the Being of essents is to be characterized ; the question rather is : What is this Being itself? It

¹ *Nietzsche II*, p. 332.

is the question about ‘the sense of Being’, not merely about the Being of essents ; and ‘sense’, moreover, is defined precisely as that in terms of which and by virtue of which Being can at all reveal itself as such and become manifest in its truth.”¹ It is to what Heidegger has to say on this question that we, therefore, turn now.



¹ *Nietzsche II*, p. 26.